June 11, 2007

Semana: "Through the Eyes of the FARC"

Yesterday's edition of the Colombian newsweekly Semana ran a brilliant analysis by the magazine's political editor, María Alejandra Villamizar, of last week's guerrilla prisoner releases. It's the best attempt I've seen in a while to answer a question that Colombia analysts get asked all the time: "What can the FARC possibly be thinking?"

Here is an English translation.

Through the Eyes of the FARC

Maria Alejandra Villamizar, of Semana, takes the hypothetical exercise of imagining how the FARC sees the government's recent decisions.

The foreigners who came to the Caguán [demilitarized zone] at the time of the [1998-2002] peace process always asked the FARC about their ideological tendency: Are you Marxist? Leninist? Trotskyist? Guevarist? And to all these known leftist currents, the answer was negative. "What are you, then?" the curious visitors insisted. "We are Farianistas [FARC-ists]," replied the FARC.

This dialogue, which was repeated time and time again, was mentioned as a nice anecdote in their stories about these visits. Another aspect of "this very particular South American guerrilla group," commented the foreigners quite correctly. Neither they nor anyone in the world had registered the historical existence of Farianismo as an ideological tendency.

But that is the key to understanding how they see the world, and how the FARC see themselves. The country has very rarely stopped to examine that other eye watching us.

It is common for Colombians to ask themselves: "why don't the FARC do this or that?" There is nothing harder to understand. The FARC never do what, from the outside, it is believed that they they will do, much less what it is wanted that they do. It is not that they do not have a logic - they do have one. The logic of war. Ignore it if you wish, but doing so will neither change them nor cause them to disappear.

The Farianismo of which they speak is a very singular form of thinking and acting that they have built over the years, and it has to do mainly with the need to survive. In the physical, political and military sense. To survive as an organization and as a group of people who share a condition. To survive the world's changes, the nation's scorn, the military campaigns, the difficulties of life in the jungle.

Today, when it is not known what will result from the liberation of more than 180 prisoners said to be from the FARC - along with Rodrigo Granda, one of the highest-ranking guerrillas captured in recent years - the questions about the FARC's actions begin to gather. Are they going to release their kidnap victims? Are they going to start negotiating?

In the first place - they've already said so - they are not going to release the kidnap victims in response to Uribe's move.

Because they are obstinate, persistent and stubborn - but mainly because they are not going to give the President any triumph of their own accord. It is necessary to understand that the FARC see themselves as the counterbalance to the country's power center, as the "other" state, and therefore, they feel that the treatment that the President gives them is not the one that they deserve. "The FARC must be respected," they will say. As a result, they are not going to move immediately, unless they see a window to play the game their way.

In addition, in the ranks of the insurgents, moves like these [Uribe's prisoner release] are interpreted as extreme reactions that prove them right, showing that the FARC is the indispensable factor when making high policy decisions, and that without them it will not be possible to solve the country's problems. And that is why they insist on a demilitarized zone, that is what will satisfy them.

In their encampments, they listen to the news, they see television reports and they read magazines and newspapers. In addition, they have satellite Internet. They are up-to-date on what is happening, and everything in the news deserves their analysis. Some of these are long and interminable; others are quick and forceful. But they always have the same conclusion: that everything justifies "the continuation of their struggle."

The "para-politics" process, the corruption scandals, the U.S. refusals of the FTA and Plan Colombia, the marches against transfers [of education funds], the paramilitaries' confessions, the sentences against the government in international courts - these are not just news for them, they are justifications for their Farianismo. "We see from here, how the wolves tear each other apart," Manuel Marulanda once said about the country he saw in the media.

Kidnapping is cruel. They know it, but they don't see themselves as guilty. Even though they hold the keys to the chains with which they bind the hostages, the FARC insist on the idea of a prisoner exchange because they see it as a way to press to the state to recognize them, and that is why they believe that these people - through bad luck - are fated to emulate the FARC "martyrs" in the jails.

They are narcotics traffickers. They respond, "no." They are - and up to their necks - but they deny it because they do not believe they are in the same conditions as "pure," Pablo Escobar-style narcotraffickers. They believe they have the legitimate right to do it because they control the territories of coca cultivation, because coca allows the farmers to eat, and because, they say, if politicians and even presidents have benefitted from the narcos, why can't they take advantage of the gains from the business in order to finance their war? That is their logic.

They are in no hurry. Their plans have been long-term, and they have convinced themselves that while they will not win their war anytime soon, they are getting there. One day the country will rise, and with the revolt of the masses the revolution will prevail. And if they are to be defeated militarily, it will be in all-out combat. This is how the FARC thinks. If they - or at least their older leaders - did not, it would be easier to defeat them.

Marulanda knew that a period of political drought was coming when Uribe arrived. "The oligarchy does not learn," he told his men after hearing the announcements of bombings and military attacks. And immediately he predicted, "With Uribe there will be nothing, it will be necessary to wait four years." Almost five have gone, and there has been nothing. But the balance has begun to move. It is difficult to know how they are militarily, but it is evident that the Secretariat, which is like its heart, is intact and ready to play. They haven't won yet, and their future is uncertain. But they are old dogs who still know how to bark.

Posted by isacson at 8:55 AM | Comments (3)

June 1, 2007

4 possible explanations for Uribe's guerrilla-release proposal

About two weeks ago, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe announced his intention to free hundreds of FARC members from Colombian jails. This proposal is now moving very quickly.

Government representatives have met with dozens or hundreds of FARC members in jails throughout the country. Space is being cleared in the prison in Chiquinquirá, Boyacá, to concentrate guerrillas about to be freed. A presidential decree is forthcoming. It is strongly rumored that one of the first guerrillas to be freed will be Rodrigo Granda, the so-called "foreign minister of the FARC" whom Colombian authorities abducted from Caracas, Venezuela in late 2004. Uribe has set June 7 as the target date for starting the prisoner-release process.

Why is this happening? I wish I could provide an explanation, but I'm as confused as anyone. President Uribe merely cites "reasons of state" that will be revealed soon. "At an opportune moment, within not too many days, the country will know all of that," Uribe cryptically told reporters on Wednesday. "I'm only waiting for the right date and opportunity for the country to know everything."

After combing Colombia's press and having a number of conversations, I've heard four theories that might explain what is going on.

  1. Uribe is truly convinced that the mass prisoner release will help move forward a "prisoner exchange" deal in which the FARC releases some or all of the 55 hostages they are holding. The guerrillas have been demanding the demilitarization of two small municipalities (counties) in order to negotiate such an exchange. Uribe could be sending a message that he'd rather just let the prisoners go now than hand the FARC a political victory by agreeing to their troop pullout demand. The FARC has already rejected Uribe's move, and relatives of their hostages worry that the government may in fact be delaying their loved ones' release. So in this scenario, Uribe's initiative is guided mainly by wishful thinking.

    • An El Tiempo editorial Wednesday remarked, "It is worth being skeptical about the possibility that the FARC will respond to a unilateral liberation of guerrillas with a unilateral liberation of hostages. It is more likely that they would consider it to be a provocation, among other reasons because the freed guerrillas would not be able to return to the jungle, and would have to embark on a reinsertion process that the FARC has repeatedly rejected. ... Not to mention that taking guerrillas out of jail to carry out supposed "peace processes" could lead the security forces and the judicial system to ask themselves, "we captured and sentenced them for this?"
  1. The prisoner release is part of a secret deal in the works to release some or all of the FARC hostages, and we're all about to get a pleasant surprise. Liberal Party Senator Piedad Córdoba said yesterday that the release of the FARC's most prominent hostage, former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, is "imminent" - an assertion that the Colombian government quickly denied. Betancourt is a dual citizen of Colombia and France; Nicolas Sarkozy, France's new president, hinted yesterday that something may be happening, adding that all involved must be "patient, vigilant, and fast."

    • In a very lucid column in yesterday's El Tiempo, Liberal Party politician and former Defense Minister Rafael Pardo wrote, "Either this is part of a secret agreement that will deserve applause when it is known, or - if not that - it could be the biggest stupidity ever committed with the FARC."
    • "What is behind this proposal? I don't know," says Bishop Luis Augusto Castro, president of Colombia's Episcopal Conference. "But I would be pleased if it were part of an accord that had to do with the liberation of the 56 hostages, because the mere liberation of guerrillas, on its own, would be very frustrating for the [hostages'] families."

  2. The prisoner release is a cynical ploy; Uribe is trying to appear evenhanded as he seeks to win freedom for political allies who collaborated with paramilitaries. A week ago Thursday, President Uribe proposed waiving jail terms for politicians who worked with paramilitaries but weren't involved in serious crimes. Many Colombian observers see a linkage between this proposal and the accelerated FARC prisoner release. Some even think that Uribe, spooked by paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso's recent "confession" that high-ranking officials helped his organization for years, is in a hurry to find a way to put a lid on things before even more alarming revelations emerge.

