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The department of Casanare, Colombia, where Mary Anastasia O’Grady got cattle ranchers’ view of the security situation.
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Yesterday, recounting a visit to the oil-producing department of Casanare, Colombia, Wall Street Journal columnist Mary Anastasia O’Grady wrote one of the most awful things I’ve ever seen published in a mainstream periodical.
Today the paras [paramilitaries] are condemned by society because they have morphed into criminal gangs. But in their early years they did not suffer such disapproval. They were, instead, hero vigilantes who had the courage to push back against the reign of terror. Many of their members were relatives of FARC victims.
People in these parts acknowledge that the paras cured FARC terrorism. One Colombian I know explains it like this: “The way I see it, the paramilitary was like chemotherapy. It makes you sick and your hair falls out but it saves your life.”
Breathtaking. In Ms. O’Grady’s narrative, Colombia’s paramilitary groups passed through a gauzy golden age in which they were selflessly defending decent citizens from guerrilla barbarism. While the guerrilla barbarism part is undeniable, when was this golden age exactly?
- In the early to mid-1980s, when drug lords were helping to form and finance the first paramilitary groups?
- In the mid-to-late-1980s, when paramilitary massacres of innocent civilians grew so frequent that the Colombian government felt compelled to declare these “hero vigilantes” illegal?
- In the 1990s, when the Castaño brothers and their associates in the newly formed AUC were killing and torturing tens of thousands of civilians, and displacing millions?
- In the late 1990s and early 2000s, when the paramilitary leaders themselves were some of the top exporters of drugs to the United States?
Ms. O’Grady goes on:
So how did the rule of law return? Locals give the credit to Mr. Uribe, who offered all combatants a deal to surrender. Here in Casanare the paras demobilized and ever since, the ranchers under the porch in the rainstorm tell me, the warring has ended and a high-profile police and military presence keeps the peace.
How does she reach the conclusion that paramilitarism has been eliminated from the department of Casanare? The longtime leader of Casanare’s paramilitaries, Hector Germán Buitrago, alias “MartÃn Llanos,” has been weakened but remains at large, while a former governor and congressman are under investigation for colluding with him. Parts of southern Casanare today are under the dominion of Pedro Oliverio Guerrero Castillo, alias “Cuchillo” ["Knife"], a paramilitary narcotrafficker closely allied with drug lord Daniel Rendón, alias “Don Mario,” who in turn is the brother of one of the jailed but un-extradited paramilitary chiefs, former Élmer Cárdenas Bloc leader Freddy Rendón, alias “El Alemán.”
Meanwhile, Ms. O’Grady misses the glaring fact that Casanare continues to be a key way station for the river of Colombian narcotics flowing into, and through, nearby Venezuela. With the guerrilla presence in the department so reduced, who controls Casanare’s drug corridors? By most accounts, it is the still at-large, still locally powerful paramilitaries, some of whom do drug business with the guerrillas.
The quote above reveals the problem with Ms. O’Grady’s journalism. The only source she cites in Casanare are the ranchers, the large landowners in a department with poor land distribution. While there is no way of knowing whether Ms. O’Grady’s interlocutors themselves ever gave financial support to Casanare’s paramilitaries, they represent a sector of rural Colombia – large landowners and cattle ranchers – that enthusiastically backed the expansion of paramilitarism in Colombia.
By consulting only this source and reporting her findings in one of the United States’ most-circulated newspapers, Ms. O’Grady gravely offends the hundreds of thousands of people who were murdered, had loved ones murdered, were tortured or raped, or had lands stolen by these “hero vigilantes.”
As any of these victims could have told her, the paramilitaries didn’t lose their way when they “morphed into criminal gangs,” whenever exactly that was. They did so at the very beginning, when they started murdering, torturing, disappearing, and displacing their fellow citizens.
June 10th, 2008 at 5:31 pm
The answer is simple: too many journalists for hire, too much money being offered by racketeers.
Last year newspaper “El Espectador” considered by many as a standard in objectivity and equanimity in Colombia, published a full two pages blown up article in which they depicted Macaco, one of the most cold blooded paramilitary criminals, as an entrepreneur of peace.
Entre preneur of Peace
Mafia is not tardy, after discovering they can launder money consistently and continuously without being bothered, they have also discover they can launder their image via “Important” media outlets.
June 10th, 2008 at 6:40 pm
Jaime, the “article” published by El Espectador was actually a paid advertising. Of course there was a huge controversy because the newspaper accepted to publish it (EE eventually didn’t accept the payment by “Villa la Esperanza”).
The WSJ article is actually that: an article written by one of its journalists. It’s different.
June 10th, 2008 at 6:53 pm
Also, she should be highly, highly embarrassed and I’m surprised you didn’t point this out Adam. The only paramilitary block that has not demobilized since the beginning of the peace process is the Casanare Rural Self-Defense Group, which means that paramilitarism (and that of the AUC) is in fact, on paper, only still alive in Casanare. Swing and a miss O’Grady, a big swing and miss.
June 10th, 2008 at 7:44 pm
Carlos Raúl van der Weyden Velásquez, I know it was paid, and they can call it whatever they want, only it looks like an article.
An advertisement is something different, take a look:
Advertisement
The WSJ article, is likely to be another paid article, not officially, but that’s my point.
June 10th, 2008 at 8:05 pm
What I want to know, and expose to public scrutiny, exactly who and why benefits from this whitewash. It’s not enough to counter and expose propaganda, we need to know why Ms. O’Grady feels compelled to write such one-sided nonsense and who she is working for (aside from Rupert Murdoch our present day Goebbels).
The underlying corruption must be exposed and exorcised.
