The Colombian government this week scuttled a Jimmy Carter-brokered deal to set Colombia and Ecuador back on the road to diplomatic relations, which were broken following the Colombian raid into Ecuadorian territory that killed FARC leader Raúl Reyes. Here is an analysis, and a translation of Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa’s strong comments, from CIP Associate Abigail Poe.
On March 3rd of this year, Ecuador pulled its ambassador from Colombia, halting diplomatic relations two days after the raid on a FARC camp in Ecuadorian territory that killed Raul Reyes and 24 others. At the time, it was not clear when diplomatic relations would be restored – but it would have been hard to believe that two and a half months later, relations between Colombia and Ecuador would still be broken off, and on the verge of getting worse.
Tensions have stayed high, and the potential for restored diplomatic relations delayed, by documents from Raúl Reyes’ computer hinting that officials from the government of Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa maintained ties to the FARC. However, two weeks ago, with the help of mediation by former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, Ecuador and Colombia agreed to restore diplomatic relations at the charge d’affaires level. According to the two governments, the restoration of relations at this level was to happen sometime this week.
Over the weekend, though, the agreement to renew diplomatic relations between Colombia and Ecuador collapsed when Colombian Foreign Minister Fernando Araújo said his country would hold back its diplomats in responseto Correa’s “aggressive†comments published in an Argentine newspaper, Página 12, on Sunday. In the article, Correa stated that in order to reestablish full diplomatic relations with Colombia, the Colombian government would have to fully explain the March 1 raid, adding charges that the bombs used in the attack came from the United States.
Ecuador’s Foreign Minister Maria Isabel Salvador, who told El Tiempo last week that the restoration of diplomatic relations to the charge d’affaires level was “only one step in the total re-establishment of confidence between the two countries,†responded to Araújo with a declaration that Ecuador has dropped plans to renew ties with Colombia and is considering limiting bilateral trade “if the situation does not improve, above all in Colombia’s position toward Ecuador.â€
Just last week, it looked like Colombia and Ecuador were on the path toward ending what has become one of the longest-lasting diplomatic standoffs in Latin America’s recent history. Unfortunately, today’s news makes it look like the bickering between two neighboring countries may continue for an indeterminate period, especially if Ecuador goes through with limiting trade.
Here is a translation of a portion of the interview with Correa that inspired Colombia’s government to postpone the re-establishment of diplomatic ties once again:
(From: “Ganar las elecciones no es ganar el poder,†by Mario Wainfeld, Pagina 12, 6/22/2008)
- What is the current situation with Colombia, given last month’s international aggression?
- We are the assaulted ones, we get to set the timetable. We have taken a step, to reestablish relations at the chargé d’affaires level. We have a very hot border, it is good to have fluid communications. But in order to establish full relations, we are going to demand that this attack be fully clarified. The bombs were North American and, according to reports by our armed forces, they could not have been dropped from Colombian planes. It is very probable that three of the wounded, according to forensic reports, were finished off after the attacks. The Ecuadorian citizens who were killed there died from blows to the neck and not from shots or bombs.
- To what point can Ecuador control the border militarily?
- Impossible. It is a very porous border. The United States can’t control the passage of immigrants to their territory and are building a wall. And there isn’t a jungle there. Here, there are 400, 500 kilometers of the Amazon jungle. The world has to understand that the problem is not Ecuador, that the problem is Colombia. And that each time a FARC patrol crosses into Ecuador, it means that it crossed out of Colombia. We have 13 military posts on the border, when we would need (in times of peace) one-fourth that amount. Colombia has two. Colombia’s strategy is to resolve the problem by removing forces from its southern border, they want to involve us.
-T he hypothesis is that Ecuador is a kind of wall…
- It is the Yankee strategy: they attack from the north to the south, leave the southern border unmanned so that we must make the effort. This also infuriates us. Do you know how many Colombian refugees we have in our country? Four hundred thousand Colombians, seventeen thousand with refugee status, there are many more requests. The problem is not with the Colombian people, the problem is with Uribe.