    • FARC prisoners in several jails have employed this argument in public statements refusing to be released under these circumstances, calling Uribe's proposal a "smokescreen."
    • Writes center-left El Tiempo columnist Daniel Samper, "The general feeling is that in the best case, [Uribe's proposal] is a senseless chaos - but in the worst case, it is a chaos of distraction that seeks to hide even worse issues."

  3. President Uribe is simply losing his marbles. Unlikely, but Colombians are wondering.
    • The normally very pro-Uribe editorial board of Cali's El País newspaper wrote Wednesday, "Amid so much uncertainty, the country is asking for explanations about what is happening, both inside the head of the Chief of State and within the National Government."
    • Uribe's first "super-minister" of interior and justice, the ultra-conservative Fernando Londoño, published a column in Medellín's El Colombiano entitled "President: where are you?" He tosses off an analogy from Homer's Odyssey: "The president we elected with the certainty that he was the man for Peace through Law, today allows himself to hallucinate from the sirens' song, and none of his friends - like the ones Ulysses had - is keeping him tied to the mast of reason and duty."
    • José Obdulio Gaviria, a close advisor and ideologist to the president, certainly supported the "lost marbles" thesis when he told the Associated Press this week, "Though many haven't noticed, we have entered a second phase of [the Uribe government's signature] Democratic Security policy. ... The principal sign of the first stage was imprisonment, [now we are moving toward] processes of clemency."

Posted by isacson at 11:38 AM | Comments (8)

May 30, 2007

Ángela Giraldo: "U.S. accompaniment is important"

Ángela Giraldo was a dentist in Cali until April 2002, when the FARC kidnapped her brother Francisco and eleven other state legislators from Valle del Cauca department (of which Cali is the capital). The guerrillas have been holding them and about 45 other hostages - in some cases for ten years - in order to pressure for a prisoner-exchange agreement with the Colombian government. Three of the hostages are U.S. citizens.

Ángela has since become a leading voice among the hostages' family members, who have organized to pressure both sides to negotiate a "humanitarian exchange" of prisoners. The governor of Valle del Cauca, Angelino Garzón, named her to the post of departmental peace commissioner.

Ángela Giraldo was in Washington last week to attend events hosted by the U.S. Institute for Peace. I sat down with her to talk about obstacles to freeing the hostages, and the important role that the U.S. government could play. Here is a five-minute video.

Posted by isacson at 12:41 PM | Comments (2)

May 24, 2007

Para-politicians out of jail? Perhaps, but not yet

I'm rarely confused with José Miguel Vivanco, the Americas director for Human Rights Watch, but it happened today.

This morning's edition of Colombia's most-circulated newspaper, El Tiempo, led with the reaction to a controversial suggestion from President Álvaro Uribe. On Wednesday morning, Uribe said that politicians accused of helping paramilitaries, but not responsible for serious human-rights crimes, should not have to serve prison terms. El Tiempo reported:

[José Miguel] Vivanco said from Washington that the most important point is that the power of "narco-mafias and paramilitarism" be dismantled. "It could be that the best way to achieve this dismantlement might be to release the detained congresspeople, officials and military officers, once they reveal all that they know about the para-mafioso networks in which they participated, and the identities of their allies in the government," he explained.

José Miguel Vivanco didn't say that. He likely disagrees with it. I didn't talk to him today - I spent my day on Capitol Hill. (Incidentally, we ran into Vice President Francisco Santos there, in the basement of the Longworth House Office Building. He - along with DAS Director Andrés Peñate and Colombian embassy officials - were lobbying so vigorously that, even though it was 3:30 PM, they hadn't had lunch yet. They were forced to eat from vending machines.)

But I bet José Miguel is angry, because I said that, not him. El Tiempo ran a rectification later this morning. The article now reads, "President Uribe's proposal was not well-received by the opposition, but the director [of programs] of the Center for International Policy, Adam Isackson [sic.], did not dismiss it." Great.

Why, then, did I say that it would be all right to let paramilitary collaborators out of jail? Here is what I sent to El Tiempo yesterday after they requested a paragraph on the subject. Spanish first, then English.

Lo más importante no es cuántos años deben quedar en la cárcel los acusados. El tema de la cárcel también complicaría cualquier futuro diálogo con los grupos guerrilleros. Lo importante es que se desmonte el poder que los narco-mafias y el paramilitarismo han tenido, desde hace décadas, sobre el estado colombiano. Puede ser que la mejor manera de lograr ese desmonte sería excarcelar a los congresistas, oficiales y militares detenidos, una vez que revelen todo que saben - hasta el último detalle - sobre las redes para-mafiosas en que participaban, y la identidad de sus aliados en el estado.

La verdad tiene que revelarse, con nombres. Los implicados deben ser inhabilitados de ejercer cualquier posición estatal en el futuro. Y deben ceder todos sus bienes ilegalmente adquiridos y pagar generosas reparaciones a sus víctimas, aunque sean víctimas indirectas. Si todo esto se cumpla, el pago de una pena en la cárcel no importará tanto. (Al menos por el momento - la experiencia de países como Argentina muestra que el clamor para la justicia puede volver a escucharse.)

The most important thing is not how many years the accused should be imprisoned. The issue of jail time will also complicate any future dialogue with guerrilla groups. The important thing is the dismantlement of the power that narco-mafias and paramilitarism have had for decades over Colombia's state. It could be that the best way to achieve this dismantlement might be to release the detained congresspeople, officials and military officers, once they reveal all that they know - to the smallest detail - about the para-mafioso networks in which they participated, and the identities of their allies in the government.

They must reveal the truth, with names. Those implicated must be prohibited from holding any public office in the future. They should lose all of their illegally acquired assets and pay generous reparations to their victims, even if they are indirect victims. If all of this happens, jail time will not matter as much. (At least for now - the experience of countries like Argentina shows that the clamor for justice can come back and be heard again.)

I stand by this for three reasons.

1. Insisting on jail time will complicate talks with guerrillas. The ELN and FARC - and any people who supported them - do not intend to go to jail at the end of a future peace process. If this is expected of them, it will be impossible to bring the guerrillas to the negotiating table for anything but surrender terms. Since neither group is anywhere near surrender, to insist on jail time is to delay the start of a peace process and to prolong the fighting.

2. The issue of jail time is being used to distract from the more important issue of dismantling paramilitary groups. Uribe government officials - and, often, President Uribe himself - routinely caricature the critics of the paramilitary process as a bunch of zealots fixated on throwing paramilitaries and their supporters in jail. "How can they call us 'soft' on the paramilitaries," the refrain goes, "when almost the entire paramilitary leadership is in a maximum-security prison?"

This misses the point completely. The main thing that should worry us about the paramilitary process is that, if Colombia's judicial system proves unable to do its job, the AUC leadership and its supporters will come out of the process just as rich and powerful as they went into it. Perhaps more.

The process needs the threat of long, long jail terms for those who hide the truth, keep their stolen goods, fail to make amends to victims and continue to break the law. But for those who cooperate with the authorities, give them what they need to dismantle paramilitary networks, give back assets and pay reparations, jail time need not be a requirement.

3. Is six to eight years much of a punishment anyway? The paramilitaries and their supporters are implicated in gruesome, disgusting, evil crimes. Yet the Justice and Peace law only metes out a maximum of eight years in jail. Even the main alternative to the Justice and Peace law in 2005 - a bill proposed by Sen. Rafael Pardo and backed by most major human rights groups - foresaw a maximum of only ten years in jail.

This raises another question. Salvatore Mancuso planned and ordered the 1997 Mapiripán massacre, and will not be in jail for more than eight years. Gen. Jaime Uscátegui refused to act to stop the massacre, and he may be looking at forty years. Does this make sense?

Let's be clear: everyone who ends up in prison for "para-politics" should stay in jail until (a) it's determined that they were not planning or ordering serious crimes, and (b) they tell everything they know about their networks, give up their illegal assets and pay reparations. Once (a) and (b) are fulfilled, though, President Uribe's proposal makes some sense.

This is a thorny debate, and I'll be interested in reading any comments.

And just so that nobody confuses me with José Miguel Vivanco again: if you see us together, look closely - I'm a bit shorter than he is.

Posted by isacson at 10:30 PM | Comments (7)

León Valencia: ELN cease-fire likely by July

León Valencia is a former member of the ELN guerrilla group's Central Command. After demobilizing in 1994 along with 730 other ELN members, Valencia has been one of Colombia's most prominent analysts of the conflict and peace efforts. He heads a non-governmental organization called the New Rainbow Corporation, whose investigations of politicians' ties to paramilitary groups get partial credit for the emergence of the "para-politics" scandal.