June 10th, 2008 at 8:25 pm
Oh, Adam. I admire that you can still muster indignation about O’Grady. She’s one of the worst right-wing hacks ever to wield a pen (or keyboard) to write about Colombia. But I agree with you that, even by O’Grady’s standards this one was a pretty dismal one. Wait, could she be also writing somewhere else with an assumed name…? Oh, never mind.
Just wanted to add my support to something you said in the previous thread. OK, Uribe should get credit for having broken the military trend of the FARC. There, said it. But people who suggest that the FARC had any realistic chance of seizing power in Colombia, either politically or militarily, before 2002 should be institutionalized under heavy medication with no access to a keyboard. (Well, some such people in fact seem to be under heavy medication, only that someone forgot to take their keyboards away.) By the 90s the FARC in Colombia were already a politically marginal group. Most of the left had deserted them in favor of all the other options on offer, the same ones that are now coalescing around the Democratic Pole. Militarily, you’re also right. The increase in military spending began under Pastrana. By 2001-2002 there was already a big consensus among all the major political forces that the Army needed a significant upgrade.
I am reasonable enough to recognize that the case for peace is not straightforward. Regretfully, it never is. You can always argue for the need of more war. But the uribistas are caught in an interesting contradiction and should be called on that. They say that Uribe (yes, Uribe, single-handedly, solo, the man, the hero…) has so weakened the FARC that the final victory is at hand. You would imagine that, given that the FARC are so weak, then we might actually end the thing through negotiations. But the moment you suggest that, then the same uribistas will say that no. That doing so would immediately bring the FARC bouncing back to full, lethal strength and to the verge of taking power. But, hold on, weren’t they in their “death throes,” to borrow Cheney’s expression? Seemingly, six year of “democratic security” can be undone in a couple months if you start talking.
“The surge is working!” “Fine, then let’s draw troops down.” “No, idiot, if we do, the insurgents will immediately come back!” “I thought you said the surge was working.” Sounds familiar?
June 10th, 2008 at 9:10 pm
hey LFM that was brilliant…true to history and reality
June 10th, 2008 at 9:20 pm
So Mr. Milla = Mary Anastasia O’Grady?
June 10th, 2008 at 11:58 pm
Jaime, I get your point. What El Espectador published is what we call a “publirreportaje” (advertorial). But I don’t know if Ms O’Grady’s text would fit in that category (could someone in the US scan or take a picture at the actual WSJ print article?).
June 11th, 2008 at 12:30 am
Never mind Carlos, I know what you mean. I believe you.
June 11th, 2008 at 12:32 am
I’m gonna agree with O’Grady. If the government hadn’t been so wrapped up in its ‘peace process’ with the terrorists, and not bothering to do its job smashing them, there would be no such thing as paramilitaries. Those creatures only exist because the government wasn’t bothering keeping law and order. Instead, it just ignored things when people were tortured, driven from their homes, firebombed, and all the other things FARC does so well. Their spiral downard into crime and barbarism is an abject lesson in why governments should never slack off on doing their jobs and staying accountable.
June 11th, 2008 at 12:32 am
Also, to add, CODHES recently published a few articles on Casanare as well; they tell a quite different story obviously.
June 11th, 2008 at 12:36 am
Wow Camilla, a possible new low and horribly twisted logic into a somewhat of a high that I’m sure if fully drawn out you would end up disagreeing with greatly (because at times it’s not as convenient for your “logic”). So if paramilitaries are done in Casanare can you explain how the fact that the Casanare Rural Self-Defense Forces are the only still-active block of the AUC supports the idea that paramilitaries are no longer active in Casanare? Just wondering.
June 11th, 2008 at 12:42 am
Kyle, how long and how well do you know Colombioaa?
Where you there in the 80’s?
do you know what was going on? You don’t s
seem to to me
June 11th, 2008 at 12:48 am
Kyle: Well, they either are or they aren’t. O’Grady went down there and asked the locals how things were going and I find her take credible. Should we insist that the people she talked to were liars? I don’t think we can know that from here.
Unfortunately, when there is a failed state and a do-nothing government, thugs take things into their own hands and paramilitaries are born. Good people go down thug road, they get corrupted because everyone is judicially drowning. It gets really bad. When the state reasserts its presence, there’s no need for vigilantes and paramilitaries and other corrupted players. Maybe Uribe needs to put a heavier state hand in Casanare to assure the locals that there’s law and order and if anything happens, justice will be done. That’s the most effective way of burning out paramilitary thugs.
June 11th, 2008 at 1:26 am
Camilla:I’m not saying the people are liars, I’m saying she’s a horrible journalist; secondly, you didn’t actually answer my question.
Secondly, the first AUC-like paramilitary groups were officially created under drug traffickers and others in December 1981. Those people fed on the lack of state presence; plus, aren’t narcotraffickers by definition already on the thug road? When was there a time which AUC-like groups operated and they were not corrupted and on the thug road? Adam essentially asked that, and all you say is that they tried to protect the people from the guerrillas. Ok, if we adopt this reason as fact, it still does not justify any of their horrific acts nor does it automatically mean that these groups started off on a good road. Like you said, “thugs take things into their own hands and paramilitaries are born.”
Thirdly, you have to be very good at denial. Just asking cattle ranchers/large landowners is not asking locals. Simple as that; O’Grady’s job is not complete after asking cattle ranchers/large landowners. Basic knowledge of Colombia and journalistic ethics should tell her that.
Fourthly, you are correctly, Uribe must establish law and order (a human rights respecting one) in Casanare, but there are a plethora of reason why paramilitary groups exist (and defending the people from the guerrillas is a twisted one – protect their interests from anyone who is a threat would be accurate) and Uribe must address them all. Law and order is only one, but not the only one.