June 26th, 2008 at 12:46 am
Correa: ‘Uribe is a meanie’
http://www.eltiempo.com/colombia/politica/2008-06-25/presidente-rafael-correa-descarta-reanudar-relaciones-con-colombia-mientras-uribe-sea-presidente_4347798-1
June 26th, 2008 at 1:14 am
Unfortunately, whatever I could say about Correa’s declarations, I find that the Colombian government overreacted and started yet another cycle of rhetorical confrontation, which may or may not go beyond that if left alone.
Why? Feel free to speculate, but I will stop there.
On the other hand, I find that Colombia does have a right to complain about what Ortega and Nicaragua have been doing (perhaps not the asylum per se, but a lot of other things).
June 26th, 2008 at 2:27 am
I’m just glad refugees are getting some attention. True, it’s attention tha
June 26th, 2008 at 2:33 am
I’m just glad refugees are getting some attention. True, it’s attention that makes them into a political pawn, but there are more refugees in Ecuador than any other Latin American country and no one seems to take note. Maybe now that Correa has voiced the fact that the percentage of recognized refugees in Ecuador is miniscule compared to their total population, he’ll actually do something to get more people legal refugee status. Because what he didn’t mention is that his goverment, just like every government before it and since refugees started fleeing from Colombia to Ecuador en masse after Plan Colombia began, has only recognized about two thirds of requests for refugee status. 17,000 out of 400,000 is pathetic.
June 26th, 2008 at 7:25 am
I’ll do a posting on this subject over at my blog later today.
Two things about Correa:
1) He can’t seem to keep him mouth shut a lot of the time. If he and his government are (were) really serious about repairing relations with Colombia, he shouldn’t (wouldn’t) have said the things he said in the interview in Argentina. He knows the Colombians and Uribe very well. Did he really think the GOC would say nothing after the interview? As well, the Colombians have not terminated the rapprochement effort; Correa did. One wonders whether Correa was in fact looking for a pretext to do just what he’s done in scotching the reconciliation work of the Carter Center…
2) Correa is disengenuous in his remarks regarding Ecuadorian security efforts in the north. It’s true that the GOC has beefed up security presence substantially in the north over the years, but most of that’s happened in previous adminstrations, not on Correa’s watch. Notwithstanding all of those garrisons, though, and the discovery of dozens of FARC encampments on Ecuador’s soil, the Ecuadorians have never, ever captured, wounded or killed one genuine FARC (or for that matter, AUC) member – ever, punto. Grrrr. I gotta go..
June 26th, 2008 at 10:02 am
Tambopaxi, I´m not sure about the last part of your second point. Doesn´t the early January 2004 arrest of Ricardo Palmera, alias “Simón Trinidad,” count for something? I´m no expert on the topic, but even for a joint Ecuadorian-Colombian-US operation, that seems to be a pretty notable contribution on the part of the Ecuadorians.
June 26th, 2008 at 11:31 am
Tambo,
I really don’t see how Correa’s position is unreasonable, 13 military posts from Ecuador to Colombia’s 2 on the border? Over 400,000 refugees? All of this from a conflict that has nothing to do with the internal politics or conflicts within Ecuador, but everything to do with an insurgency dedicated to a militarized strategy facing a government whose central aim is to destroy them militarily (as well as the various social and political factors underlying the continuation of the conflict). Given the relative weakness of the Ecuadorian security forces compared to Colombia’s how much should the world expect of Ecuador which has not received billions in mostly U.S. military aid since 2000 like Colombia? If Ecuador has long not been able (or willing according to Tambo) to go after the FARC, does it make much sense to villify Correa on this issue? Also, in regards to Tambo’s last line the FARC (and others) seems to disagree with your assertion that Ecuador has never “never, ever captured, wounded or killed†one genuine FARC member (see below). There does seem to be evidence of capture and the destruction of FARC bases, though not much on deaths in support of one of Tambo’s points. However if the Ecuadorian government does not view the FARC as a military enemy (or as terrorists for that matter) and if the government has scarce resources to expend should we expect high levels of combat between the two groups? Would Uribe and the U.S. government be satisfied if Ecuador implemented sometime “Plan Patriota†for its border, detaining civilians, perhaps working with private groups to intimidate or assassinate community leaders that have been working with the FARC in some of these Ecuadorian communities? I think one counterinsurgency war of internal displacement, massacres and selective assassinations is enough for South America, don’t you?