I cornered León yesterday at a U.S. Institute of Peace conference on peace initiatives in Colombia. He has been to Havana twice in the past month to accompany the ELN's peace talks with the Colombian government, including a visit late last week. The message he brings is that a cessation of hostilities is imminent, and that the U.S. government should no longer keep its distance from the process.

(Valencia does not refer here to the ELN's additional demand, announced late Tuesday, that a cease-fire be contingent on Colombia dropping its free-trade agreement with the United States. If this is a consensus position within the ELN - and that is not clear - it could be an obstacle to short-term progress because Bogotá is unlikely to yield.)

Posted by isacson at 7:40 AM | Comments (0)

May 18, 2007

Black humor from Colombia

I got this in my email and had to share.

CANINE INTELLIGENCE

An engineer, an accountant, a chemist, an IT specialist and a Colombian senator were bragging about how smart their dogs were.

The engineer told his dog, “Protractor, show what you can do.” The dog gathered some bricks and boards, and built a small doghouse. All agreed that it was incredible.

The accountant said his dog could do better. “Cash Flow, show what you can do.” The dog went to the kitchen, returned with 12 cookies and divided them into 4 piles of three cookies each. That was pretty neat, all agreed.

The chemist said that his dog could do even better. “Oxide, show what you can do.” Oxide walked to the refrigerator, took exactly 500 milliliters of milk, peeled a banana, used the blender and made a smoothie. All agreed that it was impressive.

The IT specialist said he could beat them all. “Megabyte, do it!” Megabyte crossed the room, turned on the computer, checked it for viruses, upgraded the operating system, sent an e-mail and installed an excellent game. All knew that this would be very hard to beat.

They turned to the Colombian politician and asked, “And your dog, what can he do?”

The politician called his dog and said, “Paraco, show what you can do!”

Paraco jumped up, ate all the cookies, drank the smoothie, erased all the files from the computer, “disappeared” the other four dogs, declared himself to be an Uribe supporter, and took over the land title to the doghouse.

Afterward, the politician insisted that he had never met the dog, that he had never even seen it, and that a photograph showing them together was faked...

(OK, maybe it was funnier in Spanish.)

Posted by isacson at 12:26 PM | Comments (5)

May 17, 2007

An update from Cartagena

Frequent correspondent Chris Stubbert is just back from a visit to Cartagena, and sends this reflection on the stark social contrasts of a city that is both a top vacation destination for wealthy Colombians, and a prinicipal refuge for their internally displaced fellow citizens.

An update from Cartagena
 
If the misery of the poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our institutions, great is our sin. - Charles Darwin, The Voyage of the Beagle (1839), Chapter XXI

Cartagena, a city with a population of around 895,000, is fast becoming the major tourist destination in a country where tourism has had a negative reputation for years. Cartagena is not your typical image of Colombia. There are no Andean mountains here, but a Caribbean coast. The weather is warm, but breezy, and the people - ‘Costeños’ - are distinct from those in other regions of Colombia.

Having just returned from a third visit to Cartagena, I think it’s about time to talk about the incredible social contrasts one finds in this city. Charles Darwin wrote the above quote in 1839, reflecting on slavery in South America, which brought millions of West Africans across the Atlantic from the 16th to 19th century. The legacy of that trade in modern Cartagena is still very strong. The contrasts of rich and poor, black and non-black are evident even when driving from the bus station to the center of the city.

Cartagena is currently constructing the tallest building in Colombia, named ‘La Torre de la Escollera’ at 58 floors. And as the skyline quickly fills with new apartment towers and hotels, and Donald Trump has even put his eye on the Caribbean city, one must wonder who is being left behind? With mayoral elections coming up on October 30th,  Colombian media have reported that some mayoral candidates are being supported and funded by narco-traffickers and paramilitary elements, who wish to get a hand in the building contracts expected to be handed out in the coming years.

The Attorney General’s office has made it a ‘top priority’ to investigate the pattern of corruption in the lead up to the election. But Cartagena is and has always been the epicenter of this type of activity.

As observers write about corruption and the political changes happening in Cartagena, what about the terrible social situation that persists? Bill Gates had also recently visited Cartagena, and at the Microsoft Government Leaders Forum, he expressed his excitement for technology in Latin America.

‘We're also starting something new, which is taking schools that are designed for how all schools will be within the next 10 years. We call these our Innovative Schools, and in these we go ahead and together with our partners make sure that every student has a laptop or tablet computer; rolling them out in 12 locations around the world, and three of those in this region, one in Brazil, one in Chile, one in Mexico, and we'll be adding to those.’

I wonder if Gates really could understand that people living in the squalor of Cartagena’s shanty towns first need better roofs over their heads, and secondly enough food to eat, before thinking about computers in their classrooms. It would be foolish to think of Cartagena as a city of progress and development, without recognizing the heavy burden that is placed on the poor, who are the majority of this city. Unfortunately after being here for my third time, I cannot imagine this city any different 30 years from now for the “have-nots”.

C.H. Stubbert
Bogotá, Colombia

Posted by isacson at 8:09 AM | Comments (1)

May 15, 2007

"What we do, we do with your permission"

Colombia's most-circulated newsweekly, Semana, published an explosive cover story Sunday. The magazine got its hands on recordings of some of the telephone conversations that mid-level paramilitary leaders in the Itagüí prison near Medellín have been having with their associates "on the outside." The recordings reveal that these individuals - the right-hand men of several of the top paramilitary leaders - are continuing to traffic drugs, order assassinations, and manage arms caches, even while supposedly in maximum-security confinement.

If this is true - and if the paramilitaries' maximum leaders know about these activities, as is likely - then the Colombian government's talks with the paramilitaries are in very serious trouble. It would mean:

  1. President Uribe's decision to send fifty paramilitaries to the Itagüí jail had no effect on their ability to continue their criminal activities.
  2. The mere fact that these criminal activities continue would mean that the paramilitary leaders are in clear violation of the "Justice and Peace" law, and thus subject to 40-year jail sentences.
  3. If they lose the protection of the "Justice and Peace" law, paramilitary leaders would likely face extradition to the United States.

Here are some translated excerpts from the Semana story (thanks to CIP intern Gareth Smail).

Semana has obtained dozens of recordings from the latest four months in which various paramilitaries held in the Itagüí prison's Cell Block 1 coordinate all kinds of illegal dealings over their cell phones and email. The voices identified in the conversations are the right-hand men of some of the principal leaders of the demobilized AUC, like Salvatore Mancuso; Ramiro Vanoy, aka “Cuco;” and Fredy Rendón, aka “El Alemán.”

…

There are some, like “El Flaco,” a member of the old Catatumbo Bloc commanded by Salvatore Mancuso, who order their men outside of jail to buy and sell large loads of cocaine. “Everybody knows that the guy that doesn’t sell the white merchandise at 22 (2,200,000 pesos, $950 USD) is in trouble. You know how it is, they are targets and targets understand each other.” Others, like “Goyo,” of the Elmer Cardenas Front lead by Fredy Rendón, aka “El Alemán,” order their men to uncover the guns they did not hand over when they demobilized, and tell them to continue dominating communities and towns that they do not wish to lose. “You know that we have some repeating shotguns there. I took a risk to put them there, and I have to have them guarded.” He also asked them to continue extorting wealthy people for financing. “We need to get back all the business in San Cristóbal so that they support us again, because we have to give something to the boys.” Most frightening is that using cell phones, they calmly speak of the murders and tortures they continue committing, like in the conversation of “El Mosco,” of the demobilized Bloque Mineros lead by Ramiro Vanoy, aka “Cuco,” with one of his men who reports his crime. “Let’s just say nobody missed this son of a bitch. You know sir that what we do, we do with your permission, and what you say, goes” says one of his lieutenants.

In the majority of the recordings obtained by Semana, the 17 highest bosses of the demobilized AUC chat about personal issues, legal proceedings, and the difficulties of the Peace and Justice process. On repeated occasions they have insisted that they cannot be held responsible for the illegal activities that their demobilized men continue carry out. Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that they are not informed of what the 25 men that accompany them in the cell block do. In the end, they are more than just their right-hand men of the past few years; they now spend 24 hours a day just a few meters from them.

…

In one of the most revealing recordings, everything that happens in the jail, the lack of control, disorganization, and above all corruption, reflects in the voice of who up until just a few weeks ago was the prison's director.

The testimony of Yolanda Rodríguez is the most impressive diagnosis of what happened there. “Every day this is getting worse. Here, they change my orders every day. When I say ‘no’ they call the general director [of prisons], the high commissioner [for peace], the minister [of interior], and if still no, the president himself.” This past April 10, this official's disappointment brought her to tell these and other grievances to her friend, the director of the Picota jail, Imelda López. Rodriguez was so disillusioned that she asked to be transferred to any other jail in the country.