GWEH: I’m wondering where your questioning of me comes from? I cite something recent and I know nothing? (It’s my only guess.) Does that mean anyone who cites recent info knows little-to-nothing? I cite that evidence because it seems to me to be the strongest piece of evidence that contradicts O’Grady’s article. There seems to be nothing at all from what I’ve written here that could be used as a true indicator of my knowledge, yet you seem so sure that I know little-to-nothing. And why the 1980s? What about the 1990s, when almost all indicators say this was a worse time period when one measures by decades? What about during La Violencia? What about the Thousand Day War? Basically, why the 1980s? (My only guess here is that you lived in Colombia during the 1980s so you’re most familiar with that time period, and also so you can say, “Yes, I was there in the 1980s.” Correct my if I’m wrong.)
June 11th, 2008 at 1:28 am
Wow, apparently I can’t post too late; sorry for the many grammatical errors. I assume some witty line about logical errors will ensue from Camilla, and GWEH will question my pointing out of the grammatical errors.
June 11th, 2008 at 2:19 am
Mr. Mary Milla writes “whoribly” in fact. Not that she cannot skillfully mold a written piece. But a piece of s**t.
June 11th, 2008 at 6:48 am
Camilla:
I thought you will be more inteligent and distance yourself from such a pack of nonsense written in that column.
“If the government hadn’t been so wrapped up in its ‘peace process’ with the terrorists, and not bothering to do its job smashing them, there would be no such thing as paramilitaries.”
But I overstimated you. Anyways, in case you didn´t knew, paramilitarism originated in the early eighties, BEFORE any serious peace process was ever attempted in Colombia (and long before the Caguan time´s). So to say it quite simple, your either lying right from your nose or you are just a complete ignoramus about colombian history (or both?)
June 11th, 2008 at 7:04 am
El argumento que usa Camilla para justificar la existencia de los paramilitares es del mismo tipo que el que usan los guerrilleros para justificar la existencia de sus movimientos. (Poca presencia estatal + violencia contra ellos -> autodefensa + control polÃtico.)
June 11th, 2008 at 9:05 am
Sergio: In any society where a government isn’t doing its job, vigilantism will happen. I’m no fan of the paramilitaries, but I understand why they happened. In the 1980s, Colombia was full of dopers and hoods. Nobody was doing anything about them, and it was all laughed off as gringo’s problem. Well, it wasn’t. That crap got into society and then the FARC hopped in and the rest is history. If you are not being protected by the cops and the army, it is natural that you turn to private justice. It always works out badly, all the time. Thank goodness the paras are disarmed now in all except a few pockets and peace and prosperity is the new story of Colombia.
Kyle: what question didn’t I answer – can you rephrase it?
June 11th, 2008 at 9:29 am
Sergio you are completely right, Mr. Mary Milla is a complete retard. Saying Colombia lives in peace and prosperity is like saying that the US finally institutionalized democracy in Iraq.
Saying that the sky is pink and the sea purple.
By issuing words that contradict the facts consistently, a dictatorship is getting installed in the land of narcotrafficking, massacres and authoritarianism. In the forsaken land of Mr. Uribe and his death squads.
June 11th, 2008 at 10:19 am
Camilla:
You are still arguing from ignorance. First, you couldnt challenge my point that paramilitaries appeared BEFORE the existence of any peace process in Colombia, so you can say that paramilitaries appeared AS CONSEQUENCE of such peace processes.
Second, repeating the myth of “goverment never did anything against guerrillas [before Uribe]” is not going to make it true (althought it has the powerfull psycological effect, since people actually buy it). Let me refresh your memory:
- Bombardments of marquetalia
- Operation Lazo
- Operation Anorà (which almost anihilated ELN at the early 70´s)
- Statute of security (under the presidence of Turbay Ayala, that passed draconian laws restricting civil liberties in order to fight the guerrillas)
So is not exactly true that the Colombian goverment hadn´t fought this guerrillas before the appearence of paramilitaries in the early 80´s. You may claim this efforts weren´t good enought, and maybe that was the case, since the colombian state and military forces were rather weak. Of course, such an interpretation fails to see that most of the guerrillas were also very weak, and hardly had the power they achieved in the 90´s (like the FARC) or late 80´s (like the ELN).
Third, your claim that paramilitarism was initiated as a “vigilante” response is just a half truth, or more exactly, partially true. Most of the initial paramilitary groups were created as a military aparatus of drugs cartels, after some guerrillas kidnapped some relatives to the Ochoa family (leading to the creation of MAS, which was essentially a death squad). Others were true autodefense organizations of peasants, like those that appeared in certain areas of the Magdalena Medio (say, puerto boyacá; and yet they were close to mafias, including emerald mafia). The rest were created and stimulated by hard core sectors in the military and big land owners, as forces of contrainsurgency and protection/and land expansion. So you see, this paramilitaries were to much close to state, big landowners and drug lord interests and were far less “vigilantes” or “autodefenses”
June 11th, 2008 at 10:49 am
For all the criticism of this WSJ piece, I don’t see anything more objective in the comments above. I don’t know too many cattle-ranchers, but I do know a lot of street vendors, waiters, taxi drivers, single mothers, soldiers, police, students and farm workers from just about every corner of the country. I have also been the willing and reluctant recipient of abundant commentary on the experiences of those various people over the past 20 years and with near universal consensus the strongest theme in the stories of their sufferings are the depredations of La Guerrilla. Especially in those areas I’ve visited which were part of Pastrana’s ridiculous Zona de Despeje. Plenty of these “bona-fide” proletarians (trying to get with the lingo here) share the opinion that the paramilitaries were born out of a legitimate need, however they eventually turned out.
