In the end, it’s clear that making a peace negotiation in Colombia these days is going to be much harder than it would have been in say, back in the 80’s (when drugs came into the picture with a bang, literally)…a pity.

The paramilitary talks do face those and other serious obstacles, which is why I’m beginning to consider that there’s a likely possibility they will eventually either crash and burn due to an intolerable act (on the part of either side or even the guerrillas), or simply dissolve into a meaningless mess that won’t survive Uribe’s term(s).

You are absolutely right that it’s impossible to imagine Salvatore Mancuso or Don Berna willingly handing in their weapons at the end of a negotiation, then going straight to jail. Perhaps this would be imaginable if the Colombian state, through military might, had weakened the AUC to the point where their leaders had no choice but to face justice. But it’s impossible to argue that the Colombian government has ever come close to that – there’s never been more than the occasional skirmish with AUC paramilitaries, and that after years of well-documented military-paramilitary collaboration.

What does accountability entail, then, if not jail? Several people scolded me in late 2002 after, in a memo about whether the paramilitary talks deserve U.S. support, I acknowledged the possibility that “some form of immunity from prosecution for most or all of the paramilitaries could be a condition of their disarmament.”

Friends in the human rights community responded with two very good points. First, Colombia has been through many “forgive and forget” peace agreements since the end of La Violencia, and the cycle of violence has just spiraled as people are forced to live alongside their loved ones’ and leaders’ amnestied killers. The argument holds that you cannot truly have peaceful conflict resolution without justice for human rights crimes. Second, many argue that the worldwide cause of human rights has progressed such that the amnesties that were part of past peace processes would represent a step backward. (People on the right also argue that because “the world changed after 9/11,” terrorist acts that may have been amnestied in the past are off the table now.)

These views are fully represented in the Senate’s version of the 2005 foreign aid bill, currently in conference committee awaiting final passage, which would prohibit any U.S. support for demobilizations if “the Colombian legal framework governing the demobilization of such groups” does not provide for “prosecution and punishment, in proportion to the crimes committed, of those responsible for gross violations of human rights and drug trafficking.” Meanwhile, as Steve Dudley’s good piece in Monday’s Miami Herald notes – and the M-19 controversy highlights – Colombians themselves have yet to agree on a workable definition of what is forgivable.

Still, I can think of no real example of a non-state armed group’s leaders agreeing to stand trial and jail unless they were facing defeat. The Uribe government has tried to split the difference with the weaker punishments envisioned in the modified “alternative penalties” bill currently stuck in Colombia’s Congress. These, however, have pleased almost nobody: the paramilitaries have rejected them as too much and the human rights community insists they are not enough.

In many other past cases, in which the non-state group still has some ability to keep fighting, peace processes have included an even weaker mechanism for “accountability”: the “truth and reconciliation commission.” This is usually a committee of dignitaries judged by both sides to be impartial and disinterested, often with the participation or imprimatur of the international community (such as the UN). The commission doesn’t have the power to hand out punishments, but the more effective ones have been able to name names – to assign responsibility to individuals for ordering some of the worst atrocities of the conflict.

Some observers, such as former Colombian Peace Commissioner Daniel García-Peña, have explored the possibility of a truth commission for Colombia’s talks with the paramilitaries. This – combined with a seizure and redistribution of all stolen paramilitary assets – may offer a way out. It would be a waste of everyone’s time, though, if such a commission were to name only the trigger-pullers, leaving the “intellectual authors” of crimes anonymous. A worthwhile commission would also take care to name military officers who facilitated or willfully ignored atrocities, and wealthy Colombians who willingly paid for the killers’ guns and salaries.

Even if that happens, a truth commission still wouldn’t please many people, because nobody would serve hard jail time. But by naming names and attaching eternal shame to the perpetrators, it holds some hope of halting the cycle of violence while still allowing a demobilization to proceed.

Is this CIP’s final position on the matter? No. But hopefully the discussion shows the direction of our thinking as we consider what kind of “accountability” is sufficient to merit U.S. support for the paramilitary talks. (Or, for that matter, U.S. support for any other peace initiative that progresses to the point where amnesty is a topic.)

And this, of course, is all without mentioning any of the other thorny obstacles the paramilitary talks face: extradition, cease-fire violations, possible “recycling” of former paramilitaries as state auxiliaries, and the likelihood that guerrillas will benefit from the paras’ absence, to name only a few…

Well, holding the AUC fully accountable, humans rights-wise, would be a poor decision at this moment. Every life that a partial cease-fire saves makes it worthy.

It’s hard to choose between “horrible” and “more horrible”, but sometimes that has to be done, when you aren’t strong enough to prevent those abuses yourself.

Pastrana didn’t even demand that the FARC make a similar partial cease-fire, but there were unilateral, temporary X-mas truces that saved an unknown number of lives, for a start.

And actually, as I said, I read the message differently. The Colombian government has made clear, not just when (wrongly) bringing up the M-19 example but in further interviews and communiques, that full amnesties (or almost full) aren’t going to work anymore. See the interview with Restrepo in EL TIEMPO, October 10, for example.

Full punishment isn’t going to be an attractive offer, neither for the FARC/ELN nor for the AUC, thus some sort of benefits do have to be offered, but nothing that amounts to a full amnesty.

However, once any workable deal is made, I’m sure that the paramilitaries and other criminals, both inside and outside the government, could well be brought to justice, if the international or Colombian opinion decides to do it.

For example, the militaries of Argentina and Chile had full pardons or immunities, which were necessary when they were made, but are now crumbling down and they’re getting what they deserve.