Posted by isacson at 12:30 PM | Comments (5)

April 30, 2007

A complicated president en route to Washington

Colombia's president, Álvaro Uribe, arrives in Washington Tuesday evening. He will be staying until Friday. This will be the Colombian government's big offensive of the year in favor of the bilateral free-trade agreement and yet another 80-percent-military aid package.

Uribe's agenda is heavily weighted toward meetings with congressional Democrats, who hold the key to decisions on both of these priorities. Many of these legislators have opposed Plan Colombia's military focus in the past, and are skeptics of the free-trade agreement.

In many cases, these congressional Democrats will be meeting with Uribe for only the first or second time. Most will have only a passing familiarity with what is happening in Colombia.

The picture they have of Colombia's leader is probably confusing and contradictory. Some have likely heard glowing accounts of how much safer and prosperous Colombia has become under Uribe, and how he is one of the United States' only friends in a politically tumultuous region. Others, on the other hand, may have heard Uribe described as a monster who has tolerated - or even fostered - paramilitary groups, and who is bent on strengthening an abusive military in the name of free-market orthodoxy.

I've met Álvaro Uribe twice, seen him speak a few times, and have read dozens of his speeches in the 1,727 days since he became Colombia's president. After all that time, I think there is some truth to both of these impressions.

The congressional Democrats and others who receive Uribe this week will be meeting with a very complex, even contradictory character. Though I disagree with many of Uribe's positions, there are some things about him and his presidency that deserve admiration. But there is also a great deal that worries me greatly - and should worry those who meet with him this week. Here is a rundown.

The good. There are some things to praise about Álvaro Uribe.

- He is one of the most gifted politicians in the world, with an uncanny ability to connect with audiences on camera and over the airwaves. He knows how to put on a spectacle, and his speeches and public appearances routinely boost his poll numbers.

- Uribe - if he spoke English and was born here - would have no problem winning an election in the United States. He is clear about what he believes, whether you agree with him or not. Unlike too many prominent U.S. politicians, nobody could accuse him of being a panderer, a flip-flopper, or a slave to his consultants' advice.

- Uribe's work ethic is the stuff of legend. In a typical week he travels to three or four regions of Colombia, and perhaps a foreign country too. He is known for subsisting on five hours of sleep per night and rarely taking a day off.

- Uribe doesn't seek power merely for its own sake; he clearly has a genuine interest in the nuts and bolts of governing. He is familiar with the minutiae of every ministry's programs and budgets, and can recite statistics like a walking database.

- Though he has undeniably authoritarian tendencies, Uribe has not gone as far as his neighbor Hugo Chávez, who is ruling by decree and closing down opposition television stations.

- Uribe's overwhelming focus on security has had enormous appeal inside Colombia. It appears to go beyond the rich landowner who is thrilled that he can once again drive between the city and his country villa. It also includes poorer residents of this rapidly urbanized (now 70% urban) country, most of them relatively new arrivals to Colombia's cities, who can once again visit the rural towns where they (or their parents) came from.

- Unlike most right-wing politicians, Uribe doesn't reject a state role in providing services to the poor. Though his main focus has been defense, he has expanded the national health system, spent more on education, and even promoted a program that gives cash payments to poor families who keep their kids in school. He has not cut taxes for the wealthiest.

The bad. There is much about Álvaro Uribe that worries us.

- Uribe, as noted above, is overwhelmingly focused on security in the most narrow sense. He has said that Colombia's poverty and institutional weakness are a product of insecurity, and not the other way around. As a result, he has overseen a dramatic increase in Colombia's security forces' size and capabilities. He places a great deal of faith in the armed forces' ability to resolve problems, and has sought to enlist everyday citizens as informants and “cooperators” in the cause of national security. This has greatly increased the militarization of Colombian society.

- While Uribe has deployed the armed forces throughout the country, he has lacked a similarly forceful effort against poverty, inequality and the weakness of civilian institutions. This unbalanced approach may improve security in the short term, but ultimately seems short-sighted, superficial and even dangerous. It is sort of like making the wall around one's house a few feet higher, without changing conditions outside the wall.

- Uribe's enthusiastic embrace of Washington's punitive approach to drug supply-reduction - including a sharp escalation of aerial fumigation - has yielded no results. His popularity at home and good relations with the Bush administration make him uniquely well-positioned to push for a new anti-drug strategy, but Uribe has so far shown no inclination to do that.

- In a country with one of world's highest rates of economic inequality, Uribe shows little concern for Colombia's rich-poor divide. He appears to believe, against most countries' experience, that an unfettered free market will resolve the yawning gap between the wealthy few and the poor majority.

- Uribe's oldest, most passionate supporters - the core of his political base - are not the political mainstream but Colombia's hard right. As in much of Latin America, this sector includes large landholders and agribusinessmen, who pay few taxes and who gave paramilitarism its initial boost. It includes hard-line sectors of the security forces. It includes people so socially conservative that they think the Catholic Church lost its way once it stopped giving mass in Latin. For now, Uribe has managed to rope into his coalition the part of Colombia's elite that is more professional, enlightened and modernizing. But they are not his core supporters, and estrangement may increase as the “para-politics” scandal develops further.

- Uribe has shown little concern about his country's alarming human rights situation. He cites statistics about declining murders as evidence of human-rights progress, but is very silent on the subject of impunity for abuses, past or present. He has done little to offer political or financial backing for investigations into allegations of government human-rights abuse. To the contrary, Uribe has consistently defended military officers accused of violations, while issuing harsh verbal attacks on the country's community of non-governmental human-rights defenders.

- Some of Uribe's attacks on human-rights groups and the political opposition are tantamount to death threats. It is one thing to say that a human-rights group's work isn't credible, or that it is sloppy or politically biased. In Colombia's dangerous climate of constant threats and frequent assassinations, it is another thing entirely to call human-rights workers “terrorists” or allies of the guerrillas, as Uribe has done on many occasions.

- One reason the “para-politics” scandal has damaged Uribe's overseas image is a longstanding perception that the president is soft on paramilitary groups. The AUC grew substantially in Antioquia department, with much support and virtually no opposition from the government, while he was governor from 1995 to 1997. In 1999, Uribe angrily and publicly defended generals who were fired under a cloud of accusations of helping paramilitaries. The first version of the “Justice and Peace” law that his government sent to Congress, in 2003, gave the right-wing militias a laughable degree of impunity and ability to keep their power and assets. He remains unwilling to extradite paramilitary leaders to the United States on drug-trafficking charges.

- Uribe's style is often described as “micro-managing.” He does not delegate authority well, favors personalistic events like “town hall meetings” where he listens to individual citizens' complaints, and is known to bark out orders to ministers like the patrón of an hacienda. Three years before Colombia's next elections, Uribe has no heir apparent. The lack of a likely successor to such a popular president should lead us to wonder whether Uribe plans to stay in power for a long time.

Posted by isacson at 4:37 PM | Comments (1)

April 24, 2007

Updated "para-politics" list

Here is our latest list of Colombian government officials and congresspeople facing accusations of assisting or associating with paramilitary groups. Most are members or supporters of the government of President Álvaro Uribe.

As it grows in size and complexity, this list is getting harder to maintain. Corrections or additions are most welcome.

Sentenced and in prison:

Under investigation by Colombia’s Supreme Court, and currently in prison:

Charged by the attorney-general’s office, and in prison:

Arrest warrants issued, still fugitives:

Under investigation by Colombia’s Supreme Court:

Under investigation by Colombia’s attorney-general:

Forced to resign by allegations of paramilitary ties:

Named in a U.S. intelligence report cited by U.S. media:

Posted by isacson at 10:48 AM | Comments (0)

April 16, 2007

The FARC, in the shadows?

Here, thanks to CIP Intern Alessandra Miraglia, is a translation of a very interesting strategic analysis of the FARC. It appears in the monthly newsletter of the UN Development Program’s Colombia office. Text in brackets is added to provide context.

The FARC, in the shadows?

Actions in different parts of the country raise questions about how long this guerrilla group will continue its strategic “retreat,” and what can be expected before the next [October 2007 municipal and departmental] elections.

What is the meaning of the military actions the FARC carried out in March? Are they coming out of their strategic withdrawal? What is expected from them in view of the next elections? What implications will their Ninth National Conference have? According to the analysts and experts who know the history and evolution of this guerrilla group, a change is currently taking place, and it should be taken into account.

During the five years in which the [Uribe government’s] Democratic Security Policy has been implemented, FARC military actions – such as kidnapping, illegal detentions and attacks –decreased significantly.

“If during Samper’s government the FARC implemented a war of movements and, during Pastrana’s, a war of position, during Uribe’s administration it went back to mobile guerrilla warfare, in which very small groups cause skirmishes. That is, it got back to its origin, to Che’s thesis”, stated Carlos Lozano, director of the weekly [Communist Party] magazine Voz.