Why are some people continually compelled to suggest that paramilitary violence is somehow more odious than other types? Usually with some oblique references to familiar bogeymen like “Big Business” or a Bush/Cheney conspiracy.
There is also no contradiction in the strategy of the Uribe government (nor the surge for that matter) in combating the insurgency. Your analysis reflects a poor understanding of the nature of insurgencies – who depend very little on infrastructure and set-piece units. When the guerrilla are disorganized and fragmented, with particular leadership vacuums resulting from successful operations, they may very well be on the ropes. But because of the nature of insurgencies these problems can be quickly resolved with just a little breathing room. They do not need to build new weapons factories or secure a new oil supply for their Navy, sometimes with insurgencies significant restoration can come from something as simple as a conference of senior leadership where organization and hierarchy are restored. It is the nature of this type of warfare that relentless and mounting pressure until the bitter end is the only reasonable strategy, despite your rationalistic analysis.
June 11th, 2008 at 10:55 am
Adam,
There are drug cartel goons and there are autodefensas. They were totally conflated at the end and there was certainly some overlap from the beginning, but it’s undeniable that there was at least the perception, which is what O’Grady is arguing, that the autodefensas were a necessary evil to push back against the much worse guerrillas. Was this view discredited as the autodefensas murdered and ran cocaine? Of course, but there is no sense in denying the initial perception of these paramilitary groups among large sectors of Colombian society.
And O’Grady doesn’t say paramilitarism has been eliminated from Casanare or elsewhere, she says they demobilized, there is peace and the rule of law has returned, none of which you deny. As the last couple years have shown, it is possible to restore a measure of security without completely rooting out all paramilitary or guerrilla influence or reducing the flow of drugs. This work must continue, of course, but that doesn’t mean significant progress hasn’t been made.
Yes, O’Grady is presenting a slanted perspective, but so does CIP (and every analyst). I haven’t seen the Colombian landowner perspective on this blog very much, for example. Of course, point out the bias, but stick to the facts and don’t get too outraged at O’Grady for reporting the views of a sector of the Colombia debate you (and I) happen to disagree with.
Dan
June 11th, 2008 at 11:41 am
In 1967, in a move still resented in many circles of the left, the Colombian government issued a decree allowing the formation of “self-defense” units, pretty much like the Convivir or the Peruvian “rondas campesinas.” For all the ire that this has generated among the left, the interesting thing is that NOT ONE paramilitary group ever used that decree. None, zero, zilch, nada. The point? The government already had in place, twenty years before the fact, the type of legal framework that the apologists of the paramilitary say they needed but in fact the paramilitary never used it. Why? Because, apart from “self-defense” the paramilitary also needed to do certain things that a decree would never authorize like killing politicians from the Union Patriotica, like intimidating all kinds of activists, like displacing people from their lands and all these other “extracurricular” activities that go beyond the mere “self-defense.” Now they want to claim that all they were doing was defending themselves, the poor things.
William: I’m not a conspiracy theorist. I just can’t miss a chance to take a swipe at Bush and Cheney, no matter how off-topic. But more to the point: there’s no such thing as the “only reasonable strategy” in these things. The Salvadoran ARENA, those fuzzy-wooly leftists, ended up striking a deal with the FMLN. Of course, if the only type of outcome you can envision is one where the insurgency is completely wiped out, then, sure, you have to fight till the bitter end. But that’s precisely the premise in dispute: is that the only outcome that we should envision? Can we consider options where an insurgency comes back from the cold and in return it lays down its weapons? Different people give different answers. I know someone in this forum that will immediately bang the table and scream “NO!” OK. But others think differently. Others, like me, think that it would be perfectly fine to have a society where the FARC (the least tainted of its elements, that is) obtain some political space and accept peaceful, legal politics. I’m not obsessed with the FARC’s end. What I want is the war’s end. If the end of the war can be accomplished with a huge accord that acknowledges victims, gives them “truth, justice and reparation” in the now so familiar words, and as a result of which the FARC enter legal politics, that’s fine by me. Especially if it can be accomplished sooner, with less casualties, than the promised annihilation of the FARC. The Uribe campaign in 2002 claimed they could get the job done in about 2 years. It’s already 6 years now and counting.
I’ve always said that a mistake of Colombia’s peace camp is to argue that “the only way out is political.” That’s wrong. There’s always a military option. The point is that those of us in the peace camp don’t think that such option is not worth it. By the same token, I would appreciate it if, in an act of symmetry, the hawks recognize that there also is a political option and that their defense of the “war to the bitter end” option is based on their assessment of costs and benefits. That would be more honest. Is it too much to ask?
June 11th, 2008 at 11:42 am
WSJ goons turning on to this blog HEEEELP!
June 11th, 2008 at 12:02 pm
LFM, personally I see Pastrana’s experiment as the full demonstration of value of a political solution with people who are not honest partners at the table. What is one to do when the guerrilla eventually demonstrate that they are willing to use the political process only as leverage and cover for their military objectives? At this point I really question the value of rerouting ourselves towards a political solution and giving up all the momentum that has been gained with the current strategy.
And I’m not a WSJ, Bush, or Cheney fan. I just have spent too much time on the ground in that country organizing aid, giving free medical help, listening to the stories of displaced families while bouncing down dusty roads in the back of farm trucks, buying hungry kids una comida and in general interacting with and caring about its people to see the country set itself up for 8 or 10 more years of REAL SUFFERING so that the “peace camp” can feel better about Colombia from wherever they live in California. Life is better now for the average man and woman in Colombia than it has been since the beginning of the memories of just about everyone I know there. I don’t really care if Ronald McDonald or Yao Ming is the president, I’m impressed that there is more hope there than I’ve ever seen before and the security situation, is better.
