The commander of U.S. Southern Command, Admiral James Stavridis, gave his annual “Posture Statement” testimony [PDF] before the House and Senate this week. One new element was increased expression of concerns about activities of Islamic terrorist groups in the region.
Another threat to the United States is the nexus with Islamic radical terrorism. In August of last year, U.S. Southern Command supported a Drug Enforcement Administration operation, in coordination with host countries, which targeted a Hizballah-connected drug trafficking organization in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Last October, we supported another interagency operation that resulted in the arrests of several dozen individuals in Colombia associated with a Hizballah-connected drug trafficking and money laundering ring. …
Islamic terrorist networks are also active, primarily involved in fundraising and logistical support for parent organizations based in the Middle East, such as Hizballah and Hamas. Individuals with terrorist training and experience who could support or conduct terrorist attacks in our hemisphere may be present in the region, and our intelligence has demonstrated that pre-operational and operational activities have indeed occurred, as exemplified by the attempt to blow up fuel pipelines at the JFK airport in New York in 2007.
Islamic terrorist networks are present in the Tri-border Area, as well as several other locations in the region. A robust Hizballah financial support network exists in the region, as well as an active group of sympathizers and supporters of Hizballah. Also present are Sunni groups, including Hamas, whose members possess operational backgrounds. Moreover, known al-Qa’ida members have journeyed to Latin America and the Caribbean and other terrorist-inspired Islamic radicals have been arrested in the region.
- Admiral Stavridis won’t be commanding Southern Command for much longer. The Defense Department on Wednesday announced his nomination to head NATO as the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.
- In several Colombian cities at once, “emerging” paramilitary groups posted flyers threatening specific individuals. The newsmagazine Cambio reports that people mentioned in some of the threatening flyers have begun to be killed.
- Seven fishermen were massacred, likely by an “emerging” paramilitary group, in the northwestern Colombian department of Chocó.
- U.S. Senator Patrick Leahy continues to place a hold on $72 million in military aid to Colombia, pending progress in prosecuting cases of “false positives”: hundreds of civilians allegedly killed by the military, then presented as guerrillas or paramilitaries killed in combat.
- Two recent articles in the Colombian newsmagazine Semana indicate that Colombia’s security forces believe they are near capturing or killing one of the FARC’s most powerful leaders, Secretariat member and Eastern Bloc leader Jorge Briceño, alias “El Mono Jojoy.”
- Semana also published an important three-article series on the conflict’s victims’ frustrating and dangerous efforts to recover land that paramilitary groups stole from them – and the resulting “counter-land reform” that Colombia’s countryside has experienced.
- Far-right intellectual Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, whom Ãlvaro Uribe had named to serve as Colombia’s ambassador to Portugal, devoted a column in today’s El Tiempo to attacking Colombia’s attorney-general, Mario Iguarán, for seeking to punish military human-rights abuse. The prose borders on the truly hilarious.
“The Attorney-General’s Office” – I have written – “is the best ally in the judicial warfare being fought against the Army.” I proved that when a member of the office’s Human Rights Unit, an expert in charges against the military, told me in secret: “I’m the only one here who isn’t a friend of the communists.” The FARC’s infiltration of the Attorney-General’s Office and the rest of the judicial branch has been lengthy, slow, and very effective. If Mario Iguarán hasn’t noticed, it is because his advisors and friends move in circles of the old left, supporters of dialogue [with guerrillas] and of Chávez and adversaries of Uribe, for whom any charge against a military officer, orchestrated by a press starving for front-page news, is worth its weight in gold. On the other hand, those of us who denounce the falsehood of these charges are seen by them as representatives of the extreme right. Are they “useful idiots?” That is what Lenin affectionately called those who, without knowing it, helped the Bolsheviks.
- Bolivia’s government says it is working on a “new framework agreement” to guide future relations with the United States.
- President Obama called Mauricio Funes, the new president-elect of El Salvador from the FMLN insurgency-turned-political party, on Wednesday. “The President said he looked forward to working with the new Salvadoran administration and expressed his desire for developing an ongoing dialogue to ensure a productive relationship,” read the White House statement.
- Obama also met last weekend in Washington with Brazilian President Luis Inacio Lula da Silva, spoke on the phone with Argentina’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, and will visit Mexico a week before the April 23 Summit of the Americas.
- Vice-President Joe Biden will be in San José, Costa Rica on March 30 to meet with Central America’s presidents. Funes will attend. So will Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega.
March 21st, 2009 at 1:37 pm
I have also come across this statement made by US Southern Command in regards to islamist groups’ involvement in Latin America, as well as the opening of Iranian embassies in the region. Another claim by US SOCOM and has been sounded off by media outlets and the blogoshpere is that the FARC is now the largest cocaine supplier in the world. Are there any basis to these claims (other than the opening of embassies)? Or is the State Dept and the Armed Forces stepping up their institutional rhetoric against the FARC and other rebel movements?
As for my opinion, I can see the Hezbollah expanding deeper into global “criminal” networks by moving up the retail chain and organizing its own contacts in the shadow economy of the tri-border area. This would serve as a serious boost to their revenues, as can be seen with the FARC.
As for the FARC being the world’s largest supplier of cocaine, does anybody have any credible sources on this, or legitimate studies, as it seems highly unlikely.
