Bolivia’s president-elect, Evo Morales, paid a visit to Venezuela on Tuesday, as part of a “world tour†prior to his late January inauguration. There, he met with Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and with Ollanta Humala, a populist who holds a slim lead in polls for Peru’s April presidential elections. Chávez celebrated the formation of what he called a new “axis of good†in Latin America, and Morales said he and Chávez were uniting in “a fight against neoliberalism and imperialism.â€
The Bolivian president-elect did not leave empty-handed. In a signed agreement, Chávez committed Venezuela to providing Bolivia with the following:
- An immediate $30 million donation to pay for social programs.
- According to Bolivia’s La Razón newspaper, “Venezuela will supply all of the fuel that the Bolivian population consumes, which has an approximate cost of $150 million per year, in exchange for food produced in Bolivia.â€
- Technical assistance for gas and oil exploration, and assistance in overhauling Bolivia’s energy sector.
- A commitment to help Bolivia build highways, both within the country and between Bolivia and its neighbors.
- Educational assistance to Bolivia, including a literacy program with the goal of eradicating illiteracy within thirty months.
- Venezuelan assistance with land reform, agriculture and healthcare.
At a moment where most observers are wondering what kind of leftist Evo Morales is going to be – a Chávez or a Lula, to use the oversimplified terms used often here in Washington – this package of aid is likely to mean a big push in Venezuela’s direction.
What is the U.S. government doing to counteract this, to keep Morales and the MAS from abandoning the center, and to keep relations cordial and constructive? U.S. relations with Morales have traditionally been horrible, as one would expect relations to be between a coca-growers’ movement leader and the main promoter of forced coca eradication.
For now, U.S. officials are taking a “wait and see†attitude. “We’ll see what kinds of policies President Morales pursues and, based on that, we’ll see what kind of relationship the United States and Bolivia will have,†State Department spokesman Sean McCormack said on Tuesday. Before leaving for Venezuela, Morales and U.S. Ambassador David Greenlee even sat down for an hour for their first-ever conversation.
That’s nice, but when Chávez is promising Morales cash, social programs and fuel, what is the U.S. counter-offer?
Well, there is none. In fact, it’s worse. Here’s what the U.S. government has to offer Bolivia (and what it would have offered to any other Bolivian candidate, had he won).
- A projected $8.5 million, or 5 percent, cut in aid (military plus economic) from 2004 to 2006, from $157.8 million to $149.3 million.
- From that amount, a cutoff of at least $2.6 million in military aid and up to $8 million in economic aid per year, because Bolivia hasn’t granted U.S. military personnel on Bolivian soil immunity from the International Criminal Court.
- The risk of being de-certified, and having even more aid and credit cut off, if it is determined that Morales’ government is not sufficiently cooperating in the war on drugs. Not to mention a likely big fight over forced coca eradication, on which the U.S. government currently spends well over $11 million per year.
- A take-it-or-leave-it approach to a free-trade agreement, even though the U.S. terms would cause a severe shock to Bolivia’s agricultural sector.
- A dwindling likelihood that Bolivia will get aid through the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), though Bolivia is among only four Latin American countries invited to submit proposals for assistance.
By the way, why didn’t Morales consider visiting the United States on his “world tour,†which includes Cuba, Venezuela, Spain, Belgium, South Africa, China and Brazil? “Mr Morales would have gone to Washington had he been invited,†a spokesman told the BBC. But no invitation has been issued.
If one were to design a policy deliberately aimed at pushing Morales away from the center-left and into Hugo Chávez’s warm embrace, it wouldn’t look much different from this one.
January 7th, 2006 at 12:15 am
Morales and Chavez openly celebrated Ollanta’s presence and predicted an electoral landslide in Peru that would strengthen their regional alliance.
Humala has a lot in common with Chavez. He ran a failed military rebellion against then President Alberto Fujimori and is running a nationalistic, anti-market, anti-American campaign.
Ollanta Humala is Chavez’s latest investment and a potential member for the regional leftist presidential club. Ollanta Humala is Peru’s next president.
But who actually is Humala. WHat do we really know about him?
January 9th, 2006 at 11:12 am
“What is the U.S. government doing to counteract this, to keep Morales and the MAS from abandoning the center, and to keep relations cordial and constructive?”
Why should Morales and the MAS have to be centrist “to keep relations cordial and constructive”? Morales won a clear democratic mandate to pursue a left-of-center program. The United States ought to respect Morales’ democratic mandate, period. To suggest that he needs to move to the center to “keep relations cordial and constructive” is to suggest that he should capitulate to U.S. prerogatives. That’s not what he was elected to do. Capitulation is not a legitimate basis of genuinely “cordial and constructive” relations.
January 9th, 2006 at 6:36 pm
Humala does appear to have come out of nowhere, at least for those of us who haven’t been watching Peru as closely as we should. When I was in Lima last June, I don’t remember hearing his name at all. Until this week or so, he has received almost no attention in the English-language media. Sam Logan and Julio Cirino provide a good first look today on the website of the International Relations and Security Network.
Regarding Justin’s comment, Morales himself doesn’t have to “be†anything. It stands to reason, though, that he’d be more centrist if he valued relations with the extreme-right Bush administration. The Bush administration, however, has given him no reason to value his relationship to them, even though they are in panic at the prospect of a “Chávez II.†Another case of the Bushistas misreading the situation and acting against their own self-interest.
Incidentally, you’re correct that “Morales won a clear democratic mandate to pursue a left-of-center program.†However, how far left of center is less clear. To win 54 percent of the vote, Evo had to have picked up a lot of very moderate Bolivians, probably a lot of urban middle-class people, for instance. If he moves too far left too quickly, he risks losing those moderates, and thus the support of a majority of Bolivians – which would make it difficult to govern. As our own president (50.8 percent in November 2004) has found, a slim majority doesn’t give you the “political capital†you need to govern from either extreme.
January 10th, 2006 at 12:51 am
There are some groups from the far-left that are already saying that Morales is a sell out and just another neoliberal right-winger. The first test of the Morales administration will be the composition of the cabinet. It will be interesting to see if he totally discounts some groups that are claiming their right to a set amount of cabinet posts.
His courting of the civic committee in Santa Cruz appears to show his true colors of trying to work for the entire country and not just the “left”.
January 10th, 2006 at 11:37 pm
I would tend to agree that Morales doesn’t have a mandate to move radically left, but I’m not sure he needed much middle class support to win the election. There isn’t much of middle class in Bolivia. I suspect that Morales still would have won overwhelmingly even if his middle class support had evaporated. Moreover, the 54 percent figure doesn’t tell the whole story with regard to the depth of Morales’ mandate. If there were a second round in Bolivian elections (in this case, between Morales and Quiroga), Morales would have undoubtedly won over 60 percent. His mandate is pretty overwhelming, I think.