But aside from that, my point as stated is that if you are seeking a military solution, as Colombia currently is, then there is no contradiction with the strategy as you implied in your original post. My point was that it is a valid strategy (I did not say the only strategy) and not an elaborate deception, as suggested.
June 11th, 2008 at 12:07 pm
You will all have to excuse Camilla. She either lives in another Colombia we don’t know about where there is peace and prosperity for all (which magically has compelled over a million people to leave the country since 2000 without returning) or she is blind to the situation before her eyes (in the real Colombia the druggers and hoods now occupy the presidency, Congress, and most of the rest of the state – and increasingly the prisons though those uribistas are there involuntarily if you know what I mean Camilla).
Have you ever traveled outside your luxurious cocoon Camilla? Or does daddy only allow you to use his credit cards in upscale areas, away from the unwashed masses?
June 11th, 2008 at 12:36 pm
My thinking is in line with William’s…I’ll give a separate example, do you negotiate with Al Qaeda? No, because Al Qaeda isn’t the type of organization that’s interested in negotiating. In the end, if they do not have absolute power then they’re not happy.
The FARC has proven to be the same… in the past, just when you thought you had reached a deal they came out with new demands. As was previously cited, their goal is not to reach a settlement, but to prolong enough to reconsitute. Even if you could successfully negotiate the release of some hostages, they would turn around, capture another group and demand even more . It’s a crazy cycle that never ends.
Adam tells me that negotiations can be ongoing while the military continues with its campaing…I guess but there won’t be any progress that’s for sure…how can you negotiate anything when every second that passes one or the other is dealt a blow. The only negotiating to be had in that setting is the terms of their surrender. The logic being that if they don’t give up now, then they’ll simply be wiped out.
June 11th, 2008 at 12:56 pm
Chris you maybe right, but this particular blog entry is trying to deal with disinformation campaigns telling public opinion fairy tales about the origin of dead squads in Colombia, portraying them as kinded hearted righteous ranchers who only tried to defend their lands, and whose efforts have given fruit in a Colombia that lives free from terrorism and criminality, aside from that of guerrillas.
Pepes, Terraza, and Ochoas (Ochoas are family with the current president) are the origins of these groups that have always been involved in drug trafficking, racketeering, extortion and people killing since their inception in early 1980s.
June 11th, 2008 at 1:23 pm
Jaime, I agree that there is some disinformation flowing around regarding the paras…
I hope that Uribe’s connections are resolved for good or bad. I hope that he doesn’t run a third time… I don’t think its healthy for a democracy.
That said, who should be Colombia’s next president…maybe this question should be a blog on its own.
June 11th, 2008 at 1:26 pm
William, you write:
“Why are some people continually compelled to suggest that paramilitary violence is somehow more odious than other types?â€
Hmm, entering a village and massacring men and women with chainsaws or ambushing an army patrol and killing its members? A systematic campaign to execute/assassinate every member of the Union Patriotica we can find or destroying a police station? One is not more odious than the other? Of course the FARC has committed massacres and political assassinations, but can we all agree at this time that the number of massacres, political assassinations and forced displacement have been largely committed by paramilitary groups over the past thirty years? In other the words the level of political violence directed specifically and purposely at civilians. Am I being “biased†by stating this fact? To suggest that somehow paramilitary violence is not particularly odious is to state that the rules of war are irrelevant, everyone and anyone is fair game, violence is violence. Paramilitary violence has been considered odious by many for a reason and the various manifestations of paramilitary groups are largely to blame for that.
William you also write:
“They do not need to build new weapons factories or secure a new oil supply for their Navy, sometimes with insurgencies significant restoration can come from something as simple as a conference of senior leadership where organization and hierarchy are restored. It is the nature of this type of warfare that relentless and mounting pressure until the bitter end is the only reasonable strategy, despite your rationalistic analysis.â€
Really? The only reasonable strategy? Not in El Salvador, Guatemala, Vietnam, Algeria, so far not in Sri Lanka or the Palestinian territories, not with the M-19 or the EPL in Colombia. Lets see, El Salvador, Guatemala, M-19, the EPL, Quintin Lame political negotiations brought an end to their respective guerrilla wars or activities. To suggest that mass military extermination is the only “reasonable strategy” to resolve an insurgency is to suggest that you do not know as much as you claim about insurgencies.
Chris you write:
“Do you negotiate with Al Qaeda? No, because Al Qaeda isn’t the type of organization that’s interested in negotiating. In the end, if they do not have absolute power then they’re not happy.â€
The FARC during the Betancur administration, the Gaviria and Pastrana administrations engaged in negotiations, I am unaware of anything similar in Al Qaeda’s development/politics. The FARC’s behavior played a role in these negotiations breaking down, but to present the Colombian state as this innocent, unified actor fully committed to peace negotiations is to seriously misunderstand Colombian politics. During the Betancur administration violations of the cease-fire occurred on both sides, the Colombian army was actively and publicly opposed to peace negotiations of any kind (and sectors of the Army often acted on this position by assisting paramilitary groups like MAS and others). During Pastrana’s peace process the government negotiated the largest U.S. military aid package in the country’s history while simultaneously watching an explosion of paramilitary violence and presence, a spike that Colombia has come down from but as a recent CINEP study found (and as was presented on this blog the level of political violence is getting down to the first half of the 1990s). Yet, the Colombian state played no role in the breakdown of these negotiations, it was just the FARC? That is way too simplistic.