Best,
-Will
Below is from a FARC statement in 2005:
“We regret the subservient and servile attitude of Lucio Gutierrez’s government (Ecuador’s president at the time) regarding the interventionist and fascist policies of Bush-Uribe as demonstrated on 2 January 2004 when it facilitated the kidnapping of comrade Simon Trinidad real name Ricardo Palmera by repressive agencies in service to Alvaro Uribe…….
This miserable attitude is repeated with the detention of seven members of the FARC-EP, who were in Ecuador, receiving medical treatment, wounded and ill, without conducting any other activity and, in disregard of the most elemental principals of International Humanitarian Law, they were turned over to the fascist government of Alvaro Uribe…..â€
From 2001:
“Quito, 22 June: An alleged commander of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) was arrested in Sucumbios Province, on Ecuador’s northern border, it was revealed today by Gen Jose Villacis, the acting commander-general of the police.â€
From BBC Broadcasts, 2000:
“On 13th June, an operation by Ecuador’s counternarcotics police that was dubbed “Arsenal 4″ broke up a criminal organization of Ecuadorans and Colombians that supplied the FARC with weaponry, ammunition, foodstuffs, uniforms and other items, according to information provided to ‘El Espectador’…â€
Finally, from Ecuador’s Defense Minister (Wellington Sandoval) on the Defense Ministry’s website: http://www.midena.gov.ec/content/view/5543/207/
Desde 2004 a hoy desmontamos 117 bases de las FARC y destruimos acciones de otros grupos ilegales (paramilitares, narcos, criminales). Detuvimos y deportamos a cientos de personas. Y ahora nosotros, paÃs neutral en un conflicto que es de Colombia, para defender nuestra soberanÃa debemos enviar más soldados, miles más, que nos cuestan mucho dinero, y desafectar soldados que están haciendo socorro en la zona de emergencia de las inundaciones. Y agrega el ministro: “El presidente Uribe tiene muchÃsimo más dinero, soldados y tecnologÃa, pero descuidó la zona sur de su paÃs. Es de él la responsabilidad. No debe empujar más a las FARC hacia nosotros, sin contro lar esa parte de su paÃs, esa selva del sudeste colombiano que su Estado tiene abandonada hace años”.
June 26th, 2008 at 11:56 am
Will: But I wonder why Ecuador has outright refused to even coordinate security efforts, long before this incident, in any real manner beyond the COMBIFRON which is mostly a reactive body and not a real form of coordination. If resources are so limited, then I’d imagine better coordination would make up for it.
Also, I think you should read some of Adam’s blog posts on U.S. aid for Colombia, to get a bit of perspective on what it’s mostly used for, not just focus on the figures alone and leave the details in a void. Plus those which mention Colombia’s own defense budget, for that matter.
Finally, I don’t think it’s a matter of saying that any further Ecuadorian effort would result in abuses, or that all those abuses are inherent to any Colombian counterinsurgency effort. Seems like a bit of a straw man, frankly.
June 26th, 2008 at 1:37 pm
The truth is for one reason or another, nobody in south america is buying rag doll uribe’s campaign selling the terrorist damnation motto on the FARC.
It’s a pity, but the Colombian stooge is on his own with all of his henchmen in this one.
June 26th, 2008 at 4:57 pm
JCG,
You write:
“But I wonder why Ecuador has outright refused to even coordinate security efforts, long before this incident, in any real manner beyond the COMBIFRON which is mostly a reactive body and not a real form of coordination. If resources are so limited, then I’d imagine better coordination would make up for it.”
So Ecuador is assisting in the counter-insurgency effort through COMBIFRON, but you want them to engage in greater “coordination” against an actor that they view as having legitimate political objectives and that is not attacking their military forces? Again, without greater military assistance (weaponry, funds) as well as a political rationale, it does not make much sense to me for them to sacrifice their troops and material to help Colombia implement its militarized strategy.
“Also, I think you should read some of Adam’s blog posts on U.S. aid for Colombia, to get a bit of perspective on what it’s mostly used for, not just focus on the figures alone and leave the details in a void.”
Its not mostly dedicated to the Colombian security forces (the national police and the military)? Thats news to me, could you please clarify what sector or sectors of Colombia’s state has received most of the U.S. aid since 2000?
“Finally, I don’t think it’s a matter of saying that any further Ecuadorian effort would result in abuses, or that all those abuses are inherent to any Colombian counterinsurgency effort. Seems like a bit of a straw man, frankly.”
