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Here is our translation of a brief memo the Colombian Commission of Jurists released last week. As Colombian prosecutors begin to look into the past crimes of demobilized paramilitary leaders, the memo reminds us, the testimony of their victims will be essential. However, in many parts of the country, the paramilitaries’ continued power, and the lack of credible government protection, may make it too risky for victims to come forward. 

It is necessary to defend the victims 

If the State wants truth, justice, and reparation under the framework of Law 975 [the so-called “Justice and Peace” law], it has to guarantee the security and integrity of all the victims, so that, without any type of pressure, they can play a proper role in the processes against paramilitary leaders.  

Unfortunately, various regions of the country are seeing the phenomenon of restructuring of paramilitary forces. These intimidate the victims who, in theory, should be part of the anticipated processes under Law 975. 

Despite the government’s promises and what this law proclaims, in practice many of the paramilitaries’ victims are in situations of abandonment by the government. They cannot, and do not even want to, risk participating in these processes. 

Law 975 leaves the security of the victims in the hands of the attorney general’s office (Fiscalía), but public opinion knows the enormous limitations that this agency’s program of protecting victims and witnesses has faced throughout its history.  

At present there is much worry over the security conditions that the victims face in regions like Antioquia, Bolívar, Casanare, Catatumbo, Cauca, Chocó, Magdalena Medio, Nariño, Putumayo, Santander, Urabá, and Valle del Cauca.

If victims from these regions are not secure enough to participate in the special processes that the attorney-general is beginning to open against the known paramilitary leaders, where then will the truth come from? And what will happen to justice and reparations for all those affected by crimes against humanity?

Since the middle of the year, in the Magdalena Medio, the regional human rights ombudsman at the time, Jorge Gómez Lizarazo, denounced deaths, threats, and displacements of campesinos at the hands of the paramilitaries that continue operating in the region.

Gómez said that the paramilitary groups, supposedly demobilized, operate in the region under various denominations, have organized private security businesses, and have committed crimes, which they blame on other armed actors, to pressure the contracting of their services.

In the port of Buenaventura the situation of insecurity, which has provoked close to 300 homicides so far in 2006, especially affects the paramilitaries’ victims, many of whom are displaced and find no conditions of security to participate in the processes of Law 975. In Buenaventura it is evident that the paramilitaries operate openly and control entire areas of the city.

In the meantime, complaints from elsewhere in Valle del Cauca department have been received about excesses attributed to the security force, and serious violations on the part of the paramilitary forces.

Meanwhile, in the Urabá region victims’ groups have received intimidating messages from people close to the paramilitary leaders that have taken refuge under Law 975, which reduces penalties to between 5 and 8 years for people responsible for crimes against humanity.

According to press reports, victims’ fear of participating in the Law 975 processes is such that in some regions, like San Miguel-La Dorada, Putumayo, the attorney-general’s office has taken to the streets with megaphones to summon them to denounce the paramilitaries’ acts.

Faced with this situation, the active participation of the internal-affairs office (Procuraduría) and human-rights ombudsman (Defensoría) is fundamental to guarantee not only the transparency of the processes, but also that the demobilized paramilitaries confess all crimes, that there be justice, that victims giving testimony have security guarantees, and that they receive integral reparations.

For all these reasons, it is urgent that the state decidedly intensify its efforts to protect, assist, and defend the victims, if there is to be truth, justice, and reparation.

8 Responses to “CCJ: Protect the victims – we need their evidence”

  1. richtiger Says:

    How to describe the “justice and peace” law? A success? A failure? A partial success? Mostly a failure?

    Is Law 975 one more piece of evidence that Uribe is quietly in cahoots with the paramilitaries?

    Who know what lurks in the hearts of men?

  2. jcg Says:

    richtiger: Nobody, but far too many people seem to claim that they do.

    As for Law 975, it’s a law with both positive and negative aspects, one which was considerably improved by the Colombian Constitutional Court, as several critics have repeatedly admitted.

    Most importantly, it’s a law that has yet to be fully implemented. So I’d say that it’s kind of premature to pass final judgment on a complex process that is still ongoing.

    Not to mention that many of the current problems are due to the negotiation itself or are structural issues that would have been exceedingly hard to avoid in the first place, even with the best of laws.

    Demonizing a single law, IMHO, doesn’t really help anyone, and least of all the victims.

  3. richtiger Says:

    Well, I don’t know whether I’m “demonizing” or not. I would argue that sentences of 5 to 8 years for the masacre of hundreds of people is hardly “justice.” Horacio Serpa remarked on Colombian TV that Uribe was “muy mal como negociador” (or words to that effect). Is Uribe simply that–a poor negotiator? Or is he trying to heal the nation’s wounds? Or is he using his presidency to help his paramilitary friends? I honestly don’t know.