According to Teófilo Vásquez, a researcher at [the Jesuit-run NGO] CINEP, “although the traditional variables with which to measure the conflict have decreased in some regions, it would be a mistake to state that the conflict in Colombia is close to an end. What is happening is that armed groups are functioning differently. The fact that they are militarily inactive does not mean that they are not socially, politically and economically influential. They continue to control people.”

According to Alfredo Rangel, director of the Security and Democracy Foundation, the FARC is slowly coming out of the strategic withdrawal in which it found itself.”

[In] a document confiscated by the Army in the [south-central] Macarena region, dated May 2006, and disclosed as the main talking point in the FARC’s IX National Conference, the FARC states that it seeks to wage guerrilla warfare and organize a clandestine alliance with dissatisfied political sectors, making governance impossible and discouraging the armed forces through military actions.

According to the document, the FARC also seeks to create new fronts, to re-build guerrilla fronts “to place them at the same level at which they were before the beginning of Plan Patriota” and to grow by 50% in terms of manpower.

Campaign in the South

This past March was characterized by many actions initiated by the FARC, which reinforces the idea that this guerrilla movement is coming out of its strategic withdrawal. These types of actions indicate a FARC willingness to organize around the [October 2007] elections of mayors, town councils and governors, a setting in which it has always activated its military, social and political apparatus.

“Before the elections, it is expected that FARC will try to have a wide impact and prove itself militarily and politically, especially in those areas where it traditionally had influence”, explained Teófilo Vásquez.

Signs of this trend can already be seen in [the south-central department of] Huila, with the attacks on Neiva’s mayors; the attempt to kill Campoalegre councilman Milton Gerardo Cortés; the threats against Rivera’s mayor, Hernando Pinto Salazar, and against other local leaders and councilmen of the department. Moreover, the FARC has threatened the governors of Arauca, Casanare and Boyacá.

In March four oil workers in Boyacá [just to the northeast of Bogotá] were kidnapped, as were eight geologists of the Logistic Services Company of Colombia, a company that carries out studies for the exploitation of gold and silver in Chocó Department [near Panama]. In addition, an assault against the Army’s Special Forces in Meta Department caused the death of seven soldiers and continued pressure on the Nestlé Company located in Doncello, in Caquetá Department.

While the FARC’s southern and eastern blocs bear the brunt of “Plan Consolidación” – the extension of “Plan Patriota” – especially in Meta, Guaviare and Caquetá departments, in the southwest of the country the FARC is showing an intention to reorganize.

In this zone, where Florida and Pradera municipalities are located [the zone the FARC wants to be demobilized in order to negotiate a prisoner exchange], as well as the reservations of the Nasa people, the conflict seems to follow the plans set out in the document of the FARC’s IX National Conference.

Fighting has occurred in town centers, putting civilians’ life at risk. Feliciano Valencia, leader of the Nasa people, affirms that “in the past few days FARC has escalated its attacks on military forces. The guerrillas installed remote-controlled gas-cylinder bombs to prevent the entrance of the Army, even near the school,” but later they withdrew them in response to the community’s demand.

A recently received letter identifies as “military targets” the leaders of Cauca’s Regional Indigenous Council (CRIC) and Northern Cauca Indigenous Association (ACIN), as well as the leaders of the Committee for Integration of the Macizo Colombiano [southwestern highlands]. Although the letter displays the FARC logo, the indigenous authorities are still investigating its origin.

The regional situation

Several factors come into play in the present FARC scenario. On one hand, as Teófilo Vásquez explains, “the FARC has sought to occupy regions where paramilitary groups loosened control. And it has done so with its militias in some places, and in others with political and social actions, because the war is not only fought in the battlefield. For example, it has entered town centers in zones such as Nariño, Chocó, Putumayo and Caquetá departments. That, in part, explains the resurgence of paramilitary groups in those regions.”

It has also reached three places considered symbolic of this confrontation: Tierralta and Valencia, in Córdoba Department [northwestern Colombia]; Dabeiba, in Antioquia Department [northwestern Colombia]; and the Catatumbo zone [in the northeastern department of Norte de Santander], all crucial regions known for a high presence of paramilitary groups. At the same time, the FARC began to come down from the summits of the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta, where paramilitary groups had isolated them, and to roam in Arauca Department after paramilitary groups had cornered it on the [Venezuelan] border”, stated Gerson Arias, a researcher for the Ideas for Peace Foundation.

According to Alfredo Rangel, “the FARC has not suffered a critical blow. Basically the effects of the Democratic Security Policy have been registered around Bogotá, where the seven fronts once present were obliged to withdraw to other regions. Additionally, urban logistical support networks were dismantled in small and large cities.”

Thanks to the Army’s actions, the FARC’s freedom of movement has been diminished, especially in the east of the country, in Meta, Guaviare, Putumayo and Caquetá departments. In that area, according to military forces, the FARC has reduced its own military capacity, faces obstacles to its mobility and has been seen its logistical activity pressured. This has complicated its provision of resources, especially of food, and the transportation of weapons and money, among other things.

This has contributed to the desertion of 6,098 guerrillas between 2002 and February of 2007, according to a report published by the Ministry of Defense. According to Gerson Arias, “the loss of manpower due to the high number of desertions leads us to think that the FARC has planned an important recruitment campaign. In fact, in 2006 they recruited 400 underage fighters in Arauca Department.”

According to the government, the guerrillas’ income deterioration over the last three years is evident. Its three main sources of financing – drug trafficking, kidnapping and theft – have diminished substantially, according to the Defense Ministry’s statistics.

Nevertheless, Alfredo Rangel argues that “if drug trafficking incomes were reduced in Caquetá and Putumayo departments, thanks to the Army’s control of coca crops, they have been replaced in Nariño, Meta and Guaviare departments. Although kidnappings have decreased, the same has not happened regarding the income they have produced. The FARC has diminished kidnappings for small funds, but it has increased those for large sums.”

To consolidate the results of “Plan Patriota” and to reinforce the Democratic Security Policy, the “Plan Consolidación” brought forward by the Ministry of Defense has emphasized both the improvement of police mobility and an increase in manpower, of nearly 38,000 men, for the army and police forces.

Humanitarian disagreement

Faced with this panorama, and the offer of U.S. congresspeople to serve as guarantors, the humanitarian [prisoner-for-hostage-exchange] agreement is again a topic of debate. Up to now, temporary advances have been achieved thanks to the role played by several actors, such as the Church, France, Spain and Switzerland, and mediators such as Álvaro Leyva and Carlos Lozano Guillén.

“Despite the fight between the government and the FARC, a significant advance on both sides has been achieved. At the outset of Uribe’s government, the FARC presented an impossible pre-condition: the demilitarization of both Cartagena del Chairá and San Vicente del Caguán [two large, strategic municipalities in southern Colombia]. The government, for its part, first proposed a peace process with the FARC and later a humanitarian agreement”, explains Carlos Lozano, director of the weekly magazine Voz and former mediator in this process.

The FARC rescinded its request in favor of the demilitarization of Pradera and Florida [two small municipalities near Cali], and the government agreed to talk about the humanitarian exchange before negotiating the peace, says Lozano. After many trips and discussions with both sides, the mediators managed to negotiate a concrete proposal for the exchange in Pradera and Florida, with neither Army nor guerrillas.

Under this proposal, continues Lozano, the guerrillas would not enter the city centers of these municipalities; they would only deploy few indispensable guerrilla fighters to protect their spokesmen, and a rigorous regulation would be established. Although there were proposals for the regulation, the initiative did not prosper.

“Both the government and the FARC have an interest in the exchange,” says Teófilo Vásquez. “The government is interested in alleviating the pressure put on it by the international community, where there has been little acceptance of the government’s tendency to negotiate with some [the paramilitaries] and not with others. This would also be helpful in the Latin American context, which is prone to leftist ideology. FARC interest is to continue resorting to the negotiation forum to accumulate political power.” According to Vásquez, “this country must get used to beginning every dialogue on the foundation that was left behind by the previous government.”

Before the powerlessness generated by the talks between the guerrillas and the government, which have at various times both increased and decreased the likelihood of bringing hostages home, today there is a new issue at stake. Lucy de Gechem – the wife of the former senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem, kidnapped by the FARC on February 20, 2002 while traveling in a commercial airplane – asked President Uribe for the authority to mediate between the parties, a request that was accepted a few days after the president ordered military forces to renew offensive actions against the FARC.

And although it was reported that the guerrilla leader Raúl Reyes rejected the relatives’ offer of mediation on March 17, Lucy de Gechem does not lose hope. “The most viable strategy – she affirms – is to bring the parties closer and to convince them with arguments.” To that end, “President Uribe must delegate a Government representative who can work full time on this. He accepted my suggestion. God permit he will communicate it to the country soon. The FARC, for its part, as a gesture of good will, should show hostages’ proof of life.”