“Straw man”? Colombia’s counterinsurgency war has been associated with one of the largest internal displacement crises in the world, is it the only reason why people have been displaced, no…is it a central factor, yes. Historically counterinsurgency wars have regularly been associated with a whole variety of human rights abuses, displacements, ethnic cleansings, (El Salvador, Vietnam, Guatemala, Iraq, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Chiapas, etc…). I am not sure what you think counter-insurgency warfare entails, but I am not constructing anything for a sake of an argument.
Best,
Will
June 26th, 2008 at 9:04 pm
“The Colombian government this week scuttled a Jimmy Carter-brokered deal to set Colombia and Ecuador back on the road to diplomatic relations, which were broken following the Colombian raid into Ecuadorian territory that killed FARC leader Raúl Reyes. Here is an analysis, and a translation of Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa’s strong comments, from CIP Associate Abigail Poe.”
To be fair the Ecuadorian govt also “scuttled” the Carter initiative.
June 27th, 2008 at 1:39 am
What I want to see is Ecuador cut off all trade to Colombia in the name of national honor or whatever. According to a market note from Goldman Sachs:
C’mon, Raf! Don’t be a party pooper. Cut off trade to Colombia like you want. Go on, do it!
June 27th, 2008 at 12:58 pm
Will: The thing is, the COMBIFRON is little more than an “Office of Claims and Complaints”. Or was, anyways.
There have also been public declarations of Ecuadorian officials, in the past not just during the present, saying that they would not coordinate efforts or engage in joint operations. It’s not hard to find them.
Again, that would not automatically require greater assistance but, to say the least, I would imagine there are ways to arrange for it, if that were the problem. I’d even think they are just simply afraid of being affected by the conflict, understandably, but that is mostly inevitable, as long as the war goes on.
Need I remind you that FARC does violate Ecuador’s sovereignty and, as far as we know, has no permission to set up military camps or to use Ecuador as resting or staging grounds? However, most of Ecuador’s efforts have basically being limited to finding empty encampments, from which the overwhelming majority of guerrillas have already fled, and officially speaking they didn’t even know that “Raúl Reyes” had a semi-permanent (or at least seasonal) base in their own border area. It wasn’t just a bonfire camp either.
Considering that, I think it’s warranted to ask for more cooperation, just as, for the sake of being accurate and fair, I also believe Ecuador has some valid complaints and demands.
I believe you are assuming too much by saying that means Ecuador, by default and not necessarily the current administration per se, thinks FARC has “legitimate political objectives”, considering their ultimate political objective is, naturally, to seize power through force of arms and revolution, period. Everything else is promises or “good intentions”, but they are impossible to accomplish unless they win (or even if).
I do not recall that being used as an argument by Ecuador, so I won’t discuss the matter at length (not that it changes much, under the circumstances, even if I were to do so)
“Its not mostly dedicated to the Colombian security forces (the national police and the military)? Thats news to me, could you please clarify what sector or sectors of Colombia’s state has received most of the U.S. aid since 2000?”
That wasn’t what I said, nor what I believe Adam has said. It would be, again, more useful if you were to read those blog posts directly.
Looking at the tables of aid percentages and absolutely nothing else, you’d have a point, which I am not trying to deny. But I’m asking you to try and look beyond that, even on this very site.
What I meant, in other words, is to look at what that aid is specifically used for, in practice, and how relevant it is to the counterinsurgency and security effort as a whole, as well as how it contrasts with the amounts of money Colombia itself spends on security.
If I still haven’t made my point clear, I can try and look for the links again, but I’d invite you to take the initiative as well, if you choose to do so. I insist it’s not just a matter of looking at overall figures and percentages.
“Colombia’s counterinsurgency war has been associated with one of the largest internal displacement crises in the world, is it the only reason why people have been displaced, no…is it a central factor, yes. Historically counterinsurgency wars have regularly been associated with a whole variety of human rights abuses, displacements, ethnic cleansings, (El Salvador, Vietnam, Guatemala, Iraq, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Chiapas, etc…). I am not sure what you think counter-insurgency warfare entails, but I am not constructing anything for a sake of an argument.”