Sincerely,
Will
June 11th, 2008 at 1:41 pm
You tell me that the total warfare concept is a failure and I tell you that the idea of negotiating is also a failure; neither side is truly commited to negotiating and end. We’re both right to some extent…
So what’s the solution! What are our options? We want to see the guerillas, the paras all go away…., and we also want the rest of the goones in the country to be brought to justice, to pay reperations, to face justice…. and to be fair that would include persons from ALL sides, left/right middle etc. Heck, looking at the totality of the problem in Colombia, everyone is guilty of something. Who’s left, the people on the bottom? Who runs the country?
June 11th, 2008 at 3:13 pm
By the way “Chemotherapy— has been one of those words coined by uribe’s propaganda machine, led by Pablo Escobar Cousin, Uribe’s favorite “counselor”, who has been known to not have any scruples when dealing with human beings or human rights for that matter, purporting to describe what Colombia has gone through during Uribe’s administration, the butchering thousands of peasants and, the “peace and prosperity” derived therefrom”.
June 11th, 2008 at 5:01 pm
Will: I didn’t say paramilitary massacres were not terrible. I AM saying that if it’s your family that’s massacred it matters little whose axe the murderers are grinding. If atrocities against civilians are your issue, take it up equally with the guerrilla. I’ve personally seen more misery at their hands than the paramilitaries, and my view has not been from a telescopic lens out of the window of some embassy or ivory tower.
All insurgencies/internal conflicts are not equal. Sometimes political solutions are possible. I have not suggested otherwise. I don’t think it is the route Colombia should take. I know it’s more convenient for your argument to make this straw man – me cheering for military extermination squads, etc – and tear it down, but nobody is saying that. I am saying that if you are pursuing a military solution against an insurgency who cannot be counted on to negotiate honestly, then a relentless strategy of pursuit, pressure and punishment is valid. It was earlier suggested that it was an invalid strategy and some kind of deception in the “Cheney blew up the levees” style. That is the argument my comment was addressing. To negotiate in Colombia is to abandon the current, legitimate, military campaign because of the nature of it. I neither think that is controversial nor out of touch with what is best for the people there.
I have been in various places in the span of my life where both the guerrilleros and/or their victims lay bloating in the sun. I have never enjoyed these experiences, nor do I lust for war. But I like less the endless stories of innocent lives eviscerated by the depredations of the guerrilla (or the paras). Or of 25 year old guerrilleros in the demob program with stories of how they were pressed into service at the barrel of an AK47 at the age of 12, and have spent the last half of their life hoping that if they left the FARC their families would not be murdered. I think the extension of the rule of law into those rural areas that have traditionally been left to fend for themselves is the best solution. Amidst all this demagoguery, I would just like to see a little more genuine concern for the pueblo. I would really like to hear more from a perspective that resonates with my experiences there. Much of what is said above I think is more informed from someone’s agenda than from objective observations of the lives of the people of Colombia.
June 11th, 2008 at 6:52 pm
An update: a source tells me that “Cuchillo” and “Don Mario” are no longer allied in the Casanare/Meta/Guaviare/Vichada region, and in fact are at odds. Instead, “Cuchillo” is now more closely aligned with wanted narcotrafficker Daniel “El Loco” Barrera.
This doesn’t at all change the point of this post, just wanted to update the details.
June 11th, 2008 at 6:58 pm
Adam, I thought that “Don Mario” was at odds with “Don Berna” and “El Salgareño”, and thus with the colombian state. Do you know if “cuchillo” is now backing up “carepapa” and family ? or is “cuchillo” also at odds with “Don Berna” and “El Salgareño”?
June 11th, 2008 at 9:56 pm
In the 1980s, Colombia was full of dopers and hoods.
Please explain how this is any different from the AUC?
June 12th, 2008 at 12:21 am
Camilla: Sorry for the gap in post as a lot has been said, but I had no internet access until now. My original question was: Can you explain how paramilitaries no longer exist in Casanare when the Casanare Rural-Self Defense forces has not demobilized, and are in fact the only block of the AUC to not do so?
June 12th, 2008 at 1:31 am
Kyle: 40,000 paramilitaries have disarmed. That’s a helluva lot of thugs. If a pocket here or there exists, it’s bad, and they need to be gotten rid of. But Casanare isn’t all that big or important a place. Maybe there are a few there, due to FARC infestations or maybe because they don’t know what else to do. If they are there, they need to be stopped. But across the country as a whole, they’re pretty much gone.
If you go to President Uribe’s Web site, you will see a photo of the vast pyre of guns that was burned by President Uribe’s rightwing government, proving conclusively that paras have been largely disarmed. The burned and melted guns went into making plaques in memory of the victims. I suppose you think it was all an act and President Uribe is still in cahoots with these paras despite the disarmament and honor to the victims. But what I see is extraditions, jailings, gun burnings, plaques recognizing the victims, and other acts that suggest the president is serious about getting rid of these paramilitaries and largely has. It’s real evidence that shouldn’t be dismissed. The biggest problem in the country isn’t a few diehard paras, it’s the FARC.
I have met disarmed paramilitaries. That was how I came to learn they were thugs – they said that where they came from, their only career choices were working for Pablo Escobar or joining the paras and they felt safer with the paras, that’s how wretched these people are. If you watch the documentary ‘La Sierra’ which is about barrio dwellers who join either the paras or the FARC as the neighborhood dictates, you can see easily that these people have no ‘rightwing’ ideology and no opportunities in life either, they are just thugs of necessity. In the documentary, they do get disarmed and then have to start new lives. They are all real people. They aren’t everyone of course, but they do illustrate what happened to most paras. I don’t say there aren’t a few pockets left, but they are no longer the danger that an unrepentant and undisarmed FARC is.