For its part, civil society continues to press for the humanitarian agreement and for the constitutionally mandated right to peace. To this end, since the presentation of the Huila Development and Peace Program last February, when the fifth anniversary of the peace talks’ end was commemorated, they began collecting signatures to support a legislative bill for the humanitarian agreement.

The pronouncements of the United States, a country that has had three citizens in the hands of the FARC since February 13, 2003, have increased expectations. Besides the congressmen’s offer to be guarantors of the humanitarian agreement, during his visit to Colombia, President George Bush appeared “very concerned and [willing to accept] the request of the contractors’ families regarding the possibility of a humanitarian agreement”, stated Foreign Minister Fernando Araújo. Meanwhile, as the country wonders how long the FARC will continue its strategic withdrawal and the humanitarian exchange remains in the shadows, the civil population continues to be in the middle of the conflict.

Posted by isacson at 5:21 PM | Comments (0)

April 12, 2007

“More than complicated”

Here's a translation of a column by Alfredo Molano that appeared in Sunday's edition of El Espectador. I have no idea how he packed so much into 730 words. Text in brackets is our attempt to provide context.

More than Complicated

Looking ahead, the way that big businessmen do, the Pacific coast and the eastern plains are the country's most promising regions in terms of value and profitability, taking into account the FTA [free trade agreement] and the paramilitaries' “reinsertion.” Or as the youngsters in Planning [the presidency's Department of Planning] might say, in the future soybeans, oil palm, corn, and sugarcane should displace the obsolete extensive cattle-ranching, bananas and basic food crops. And this project has been underway for several years now.

The planners and investors have had to overcome three obstacles to make their dreams reality: the poor people who occupy lands and live in these regions, the illegal crops that give these people what the state doesn't, and the guerrillas, who fish in these turbid waters [profit from the chaos].

Behind the economic project is another, developed by who knows whom, which consists of: 1) Implanting paramilitary groups, carefully protected by the security forces and legitimized by the gamonales [local political bosses, wealthy landowners and businessmen]. 2) Fumigating with poisons to displace both the coca crops and the population. The resulting displacement of crops to new areas widens the theater of war to regions that are proposed to be included in the development package, and those displaced are treated as criminals who legally have no right to benefit from the government's [emergency humanitarian aid] programs. 3) When the hornet's nest is stirred up, the security forces enter to finish off the plan, and the minister in power solemnly declares that the issue “is very complicated.”

The model is repeated with severe regularity in the zones they have had their eyes on: the eastern plains, from the Arauca River [border with Venezuela] to [the southern department of] Guaviare; and the Pacific, from the Darién hills [on the Panama border] to the Mataje River [border with Ecuador]. It has been decided to fill [the eastern department of] Vichada to the [south-central department of] Meta with African oil palms, while the lands in Casanare and Arauca are prepared for genetically modified sorghum and corn. On the Pacific coast, in addition to the bananas for Chiquita Brands that extend from Urabá [near the Panama border] to the south, Urapalma [an African oil palm company widely believed to be tied to - or owned by - paramilitaries], with [local paramilitary leader] El Alemán in the lead, has established beachheads on the Juguamiandó and Curvaradó rivers to grow African oil palm and, in the short term, to produce biodiesel. In a few years, the entire Pacific region will look like Tumaco, Puerto Wilches, San Alberto and San Carlos de Guaroa [areas with extensive oil palm plantations] look today.

The playbook has been set into motion right now in El Charco, Nariño [in southwestern Colombia], a forgotten port that was erased from the map by a tsunami in 1906. Everything has been prepared with an astonishing amount of care. Last year, paramilitaries from a group called the New Generation Organization - whose initials are NGO and whose commander has called himself Armando Paz - took over El Charco. The population reacted and forced the “paras” out.

But in June there was a massacre of eleven people in Sanquianga. This provoked a large demonstration of indigenous people, afro-Colombians and mestizos to protest against these acts of violence. The dioceses of Tumaco, Guapi and Buenaventura warned of the danger they faced and issued a call to respect the civilian population.

Nonetheless, the plan continued apace: on January 16, 2007, the commanders of the New Generation Organization entered Playa Bazan, in El Charco, now backed by the Black Eagles [the largest of the rapidly growing “new” paramilitary groups]. At the beginning of February the glyphosate bombardment began near the Tapaje river. At the end of that month the Marines entered via the villages of Taija and El Hojal, and rapidly occupied La Tola and Sequihonda after fighting with the FARC.

The forced displacement increased with every armed confrontation, bombardment or operation. Monsignor Girón, of the Tumaco Diocese, denounced the threats made by the “NGO” paramilitaries “against members of social, indigenous, ecclesiastical, and humanitarian organizations defending human rights in Nariño, among them the Pastoral Social [Caritas] of our own diocese.” Days later, Santos, the defense minister, acknowledged that today there are 400 families displaced in El Charco; Bishops Héctor Fabio Henao and Gustavo Girón corrected him: there were more than 1,000.

The office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which should know, cried: what is happening in El Charco is also happening in the municipalities of Barbacoas, Cumbitara, Policarpa, Magüí, Linares, La Llanada, Sotomayor, Iscuandé, Samaniego, Ipiales and Cumbal [all in Nariño], and it asked that the entire region be declared a humanitarian crisis zone.

More than “complicated,” Mr. Minister, is what is happening in Nariño, which by the way shares a border with Ecuador.

Posted by isacson at 6:29 AM | Comments (0)

April 9, 2007

ELN talks: is Luis Carlos Restrepo up to the task?

The slow-moving talks between the Colombian government and the ELN guerrillas have hit a crucial moment.

Negotiators are to meet again in Havana on Thursday for a sixth round of talks. Instead of another “exploratory” round, this time the goal is to achieve some sort of “base agreement” so that real negotiations can begin. Government spokesmen and analysts in Colombia's media are billing this as a “do or die” meeting: if the negotiators get up from the table empty-handed this time, political reality may make it difficult to continue the process.

The government wants this agreement to include a guerrilla cease of hostilities, including the release of all kidnap victims (could be dozens, could be hundreds) whom they are holding for ransom. The ELN wants the government first to agree to negotiate an agenda of political reforms.

It would seem that both sides should be able to accommodate each other on April 12, arriving at an agreement that exchanges a cease of hostilities for an agenda somewhat more ambitious than might be expected given the ELN's current military weakness.

This is certainly achievable. It will be a pleasant surprise, though, if it actually happens.

The main reason has more to do with personalities than issues. By all appearances, the Colombian government's peace negotiator or “High Commissioner for Peace,” Luis Carlos Restrepo, is actively pushing the ELN further from a cease-fire, rather than reeling them in.

Restrepo, a psychiatrist by training, has a hard job. Though it has been badly weakened on the battlefield, the ELN is a very difficult group with which to negotiate. It has a consensus-based decision-making model that makes it move very slowly. Its leadership continues to be relatively ideological, so it is important to them that their negotiation have some political content and that they can participate in politics afterward. All ELN leaders, though, are not yet convinced that a cease of hostilities is the right step for the group to take at this time.

A guerrilla group “playing Hamlet” about a cease-fire requires the government's negotiator to act with subtlety and empathy - with a full set of tools, not just a bludgeon. The high commissioner for peace should be encouraging ELN moderates who are willing to sign onto a cease of hostilities. Success will require that the ELN's cease-fire advocates win the group's internal debate. Any government actions that improve trust, create space for political discussion, and foster contact with civil society and the outside world will strengthen the ELN moderates' position.

The best way to do all of these would be to allow a negotiating agenda with political content. Of course this agenda is unlikely to include deep and sweeping reforms, such as a nationalization of the energy sector; the ELN is too weak to demand that. But as analyst León Valencia - a former ELN member - put it in an El Tiempo column on Saturday, “The agenda is the passport that the ELN needs to enter the cease-fire, it is the way to persuade all of the fronts and combatants that their negotiation has a political character and is not just a demobilization and turnover of weapons.”

At this moment, what the ELN needs is a graceful exit from the conflict. A cease of hostilities is a big decision for them, and they will not assent if it comes with a dose of humiliation. The ELN will walk away from the table if it looks like they are meekly giving in to a government ultimatum. And they can still do so. They can keep fighting at a low level, they can buy more weapons by allowing more drug money into their coffers, or much of the group can end up being swallowed by the FARC.

Does High Commissioner Restrepo understand that? On the surface, yes: he authored a column in Sunday's El Espectador indicating that the government will be flexible on the question of an agenda once a cease of hostilities is in place.

Behind the scenes, though, Restrepo has been more heavy-handed. The result since early March has been a very rough month for the peace talks.