Even though that makes complete sense, on the surface…I think it’s more complicated than that, as far as my particular point goes.
What I’m trying to say is this: It is not necessary for every single operation or effort to result in abuses, at least not to the same degree, so the very fact that Ecuador could provide more cooperation by coordinating efforts doesn’t mean it would automatically result in, say, Ecuadorian paramilitarism or torture to name a couple of examples.
Unless you assume that every unit, soldier or operation is inherently going to lead to such things, equally and unequivocally.
It’s clear the conflict as a whole does, that much is obvious on a macro level and goes along with what you just wrote, but I see no reason to generalize in such an absolute manner in a micro level. And that’s where I’m trying to make a point.
Finally, the war in Colombia isn’t just insurgents vs. counterinsurgents at this point, and displacement has also been associated to processes of land concentration, drug trafficking, fumigations and resource disputes which, while not entirely unrelated, can’t really be described as merely products of the war, even if they interact with it and its actors.
June 27th, 2008 at 2:44 pm
JCG,
“I’d even think they are just simply afraid of being affected by the conflict, understandably, but that is mostly inevitable, as long as the war goes on.”
They definitely seem to be afraid of being affected and based on what you and Tambo have written they have long done a decent job of not being affected (in terms losses of soldiers/civilians in combat). Of course, they have been affected by refugees and Uribe’s recent bombing action. They have also been affected by having to dedicate their few resources to guarding a border that Colombia has been unable/unwilling to properly secure. The resources that Adam and others have written about don’t all go to counterinsurgency (I never wrote this), but they do allow the Colombian state to free up its own resources and dedicate more of them to this purpose. My only point is that its the type of assistance that Ecuador lacks and could use, but their government is still criticized by you and Tambo for their lack of cooperation.
“What I’m trying to say is this: It is not necessary for every single operation or effort to result in abuses, at least not to the same degree, so the very fact that Ecuador could provide more cooperation by coordinating efforts doesn’t mean it would automatically result in, say, Ecuadorian paramilitarism or torture to name a couple of examples”
I would agree with the point not every single military operation by the Colombian armed forces (or potential future Ecuadorian ones) would lead to human rights abuses, I was responding to your point that “that [not] all those abuses are inherent to any Colombian counterinsurgency effort”…Colombia’s counterinsurgency effort as well as others have regularly involved human rights abuses, I believe its quite inherent with the difficulties and challenges faced by any military that confronts an enemy that moves in and out of society.
In regards to Ecuador’s future role the devil is in the details, what sort of “coordinating efforts” are you talking about? To what extent would this “cooperation” lead the FARC to begin targeting/attacking the Ecuadorian military? In other words, once Ecuador begins this path that you are recommending where will it end for the Ecuadorian military, Ecuadorian civil society or the government? I think these are reasonable concerns and contribute to an understanding of the government’s reluctance to get involved in a more substantial way in Colombia’s war.
Best,
Will
p.s. “Finally, the war in Colombia isn’t just insurgents vs. counterinsurgents at this point, and displacement has also been associated to processes of land concentration, drug trafficking, fumigations and resource disputes which, while not entirely unrelated, can’t really be described as merely products of the war, even if they interact with it and its actors.”
I agree and my previous post does not conflict with this point.
June 28th, 2008 at 12:41 am
Will: You are right, the devil is certainly in the details.
“The resources that Adam and others have written about don’t all go to counterinsurgency (I never wrote this), but they do allow the Colombian state to free up its own resources and dedicate more of them to this purpose. My only point is that its the type of assistance that Ecuador lacks and could use, but their government is still criticized by you and Tambo for their lack of cooperation.”
Has Ecuador made any concrete proposals which would aim to resolve that lack of resources?
Aside from Plan Ecuador, which is essentially a social development plan, at least from what little I’ve looked into it, and not really what we are talking about here (though, for the record, I also think a lot more of that is necessary in Colombia, for obvious reasons, but it isn’t the point so I won’t expand on it as much as I probably should, in another situation).
I may well be going out on a limb here, but I could conceive of Colombia or even the U.S. being willing to provide Ecuador with resources, directly or indirectly (loans, debt exchange, money, whatever applies) if that was all there was to it.