June 12th, 2008 at 2:12 am
[...] “Chemotherapy?â€Yesterday, recounting a visit to the oil-producing department of Casanare, Colombia, Wall Street Journal columnist Mary Anastasia O’Grady wrote one of the most awful things I’ve ever seen published in a mainstream periodical. … [...]
June 12th, 2008 at 5:59 am
Mathematics of Politics:
Officially Pastrana administration handed over around 11.000 paramilitaries and 9.000 guerrilla fighters to the Uribe Government that started 2002.
If there were 40.000 demobilized hoodlums according to what they say, then that would confirm rumors that lots of narcotraffickers were included in the “peace process”, which every smart and informed Colombian knows has been a hoax from the start, in order to legalize their blood money and badly earned assets.
June 12th, 2008 at 6:28 am
Camilla:
Interesting you haven´t responded to my last post….
June 12th, 2008 at 10:54 am
What’s the record for posts on a blog?
June 12th, 2008 at 11:15 am
Chris, for posts on a blog don’t know but for comments to an entry I think it’s 46.
June 12th, 2008 at 11:17 am
The most crucial question right now is: “Are the FARC ready to negotiate?” You answer that, you pretty much have sorted a big chunk of the mess out. There will be other issues later, but this is the biggest one. Now, there are two ways of approaching this question:
1. The hawks’ approach: “Of course the FARC are not ready to negotiate. We can tell you that on the basis of events that happened 6 years ago, during Pastrana’s peace process, with a much different military and political situation on the ground. You may think that 6 years is a lot of time and that, facing all the changes that have taken place, maybe what happened then is not a good predictor of what the FARC think right now. You may argue that since the FARC are human beings that learn from their circumstances, maybe this time around things are different. Well, you’re wrong. They don’t change, they are not even humans. If you don’t believe us, we’ll bring some highly paid contractor that has credentials as a “counterinsurgency expert” to tell you that you’re wrong. If you keep shaking your head, we’ll make up lots of historical analogies and, for good measure, toss in some unintelligible psycho-babble just to make sure you don’t understand. But the point is clear. You’re wrong, the FARC will not negotiate.”
2. The approach that the peace camp proposes is: “Instead of scratching our heads about what the FARC think right now, based on the little we know about them from 6 years ago, what about the radical idea of just asking them? We can initiate contacts, start the peace process while fighting. If we see that things are headed in the right direction, then we can get to a cease-fire. If not, we keep fighting.”
I support number 2.
June 12th, 2008 at 11:24 am
Oh! Something else: may I propose a rule of discussion: “don’t question your opponent’s concern for Colombia”? The reason I bring this up is because always, from both sides, someone will accuse the other one of not carrying about the country. Of all the rhetorical offenses that have been committed here, I think this one is serious because it has substantive consequences.
It works this way: in a war you can always find something that works. You go to the right town, at the right moment and you’ll see people talking about security improvements, children going back to school, roads been paved, the works. Then someone tells you that maybe we should try something else and you’re so emotionally attached to these good people that surely your opponent must not care about them. Right?
Well, the problem with this approach is that, in real life you never get to see the counterfactual. Those of us in the peace camp of course feel happy for the people whose lives are getting better thanks to the advances of the Colombian Army. But we wonder if, as a whole, the country isn’t paying a high price for these advances. We wonder if we could achieve better and faster results if we combined this work of the Army with some political craftmanship to start negotiations.
The honest truth is: we don’t know. But the hawks don’t know either, so stop pretending that you know the right answer. Life is uncertain and we have to deal with risks all the time while caring a lot.
June 12th, 2008 at 11:29 am
Camilla, 31,671 paras demobilized, the rest that make up around the 40,000 are the vast majority guerrillas. And you should be embarrassed. Casanare is not that important of a place. (1) That’s not true. (2) Even if it were, there are people there, and that matters. Remember, human rights are for everyone. Not just people in “important” places. Why are they there still as well? Only because there is a FARC presence? Maybe because there are massive narcotrafficking routes that run through the department as well? (But according to you, not a possibility).
You’re assumption on my opinion about the peace process and Uribe is wrong. If you want, I can send you a rough (emphasize rough) draft of an essay I wrote about the peace process based on the theories of transitional justice and the progress of the peace process. I don’t know if I really can put priority on the problems with the armed conflict. FARC is now the biggest operating group, and they are a huge problem. But I would say the biggest problem is the continued existence of the underlying causes of the conflict, and the causes that fuel the conflict. Addressing these would, in theory, hurt ALL armed groups, from the FARC, to the ELN, to the paras, and so on. Perhaps narcotrafficking in general would another problem bigger than the FARC.
I have seen La Sierra, and I should first remind you that the two groups in the movie were the paras and ELN: NOT THE FARC!
Also, members of the defunct Bloque Cacique Nutibara (and Metro) are continuing their old activities in and around the small barrios of Medellin. I also agree that a lot of people see para/guerrilla groups as a job and join sometimes (but not always) out of necessity. This would be an underlying cause/fuel of the conflict. Also, the UN in its human rights report this year classified the new “emerging groups” as official actors in the armed conflict by saying they have a clear command structure, have the military capacity to control territory, etc for all the things necessary according to the Geneva Conventions Protocol II of 1977. So pretty much gone? These groups already are larger in size than the ELN! 5,000 fighters are a lot, especially when they’ve been able to organize themselves so quickly post-demobilization. The FARC are a huge danger of course but these groups are quite telling as well. 5,000 people are not “a few diehard paras.”