    But I do think I know that the law was ill-conceived and equally poorly implemented. While some areas have apparently seen a near-complete surrender of arms and AUC members (such that the FARC feels free to move in),
    the process has been a charade in other regions, a fact noted by Adam in his post.

    I guess one could argue that this partial demobilization of the autodefensas is the best that the poor, muddled, corrupt Colombians can do. Yet I remain convinced that there are enough Colombians of exemplary courage and ability to hope for something better than “improvement.”

    I suppose I agree with Carlos Gaviria, who argues that there is a profound lack of “etica” in Colombia. Like Gaviria, I have to feel some pessimism about the possibility of “etica” and “normas” taking root in the country; but, like Gaviria, I have to feel that a minority of people in the country can lead an essentially peaceful revolution that will truly transform the country.
    I’m no pacifist. I’m willing to applaud Colombian governments that use force against the autodefensas and the “subversivos” of the left. Nevertheless, I know full well that force is no answer to the problems of the country.

    Well, with the erosion of civil liberties and the widening of the gulf between rich and poor in these United States of America, I suppose I ought to concentrate my efforts in my own country and accept that enlightened Colombians must make their efforts in their country.

  4. KyleHanky Says:

    As I see it, some criticisms of the Law do not help many, but it is the recommendations that come with these criticisms that help the most. There are criticisms that do help, and I think this one is an example. By making aware that paramilitaries are still active in many parts of the country, and quite strong in some, it forces people to look at ways to improve or change the law, or demand action from the Colombian government. In those ways critiques do help. Criticisms are also quite key in the debate of whether this law is a “success” or “failure.”

    I agree that some of the problems with the law are near impossible to avoid. But, IMHO, the Colombian government, when deciding to take on such a venture, should have known that just having paramilitaries hand in guns, and not dealing with at least some of the root cuases of paramilitarism, would not lead to the end of this brutal phenomenon, though “phenomenon” doesn’t depict the paramilitaries brutality nearly enough.

    Also, again IMHO, I don’t think Justice and Peace Law may ever be fully implemented. Investigations won’t be done (for whatever reason) and people responsible for massacres (mainly the actual fighters and killers) could walk free, and some may be right now. Real pressure has been put on the government to implement the law more fully due to Jorge 40’s laptop and the current para-congressional scandal, amongst international pressure. But I think it can be debated whether the law has been a success or failure so far, and many signs point to failure (there are some positive aspects though, without a doubt).

    Lastly, we should note there are recommendations, though brief, at the bottom of the CCJ memo.

  5. jcg Says:

    richtiger: Demonizing isn’t equal to criticizing in my book and it would be a gross error on my part to equate the two. Which I’m not. That phrase wasn’t directed at you nor at the CCJ per se, but at the general idea that a single law is responsible for all the problems of the entire process. Forgive me if I didn’t make myself clear.

    As for the 5-8 years sentences, of course, they aren’t the “justice” that those criminals deserve. But the fact is this: the justice they deserve would be impossible to implement through any kind of negotiation process, especially when none of the parties has defeated the other.

    That’s not going to happen. Not with the paras, not with the guerrillas (which have been given practically blanket amnesties during previous negotiations. Even if we assume that their actions are somewhat less barbaric, they weren’t victimless at all). Personally, I’d just love to do away with the entire lot, lock ‘em up and throw away the key, but I’m a realist: that’s not going to happen.

    It’s interesting that you bring up Carlos Gaviria. He and Gustavo Petro have stated that, although they would probably have demanded more (and I completely agree with them on that! I’ve repeatedly stated as much), as far as other aspects of the negotiation and the law are concerned (please do not confuse the two; that’s another point I’m trying to make), they still wouldn’t have given the paras anything close to, say, 40 years to life in a maximum security jail. That would be basically negotiating an unconditional surrender, not a demobilization, and it’s extremely hard to force undefeated parties to surrender without any benefits.

    I, like other people including at least some of the victims themselves (and probably more), place far more emphasis on the truth and reparation requirements than on justice (if by justice you understand “long jail terms” and nothing else). In that respect, the government could well have made better requests and asked for more (though probably at the cost of an explicit and legally solid cancellation of extraditions, something that has not been done yet, btw, even to this day).

    Indeed, the government has in fact made many mistakes in both its handling of the negotiations and in the designing and implementation of the law. That much is true and I’m not contradicting it.

    But that doesn’t deny that the law does have some positive aspects, that some of the original criticisms of it have already been addressed, and that it’s still too early to pass final judgment, since the law’s implementation is far from finished (in fact, it’s barely started). Again, that doesn’t deny the existence of both past, present and future problems.