“I would agree with the point not every single military operation by the Colombian armed forces (or potential future Ecuadorian ones) would lead to human rights abuses, I was responding to your point that “that [not] all those abuses are inherent to any Colombian counterinsurgency effortâ€â€¦Colombia’s counterinsurgency effort as well as others have regularly involved human rights abuses, I believe its quite inherent with the difficulties and challenges faced by any military that confronts an enemy that moves in and out of society.”
But I believe those abuses can, and should, be reduced as much as possible (which is one of the reasons I think human rights NGOs and other critics do extremely valuable work, even in principle, and should be respected regardless of particular disagreements, not treated like “terrorists”, even when they say things which are either the painful truth or just otherwise bothersome for the government)…even to the extent that they may not be an issue in these particular circumstances.
“In regards to Ecuador’s future role the devil is in the details, what sort of “coordinating efforts†are you talking about? To what extent would this “cooperation†lead the FARC to begin targeting/attacking the Ecuadorian military? In other words, once Ecuador begins this path that you are recommending where will it end for the Ecuadorian military, Ecuadorian civil society or the government? I think these are reasonable concerns and contribute to an understanding of the government’s reluctance to get involved in a more substantial way in Colombia’s war.”
I would need to be an expert on such matters to provide a truly comprehensive and accurate reply. Since I am not, but should still say something…there could probably be a much more fluid communication between the armed forces of both nations, to the extent that Ecuador would know when Colombia is going to execute a certain operation, and vice versa, which could improve the efficiency of both forces and even allow for joint operations or, to address another point, the sharing of resources if necessary.
It’s easy to say that there is already some communication, but it is limited because, again, Ecuadorian officials have publicly said that they do not want joint operations in the first place, and because Colombia complains about Ecuador always arriving late, to find empty FARC camps and little else, which led to distrust and, apparently, the attack on the “Raúl Reyes” base.
It is hard to measure how much this would impact Ecuador itself, and I recognize you are pointing to valid worries, but it isn’t so difficult to imagine that FARC could be further weakened in turn, and that the conflict could be reduced in intensity and length, including FARC’s capacity to defend itself from a two sided. This isn’t guaranteed, but it is somewhat logical to imagine that the more enemies FARC has, the more difficult the war will be for them.
In some ways, to simplify this a bit, though perhaps too much…it’s kind of like the guy who set his own house on fire and wants everyone else to help him. The neighbors fear being burnt, but if they just stand and watch, they’ll still get a lot of smoke in their faces over a potentially longer time and the occasional burn as well. If they tried to help the guy to fix what is admittedly a problem of his own creation, they might get a lot burns, but the problem could be resolved earlier and easier, if everyone knows what they are doing. Both positions can be defended, I’m not arguing one is necessarily superior to the other.
July 3rd, 2008 at 9:17 am
Will, Steve, I apologize for not getting back to you all earlier on your comments. I don’t check in on postings and comments all the time, and when I do, don’t have time to respond.
In any event, my comments about absence of FARC captives or casualties relates to the camps in the north, not events elsewhere in Ecuador, such as the capture of Comandante Trinidad cited by.. Will, I believe. The various governments of Ecuador over the years have known about the presence of FARC members and allies in country and again, have done little or nothing about it.
The latest high profile example of this was the Ecuadorian citizen Aisalla, who was killed along with Reyes on March 1. Turns out the military had known about this guy and others around him for years and done nothing (which pissed off Correa, btw).
Correa’s anger brings me to my next point regarding lack of captives/casualties. I want to note again that this has gone on for years, not just during Correa’s administration. The very newspaper article that Will references regarding over 100 encampments found, highlights the point that in every case, not one person was held or caught. (I should note one interesting, little noted incident took place last November, when the FAE grabbed two Colombians and three Ecuadorians in the vicinity of the one of the camps, but then let them go, saying that there was no evidence that they were FARC…)
Will makes the point that the Correa (and previous administrations) has made that they don’t want Ecuador dragged into the Colombian conflict. All well and good, but the fact is that FARC (and I believe there is AUC presence in country as well, btw) has been here in force and armed, for years. So it gets down to this: Is Correa serious about the soberania that he touts when he attacks the GOC, or not? Because if he is, then he’s going have to do something serious about the armed (FARC and AUC) presence in this country and either evict these guys are bring them down… Gotta go, regards, and thanks for your civil comments, you two…