Also, Uribe really doesn’t know a whole lot about honoring victims (or transitional justice in general). Rhetoric is one thing; action is another.
Also, is this 47? The alleged new record?
June 12th, 2008 at 11:30 am
Nope it was 49, and this is 50. Casanare not that important? Ha! That’s like saying Arauca isn’t important either.
June 12th, 2008 at 12:05 pm
In response to comments on FARC and paramilitary members (I think William talked about someone who was forced to join the FARC when he was 12) Francisco Gutierrez has an excellent piece on the reasons why people have joined these organizations and their social characteristics (”Tellinig the Difference: Guerrillas and Paramilitaries in the Colombian War” in POLITICS AND SOCIETY, MARCH 2008). Now I know he is in the “ivory tower” thus illegitimate in some of your eyes, but in his analysis of different interview data sets of demobilized paramilitary and guerrilla members he found the following:
For the guerrilla, the reasons for joining were (this was from a 2002 dataset):
20% forced recruitment
20% allure of weapons and uniforms
16% false promises of salaries, good treatment
12% ideological conviction
10% fear or vengeance against the Army or paramilitaries
From a 2004 database of the Paramilitary Reinsertados of the Bloque Cacique Nutibara it found that their involvement in a previous armed group broke down in the following way:
37% had been enaged in common delinquency/gangs prior to joining
4.5% had been a part of other paramilitary entities
9.4% had served in the Army
48% no involvement prior to joining the para
.53% had been with the FARC
Finally, a database made up of 418 judicial proceedings (between 1989 and 2003) for FARC and AUC members found that:
-The average # of years of education for a FARC member was 4.94, the average for an AUC member was 9.4
-The proportion that were peasants and workers: 86% of the FARC; 32% of the para
-Average age: FARC, 21.98; AUC, 32.85
I am in full agreement with lFM position set above, steps toward a negotiated resolution do not equate to ending the military campaign…again Colombia’s military build-up, expansion began under the “peace-loving” Pastrana administration before the Uribe era began.
Best,
Will
June 12th, 2008 at 12:26 pm
Will:
Precious source of data that I was not aware of. You don’t know how helpful this is for me! Thanks.
June 12th, 2008 at 1:07 pm
Just want to point out I’m still around and reading this, despite some technical problems that probably shouldn’t be ranted about here.
This discussion is fairly interesting, but I’ve only browsed through it (and other recent blog posts) briefly, so I’d rather not jump in immediately without being up to date.
June 12th, 2008 at 1:59 pm
Perhaps the buildup began under Pastrana, but it’s been Uribe who fully unleashed it. Also, I would agree there’s a point at which you *may* be able to negotiate with vicious terrorists like the FARC, but only after you have them by the bloodied throat. They were nowhere near that condition under Pastrana, so hence the catastrophic failure of the peace process. Most commenters here(like LFM) are loathe to admit this, lest Uribe get an ounce of credit.
Regarding O’Grady’s article, my wife grew up in Colombia in a lower middle class neigborhood. In other words, very poor by USA standards. I’ve heard her and her friends make fairly similiar comments as O’Grady about the paras. I’ve also heard her express pure hatred for the FARC who she sees as the root of the problem. Clearly, my experience is anecdotal, but I think it demonstrates O’Grady’s point-of-view has a representation in Colombia even though you may disagree with it.
June 12th, 2008 at 2:14 pm
For the record my experience has been similar to what William and Paul have stated. My wife’s family is middle class, from Cali or the surrounding areas i.e. Florida. They don’t glorify the paras and they seek justice, but they have a much greater disdain for the guerrilla… their view of the paras is that they started out with good intentions, but later got caught up in the drugs and were corrupted… at which point they look at me and chide the U.S. for the drug problem.
When you talk about the FARC… they have absolutely nothing good to say about them.
So, I guess you can tell where some of my perspectives come from.
June 12th, 2008 at 2:35 pm
I wonder why is it that gringo’s are fond of marrying middle class exotic third world women, what with first world ones not knowing the times table yonder than three.
June 12th, 2008 at 2:48 pm
My family is from Cadiz, Spain. They would not have gotten along with an American family…different views on life in general. The latter plus the military and a love for all things Colombian led to my “fondness”…oh and BTW, I am not some 50+ cradle robber….I am only 30.
June 12th, 2008 at 3:28 pm
Will, great source it seems by this data. I hadn’t really been searching too much in the academic journals. Thanks!
June 12th, 2008 at 3:45 pm
I wonder if I can critique the statistics presented here (I haven’t read the whole article yet): The Block Cacique Nutibara was very city-oriented, which is to say that because of their control in the cities, we are probably looking at the high end of certain #s: in a gang before, years of education, even the high % of people with no criminal past before joining the paras. While we all know that these #s help but are not 100% indicative, I think we can probably put the #s from the Cacique Nutibara on the high end of the scale regarding those statistics. Keep in mind, I haven’t read the article, but these are my first thoughts.
June 12th, 2008 at 5:00 pm
I guess it may seem contradictory that being a city-based faction, the Cacique Nutibara would show a high amount of both people in gangs and people not involved in crime. In Medellin, the history of gang-paramilitary relationships goes back well over a decade, at least. At the same time, people may not be involved in crimes because there is more opportunity; opportunity to be in school, be at work, be at home, etc. Yet for some reason these people changed their minds. Because of these other opportunities I also think the numbers for Cacique Nutibara are on the upper end of the spectrum. We also know the Caciques actively looked for support/subordination/inclusion of gangs that existed in Medellin. This probably accounts for the high % of previous criminals. The rest, well, we have to ask why they went from no crime (and most likely taking part in other activities, such as school, work, etc) to being a paraco…