  6. jcg Says:

    richtiger: Demonizing isn’t equal to criticizing in my book and it would be a gross error on my part to equate the two. Which I’m not. That phrase wasn’t directed at you nor at the CCJ per se, but at the general idea that a single law is responsible for all the problems of the entire process. Forgive me if I didn’t make myself clear.

    As for the 5-8 years sentences, of course, they aren’t the “justice” that those criminals deserve. But the fact is this: the justice they deserve would be impossible to implement through any kind of negotiation process, especially when none of the parties has defeated the other.

    That’s not going to happen. Not with the paras, not with the guerrillas (which have been given practically blanket amnesties during previous negotiations. Even if we assume that their actions are somewhat less barbaric, they weren’t victimless at all). Personally, I’d just love to do away with the entire lot, lock ‘em up and throw away the key, but I’m a realist: that’s not going to happen.

    It’s interesting that you bring up Carlos Gaviria. He and Gustavo Petro have stated that, although they would probably have demanded more (and I completely agree with them on that! I’ve repeatedly stated as much), as far as other aspects of the negotiation and the law are concerned (please do not confuse the two; that’s another point I’m trying to make), they still wouldn’t have given the paras anything close to, say, 40 years to life in a maximum security jail. That would be basically negotiating an unconditional surrender, not a demobilization, and it’s extremely hard to force undefeated parties to surrender without any benefits.

    I, like other people including at least some of the victims themselves (and probably more), place far more emphasis on the truth and reparation requirements than on justice (if by justice you understand “long jail terms” and nothing else). In that respect, the government could well have made better requests and asked for more (though probably at the cost of an explicit and legally solid cancellation of extraditions, something that has not been done yet, btw, even to this day).

    Indeed, the government has in fact made many mistakes in both its handling of the negotiations and in the designing and implementation of the law. That much is true and I’m not contradicting it.

    But that doesn’t deny that the law does have some positive aspects, that some of the original criticisms of it have already been addressed, and that it’s still too early to pass final judgment, since the law’s implementation is far from finished (in fact, it’s barely started). Again, that doesn’t deny the existence of both past, present and future problems.

  7. jcg Says:

    KyleHanky: You have a point, and in fact I acknowledge and support the CCJ’s recommendations about the needs of the victims. Their general criticisms are also valid, in my opinion, but the specifics of their reasoning aren’t flawless, as far as I can see.

    Still, the point is I agree with their conclusions, and I also agree with you in that criticisms can help to pressure the government. Again, I still don’t equate criticism with demonizing. A small part of all criticism does come close, but I’m not blind to the rest of it.

    As you say, it’s clear enough, as many different people have argued and as events have showed, that there are still paramilitaries (and, to use the term in vogue, emerging bands of criminals that aren’t that “paramilitary” in nature) operating in several parts of the country. That needs to be denounced, I’m totally in favor it, repeatedly and openly.

    I can agree that the multi-year negotiation and demobilization process itself has turned out to be more flawed than right. But I still think that, since the law is barely starting to be implemented, it’s way too early to demand results.

    Real implementation of the law only began late last year, at most. Hence, if I’d have to call anything a “failure” right now, it’d be the entire process itself, not a single law that couldn’t even begin to be applied until recently (late 2005-early 2006). IMHO, it’s mostly the government’s fault, for designing the law way too late in the process and beginning most demobilizations when no law was in place, but part of the delays are also inherent to the overloaded, slow, corrupt, etc. Colombian justice system itself.

    Even with a much better law though, there are still going to be some real limits that are impossible to totally overcome: the full truth will never come out. Even victim activists (who are sometimes victims themselves) such as Ivan Cepeda are aware of that, even as they demand more of it.

    A large number of crimes will never be individually punished or resolved, a large number of individual criminals will walk free. That’s happened everywhere in the world (see WWII, post-Franco Spain, post-dictatorship Chile or Argentina, or even post-apartheid South Africa).

    However, in spite of it, some of the most notable and most representative paramilitary leaders and paramilitary-connected politicians are facing too much pressure, and aren’t going to walk free so easily. It looks like they’ll be forced to at least reveal a sizable part of the truth, if only to save themselves. Some will, of course, find ways to get away (for whatever reason), that’s practically inevitable.

    In spite of those limits, I continue to recognize the need to criticize the failings of the law and the process, while doing everything possible in order to minimize impunity.

  8. richtiger Says:

    Thanks to jcg and KyleHanky for a thoughtful, balanced series of posts. When dealing with atrocities such as those of the autodefensas, such an attitude is hard to maintain.

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