This heavy-handed behavior is more appropriate for a negotiation of surrender terms. Perhaps that is how Restrepo views the ELN process. But the ELN has been clear that it would rather keep fighting, even in its weakened state, than end its 40-plus years with a whimper: a process widely seen as a capitulation to a right-wing government.

ELN negotiator Francisco Galán recently called Restrepo “arrogant.” Restrepo replied to an El Tiempo interviewer, “My negotiation style is not to make friends or to be intimate with the counterpart at the table. I represent the President and I have to speak clearly. And as he has said, maybe my personality isn't pleasing.”

It is important to speak clearly. And Restrepo has made it quite clear that “this is not a negotiation between equals, and the government wants you to say 'uncle.'” Saying this clearly, though, only ends up weakening the pro-peace elements within the ELN.

Of course the government is stronger than the ELN. But Restrepo must realize that it has not been strong enough (even with paramilitary scorched-earth tactics) to defeat the ELN, and that an opportunity exists to bring the ELN's fight to a peaceful close without further bloodshed.

If he wishes to seize this opportunity, Restrepo must stop doing things that make his own job harder. Allowing the ELN more face-saving - on the negotiating agenda, on the international role, on the general subject of “arrogance” - can speed the process. More public taunts and private pettiness, though, will only prolong it.

Issuing ultimatums is easy. Negotiating requires a lot more. Let's hope Dr. Restrepo figures that out, or gives someone else a try before the ELN opportunity is lost.

Posted by isacson at 8:52 PM | Comments (0)

March 14, 2007

Para-politics scandal update

Updating a post from November, here is our most current list of Colombian government officials and congresspeople facing accusations of assisting or associating with paramilitary groups.

Some are in prison, some are under investigation, and some are facing accusations from witnesses in formal investigations. All are members or supporters of the government of President Álvaro Uribe.

Corrections and additions are welcome. It's not easy to keep score.

Sentenced and in prison:

Charged by the attorney-general’s office, and in custody:

Charged by the attorney-general’s office, and suspended from duty:

Under investigation by Colombia’s Supreme Court, and currently in prison:

Arrest warrants issued, still fugitives:

Under investigation by Colombia’s Supreme Court:

Under investigation by Colombia’s attorney-general:

Forced to resign by allegations of paramilitary ties:

Fired by the Procuraduría (internal-affairs agency):

Posted by isacson at 3:41 PM | Comments (1)

January 26, 2007

Memorandum to Marulanda

Colombia must be the only country in the world where the guerrillas die of old age.

Paramount FARC guerrilla leader Pedro Antonio Marín ("Manuel Marulanda") is still kicking - but he will be eighty years old in May. Here is a translation of a concise but compelling memorandum to the near-octogenarian from Colombian journalist and general establishment-figure Miguel Silva, which appeared on the op-ed page of today's edition of El Tiempo.

Memorandum to "Marulanda"

To: "Manuel Marulanda Vélez"
Re: The moment to engage in politics

I write this memorandum with the belief that nothing said here will move you a single centimeter. If I thought that a few lines in EL TIEMPO would impress you, they would accuse me correctly of being ingenuous. But in order to say something to you that few would (nobody contradicts even an average rich person in this country, so I imagine that few dare to do so before you), now that you approach 80 years of age, this column is worth the trouble.

There are some who say that politics don't interest you. That the political FARC leader was Jacobo Arenas [who died in 1989]. That you are little more than a military leader. I, however, believe that you, an expert in military affairs, are passionate about politics. Since you turn 80 years old next May 13, it seems to me a good moment for ideas. After all, that is an age at which only a few years remain to arrange worldly affairs and to leave a last mark on this Earth.

The FARC blindly follows what you say, and although there is a Secretariat and those, like "Raúl Reyes," who have been assuming new functions and acquiring new powers, the power in the FARC is you, period.

The FARC never managed to begin what you might have wanted: a prolonged popular war resulting in victory for what you denominated the FARC-EP, Army of the People, with a clear reference to the organization's military nature. The FARC does not have the esteem of either the urban masses or the rural population. This does not mean that democratic government institutions have much favor among these groups - perhaps they don't - but anyone who tries to argue that the FARC enjoys popular support is simply blocking out the sun with his hands. The FARC is feared or hated, not admired.

Nevertheless, the FARC has managed to maintain an armed conflict for 40 years, and although 15,000 men in arms do not seem too many in a country of 40 million people the size of France, Spain and Portugal combined, it is enough to observe the growth of official military spending to understand how the FARC represents a challenge to the government and all Colombians.

But if everything remains the same, there will be no important changes in the balance of power. You and the Secretariat must know that, athough I suppose it isn't part of your afternoon chats in [the longtime guerrilla stronghold of] La Macarena. There will be attacks on populations that are successful, one or another kidnapping that makes income or headlines, but not much else. More and more, the FARC will see itself isolated in the international panorama. More and more, they will be called terrorists or narcotraffickers.

There is, however, another alternative. The regional moment demonstrates that an organized left can make progress through politics. Our own national experience indicates that too. The mere existence of Chávez would be a guarantee. The door toward politics is open.

The decision to open that door is in your hands. Three unexpected political gestures would be enough to recover the initiative and make the chessboard change completely: to release Íngrid [Betancourt] and the other kidnap victims; to speak of a unilateral cease-fire, in order to initiate a bilateral one; and to accept international intermediation, without which all dialogue with the government will be unfruitful.

I know that these are all prohibited subjects in the world of the FARC, but the day you take these steps, in terms of pure politics, you will have won more for your people and their ideas than what you have won with 40 years of armed warfare. And you will be able to turn 80 in a Colombia that would have to take into account - not because it would like to do so, but because those are the rules of democracy - what you think.

Miguel Silva

Posted by isacson at 4:03 PM | Comments (1)

January 23, 2007

Left Behind in Caquetá

Here is a new dispatch from contributor Chris Stubbert in Bogotá.

On January 17, a small truck packed with over 660 pounds of explosives brazenly entered a new Nestlé dairy refrigeration plant in the town of Doncello in the department of Caquetá, a zone of strong guerrilla influence more than 200 miles south of Bogotá. After parking the truck strategically next to the milk processing tanks, the driver ran away and screamed something about a bomb, while a motor bike waited to pick him up outside the main gates. Seconds later the truck exploded, destroying the entire factory. Fortunately no one was killed, but a contracted engineer was seriously injured, losing an arm in the explosion.

Caquetá
Doncello
Caquetá.
Doncello.

For over 32 years the Swiss multinational had never had serious problems with Colombia's violent groups. Everyone within the company was shocked to hear of this attack. Nestlé is the only multinational operating in this poor and neglected department (which USAID had recently abandoned due to the region's prevalent connection to narcoterrorism and insecurity), providing a buyer for the local farming community. The destroyed plant had collected 45,000 liters of milk (11,890 gallons) daily from local farmers. Nestlé has blamed the FARC and is now considering whether to pull its operations from Caquetá.

Why did Nestlé's relative calm in Colombia come to an end? Company officials to whom I've spoken claim that the FARC had been demanding "boleteo" - in plain English, extortion. Nestlé had not given in to their demands.

It has been common practice for companies operating in Colombia's conflict zones to pay protection or transportation taxes to AUC paramilitaries, ELN, and FARC guerrillas. Companies that refuse assume great risks. This unfortunate reality is rarely discussed outside Colombia. The business of "cooperation" with armed militias could be very damaging to corporate images.

Nestlé has consistently refused this type of demand in the past and I expect their strategy will remain in place. They will most likely not bow to the intimidation of the FARC since, once a precedent is set, it would be difficult to refuse a second time and so on. Despite this stubborn stance, I fear that simply moving operations out of Caquetá, a recent public contemplation, could send the message that extorting forces have defeated a large company. Not to mention the political-economic fallout that would further damage the image of Uribe's 'democratic security plan'.

After the attack, Colombian Vice-President Francisco Santos and National Police officials met with top Nestle officials at the company's Bogotá headquarters. Santos was pressed with questions about why an army post had recently been removed from the area - part of the zone where the U.S.-funded "Plan Patriota" military offensive had taken place between 2004 and 2006. Maybe his cousin, Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, will be the next to be peppered with questions about this decision.

As these damage control sessions were taking place in Bogotá, back at company HQ in Switzerland, the brass were livid. Maybe Nestlé will pressure the Swiss government into recognizing FARC as a terrorist group.

Why has FARC decided to act now against Nestlé? Recently they had been transmitting messages through local community members demanding that Nestlé pay up. Maybe the violent approach was their final warning. Intimidation has long been a tactic used by Colombian groups to gain power, territory and resources. On the other hand it could be a sign of outright desperation on the part of FARC.