March 21st, 2009 at 8:08 pm
Eric,
I don’t have any official sources, just remarks, but I too have been skeptical. For example, the only way this would be possible would be if the FARC were the biggest supplier would depend on two things: definition/methodology for “supplier” and a slim plurality. For example, are we saying money made in the trade? Or are we talking about amount of cocaine “supplied”? Does supply mean directly sent overseas, or does it mean given to people who then transport it overseas? The only way I see this possible is in the following arrangement:
First supplier will include transporting cocaine both overseas AND supplying it to people who traffic it overseas (this is key for the FARC, as I don’t think you will find a FARC member on a drug flight or a drug boat – i.e. directly trafficking). Secondly, I’ll try to touch on both quantity and money.
First, the FARC have to have a large hand in trafficking along the Venezuelan border. This is quite likely, but the FARC are not be without competition. Out in this area, they would be able to supply cocaine hydrochloride and make the most money, possibly even transporting it from Colombia into Venezuela along the border with Arauca. From there, it’s drug flights by other traffickers.
(In the Meta/Guaviare area. Here the FARC probably have a large hand in the coca base industry (though not with direct contact with campesinos, not all of whom make paste in this region of the country). But again, major competition, from men like Cuchillo (who also has his hand out in Vichada apparently) – but this is not included in “supply”).
In Putumayo/Narino, the FARC probably do some trafficking on the Ecuadorian side of the border – but this is most likely very little. The real trade is on the Colombian side, and there they face fierce competition. They probably aren’t even the largest traffickers in this region. The same goes for Cauca, I would think.
In the Valle, the key is Buenaventura. Newer reports state these has been a somewhat drop in trafficking out of the post city, but these reports tend to associate violence with trafficking. There is probably still an incredibly large amount of cocaine coming from Buenaventura and southern Choco. Again, the FARC probably are not even the largest suppliers here. They do have their hand in el negocio here.
In Uraba, it seems that Don Mario is calling the shots. The FARC have some presence in northern Choco (from Bellavista up to Panama) but their trafficking abilities are most likely highly, highly limited. Though I’ve read some reports that the FARC has been able to re-coup in this area, and some people I know who live/work in the area have stated the FARC still control some rivers in the area.
It would seem that the FARC would need a plurality. That is to say they supply something like 15%, Don Mario 10% and the other 300-400 microcartels the rest (complete made up numbers). The FARC would have to be supplying almost all of this cocaine on the Venezuelan border, and much smaller quantities elsewhere. In most areas, they face some fierce competition. Don Mario is probably the largest supplier in my mind, but again, with a plurality. But again, this is just the only way that I would see the FARC being the largest suppliers possible – more than likely, they are not. Of course, I haven’t read any scholarly source say that they are. The only official thing I’ve read is the FARC indictment (I believe it was) which said the FARC control 60% of the cocaine trade which is highly overstated. If you find something legitimate though, do give us a heads up.
March 22nd, 2009 at 1:33 am
Thanks, that was an excellent survey of the contemporary regional organization of the drug trade in Colombia. I will keep it in mind as I am considering options for my thesis. Any insight into the link to Lebanon though?
Also, you seem to know your stuff quite well in regards to the FARC and the drug trade. As a historian by trade I have been looking at the growth of coca cultivation and processing in Colombia during the 1980s and the literature on the topic (as it is on the historical dimensions of the conflict in Colombia in general) is extremely weak. I am wondering if you have any insight into the FARC’s early involvement in the drug trade. This is I think a historical question of significant weight, as the tying of the FARC to the drug trade is the hinge to US policy in Colombia.
This is what I know
a) at first they were opposed to it during the marijuana bonanza of the 1970s and destroyed peasant crops
b) they were unable to and unwillling to confront the cartels of the early 1980s so they opted to tax them
c) initially the relationship between the Medellin cartel and the FARC was a functional alliance
d) this broke down, for reasons unknown
other interpretation
a) they initially taxed peasant coca crops
b) they taxed steadily moved up the supply chain, taxing middle men, cartels,
c) they themselves moved up the supply chain, to tax man, to middle man, to wholesaler.
March 22nd, 2009 at 9:48 pm
I bought some good books on the trade this summer in bogota (their libraries and book stores are phenomenal resources). As I read it, the FARC first was against coca cultivation when it appeared in the Caguan region of Colombia, but under pressure from peasants, they allowed the growth of coca as long as food crops were grown as well. If you find the book “Coca, Cultivacion y Guerrilla” (I believe it is called) it documents that. Also, the FARC’s involvement was limited to the gramaje in the early 1980s and taxing traffickers in areas under the control of the FARC, as you stated. I can’t really pinpoint exactly when the FARC started becoming actual brokers in the trade. This, I imagine, is dependent on two things: region and budgets. Originally when the FARC decided to step up its war in the early-to-mid 1980s, extortion and kidnapping began to rise. I bet some groups closer to the trade become more involved at this point, though it would have been limited due to the cartels – the working relationship may have been the least worst option.
I will recommend, though, that you read Nazih Richani’s book “Systems of War” to read (if you haven’t already). It has a great analysis of the guerrillas, the drug trade and its effects on campesinos. I think this is one of the most important pieces because people tend to think drug money just as income for the guerrillas but in actuality, as Richani argues (and I think demonstrates), is that there are positive political advantages for the guerrillas and the with regards to the relation between the guerrilla and campesino population. Anything by Marc Chernik and Fernando Gutierrez Sanin are good (if you haven’t read them – I imagine you’ve read some of them). Connections to Lebanon, I don’t know but I’m sure it’s out there though I would fear some bias, as they may be all governmental sources. It’d be interesting to look into though. As for the early parts of the trade in general, I will thumb through my bookshelf and see what’s good (I’m not at my apartment right now).