The tragedy of this situation, which may play out in the coming weeks, will not be a serious detriment to a giant like Nestlé, but rather to the hundreds of farmers who have relied on this company to buy their milk and provide income to their families in Caquetá for over 32 years. This is yet another example of the true cost of Colombia's protracted armed conflict. The impoverished civilian population continues to be the real casualty.

C.H. Stubbert
Bogotá, Colombia

Posted by isacson at 2:18 PM | Comments (3)

January 15, 2007

A dirty war against the paramilitaries?

In early December, shortly after President Álvaro Uribe confined most of Colombia's paramilitary leadership in a maximum-security prison, an article in El Tiempo, the country's most-circulated newspaper, contended that the paramilitaries had one "secret weapon" left. If they felt they were getting a bad deal out of the negotiation process, they could always reveal the truth about who in Colombia's "legitimate" society - businessmen, landowners, military officers, politicians - had founded, financed and supported them.

During the past two months, however, persons unknown appear to have launched a concerted effort to keep them from playing that card and revealing what they know. The paramilitary leaders - for years, some of the most feared people in Colombia - are now themselves quite threatened.

December saw the murders of several mid-level paramilitary leaders, including some who appeared willing to talk about who had helped them. As one top paramilitary leader began his confession to prosecutors - required by law as a condition for a lighter jail sentence - his family was threatened and his right-hand-man was murdered.

It's still not clear who is ordering these killings. Is it the jailed paramilitary leaders themselves, in the midst of a mafia turf-war or "code of silence" enforcement? Or is it some "higher," even more powerful actor who, amid a growing scandal about politicians' ties to the illegal groups, has a strong interest in keeping the paramilitary leaders silent about their past relationships?

The answer, for now, is anyone's guess. But consider this recent timeline.

This grim chronology leads us to a recommendation that we never thought we'd have to make. But here it is: the Colombian government must provide necessary security to paramilitary leaders. They may be murderous, drug-dealing thugs, but they are also repositories of information that is desperately needed if Colombia is to know the truth about what happened during the past decades of violence, and if it is to turn back the creeping narco-right-wing-mafia influence over its own institutions.

Just as more must be done to protect the victims who dare to come forward and testify, more must also be done, ironically, to protect the victimizers.

Posted by isacson at 11:41 PM | Comments (3)

January 12, 2007

Taxation, Corruption, and Indifference

Here is the first of what I hope will be several posts from Chris Stubbert, a Canadian citizen and frequent correspondent living in Bogotá. Here, Chris notes that Colombia's government manages to collect lots of taxes - at least from the middle class - and wonders why people are not more outraged that they seem to get so little back.

Taxation, Corruption, and Indifference

The modern history of taxation in my country began during the First World War. During the war, the government introduced a temporary income tax to raise much-needed funds to fight the enemy in Europe. Yet after the war, the government could not give up this endless supply of finance. Canada today is one of the most taxed nations on Earth, but arguably holds some of the finest public schools, affordable universities, free universal health care of high quality, and an admirable national pension system.

This background weighs heavily when I think about the tax burden here in Colombia. Businesses in Colombia are taxed at about 38.5% of their profits, while middle-class citizens are taxed just under this amount. A 16% sales tax (IVA) raises further cash for the government.

And finally, the most bizarre taxes of them all: the financial transaction tax. All withdrawals from savings and checking accounts, credit card transactions, loan disbursements, and certain other transactions are charged 0.4%. It was originally imposed in 1998 as a temporary tax of 0.2%, but was made permanent in 2001, and today is 0.4%. The tax is an important source of revenue to the government, contributing revenues equal to about 0.8% of the GDP. It was originally enacted as a temporary measure to finance the bailout of bankrupt financial institutions. Yet today banks like Davivienda, Bancolombia, BBVA, and Banco de Bogotá have been making record profits while acquiring banks across Latin America. Many people to whom I’ve talked in Colombia claim that the real purpose of this tax is to finance the war and feed waste and corruption in the government.

One would expect all of these taxes to amount to some pretty decent public services - but the reality is very different. Bogotá, the capital city, is suffering from an inadequate road network. Every year thousands more cars come onto the capital’s streets, and the traffic gets worse. I have seen this change after living here for only 18 months.

Education is another casualty. Most of the middle and upper class here go to excellent private schools, while the majority working and poorer classes are left with low-quality and overcrowded public schools. There aren’t even enough schools to accommodate the demand, leaving many without a secondary education.

Healthcare, too, is in crisis. The private clinics patronized by the upper and middle classes are as high-quality as those of any developed nation, while the government-funded public hospitals are underfunded and overwhelmed.

I continually ask Colombians from all backgrounds the same question: if there is so much taxation in this country, why are government services so poor? The answer I commonly hear is that the politicians are simply funneling the tax money into their own interests or their own pockets.

That corruption is a chronic problem in this country is not news, but this perception of corruption is of greater concern to Colombia as a whole. Cynicism and lack of trust in the security services, legal system, and political environment are the real story here. Yet a sense of serious outrage and a desire for immediate change don’t exist in modern Colombia.

If dozens of villagers are massacred by the paramilitaries or guerrillas – as has been happening for decades here, the general reaction in the capital, Bogotá, is not protest but apathy. The millions of displaced people in the urban slums of Colombia’s biggest cities are virtually invisible. Even the May 2006 massacre of a police anti-drug unit at the hands of an army patrol in Jamundí had little impact on the public sphere. Sure, it made newspaper headlines… but after a few days, people focused on something else.

Why the desensitized reaction to corruption, violence, and political incompetence? The lack of outrage, the lack of a culture of change, allows issues like lost and wasted tax revenue to persist. But Colombian citizens themselves must also take the blindfold over their eyes and demand justice and transparency.

Someone told me recently, “The urban middle class think everything has gotten better here. The economy has improved, security is better from city to city, but people forget there is a still a war going on in the countryside.” Maybe people want to forget this dirty conflict – and that is the most dangerous thing of all.

C.H. Stubbert
Bogota, Colombia
January 9, 2007

Posted by isacson at 3:51 PM | Comments (7)

January 9, 2007

A miracle, but not a model

Fernando Araújo's escape from FARC custody is a remarkable story. The former minister of development, kidnapped by the guerrillas in December 2000, showed up exhausted and bone-thin in San Agustín, a village near Cartagena, on January 5. He had spent five days walking in the jungles and dry thickets of coastal Bolívar department, after escaping a guerrilla encampment under military attack.

Colombia has been transfixed by images of Araújo reunited with his jubilant family, after more than six years as one of the sixty hostages whom the FARC had been holding to pressure for a prisoner exchange. “The 21st century begins for me today,” he told reporters.

Colombia's military and defense establishment swarmed around Araujo, basking in the glow. But there is reason to fear that they are drawing the wrong conclusion from his liberation.

“We are going to continue with rescue operations, in order that some day there might not be a single kidnapped Colombian,” promised Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos.

“These [kidnapped] people who have special connotations for the FARC, because they prize them for their political or economic importance, or in the case of soldiers, as a mechanism to pressure the government - it is difficult for them to be freed by the guerrillas. This is where it is more correct to call for a successful military operation,” added the head of the armed forces, Gen. Freddy Padilla.

Emboldened by Araújo's escape, are the Colombian security forces truly determined to attempt more armed rescues of guerrilla hostages? Let's hope not:

Fernando Araújo's escape should not embolden Colombia's security forces to attempt a series of high-risk hostage rescues. Nor should it lead decisionmakers to write off negotiations and view armed rescues as the best way to win all hostages' release.

As Araújo himself said last weekend, “I have faith in the military forces; however, the opportunity of a humanitarian [exchange] agreement is a solution that holds less risk for the kidnap victims.”

Posted by isacson at 1:04 PM | Comments (2)

January 2, 2007

Colombia in 2007: a look into the crystal ball

In a posting dated December 31, 2005, I made thirteen predictions for what would happen in Colombia in 2006. It is a year later now, and my record is not bad. Here is what I thought would happen a year ago.

All in all, not a terrible record - though several of these predictions were rather obvious.

The coming year is harder to predict. Levels of violence and coca cultivation could plausibly increase or decrease. It is utterly impossible to determine where the current “paramilitary politics” scandal is headed: will it consume military officers and other high government officials, or will Colombia's political class find a convenient way to make it go away? Meanwhile, will the power of paramilitary criminal networks continue to increase, or will those in Colombia's government and society with the will to curtail it be able to do so?

The crystal ball is far too cloudy on these questions. Probabilities seem higher, however, on the following predictions for 2007:

  1. The continuing scandals, persistent unemployment, and the security situation may erode President Uribe's popularity somewhat, though polls of urban areas will likely continue to show approval ratings over 50 percent.
  2. The left will continue to grow as a political force, and will do quite well in October 2007 municipal and gubernatorial elections.
  3. As their influence grows and paramilitary power mutates