Here are some highlights:

• The State and Defense Departments spent $309.6 million on private contractors carrying out military and police assistance programs in Colombia last year. That is roughly half of the $632 million in military and police aid that we estimate Colombia received in 2006.
• Funding for contractors in Colombia has doubled in four years. In 2002, aid through contractors totaled just over $150 million, about three-eighths of the $400 million in military and police aid Colombia received that year.
• One company - Dyncorp, which carries out the aerial herbicide fumigation program - accounted for fully one-quarter of all U.S. military and police aid to Colombia last year, with $164.3 million. That is roughly double the $85.6 million that DynCorp was reported to be earning in 2002.

Here is a summary table of the contractors listed in the report. Read the report for more information on each, including a description of contract activities, assessments of the risk to contractors' safety, and the plan - if any - to turn over responsibilities to Colombian forces.

Here is an English translation.

Through the Eyes of the FARC

Maria Alejandra Villamizar, of Semana, takes the hypothetical exercise of imagining how the FARC sees the government's recent decisions.

The foreigners who came to the Caguán [demilitarized zone] at the time of the [1998-2002] peace process always asked the FARC about their ideological tendency: Are you Marxist? Leninist? Trotskyist? Guevarist? And to all these known leftist currents, the answer was negative. "What are you, then?" the curious visitors insisted. "We are Farianistas [FARC-ists]," replied the FARC.

This dialogue, which was repeated time and time again, was mentioned as a nice anecdote in their stories about these visits. Another aspect of "this very particular South American guerrilla group," commented the foreigners quite correctly. Neither they nor anyone in the world had registered the historical existence of Farianismo as an ideological tendency.

But that is the key to understanding how they see the world, and how the FARC see themselves. The country has very rarely stopped to examine that other eye watching us.

The Farianismo of which they speak is a very singular form of thinking and acting that they have built over the years, and it has to do mainly with the need to survive. In the physical, political and military sense. To survive as an organization and as a group of people who share a condition. To survive the world's changes, the nation's scorn, the military campaigns, the difficulties of life in the jungle.

Today, when it is not known what will result from the liberation of more than 180 prisoners said to be from the FARC - along with Rodrigo Granda, one of the highest-ranking guerrillas captured in recent years - the questions about the FARC's actions begin to gather. Are they going to release their kidnap victims? Are they going to start negotiating?

In the first place - they've already said so - they are not going to release the kidnap victims in response to Uribe's move.

Because they are obstinate, persistent and stubborn - but mainly because they are not going to give the President any triumph of their own accord. It is necessary to understand that the FARC see themselves as the counterbalance to the country's power center, as the "other" state, and therefore, they feel that the treatment that the President gives them is not the one that they deserve. "The FARC must be respected," they will say. As a result, they are not going to move immediately, unless they see a window to play the game their way.

In addition, in the ranks of the insurgents, moves like these [Uribe's prisoner release] are interpreted as extreme reactions that prove them right, showing that the FARC is the indispensable factor when making high policy decisions, and that without them it will not be possible to solve the country's problems. And that is why they insist on a demilitarized zone, that is what will satisfy them.

In their encampments, they listen to the news, they see television reports and they read magazines and newspapers. In addition, they have satellite Internet. They are up-to-date on what is happening, and everything in the news deserves their analysis. Some of these are long and interminable; others are quick and forceful. But they always have the same conclusion: that everything justifies "the continuation of their struggle."

The "para-politics" process, the corruption scandals, the U.S. refusals of the FTA and Plan Colombia, the marches against transfers [of education funds], the paramilitaries' confessions, the sentences against the government in international courts - these are not just news for them, they are justifications for their Farianismo. "We see from here, how the wolves tear each other apart," Manuel Marulanda once said about the country he saw in the media.

Kidnapping is cruel. They know it, but they don't see themselves as guilty. Even though they hold the keys to the chains with which they bind the hostages, the FARC insist on the idea of a prisoner exchange because they see it as a way to press to the state to recognize them, and that is why they believe that these people - through bad luck - are fated to emulate the FARC "martyrs" in the jails.

They are narcotics traffickers. They respond, "no." They are - and up to their necks - but they deny it because they do not believe they are in the same conditions as "pure," Pablo Escobar-style narcotraffickers. They believe they have the legitimate right to do it because they control the territories of coca cultivation, because coca allows the farmers to eat, and because, they say, if politicians and even presidents have benefitted from the narcos, why can't they take advantage of the gains from the business in order to finance their war? That is their logic.

They are in no hurry. Their plans have been long-term, and they have convinced themselves that while they will not win their war anytime soon, they are getting there. One day the country will rise, and with the revolt of the masses the revolution will prevail. And if they are to be defeated militarily, it will be in all-out combat. This is how the FARC thinks. If they - or at least their older leaders - did not, it would be easier to defeat them.

Marulanda knew that a period of political drought was coming when Uribe arrived. "The oligarchy does not learn," he told his men after hearing the announcements of bombings and military attacks. And immediately he predicted, "With Uribe there will be nothing, it will be necessary to wait four years." Almost five have gone, and there has been nothing. But the balance has begun to move. It is difficult to know how they are militarily, but it is evident that the Secretariat, which is like its heart, is intact and ready to play. They haven't won yet, and their future is uncertain. But they are old dogs who still know how to bark.

People seem to forget that Plan Colombia was brought to us not by George W. Bush, but by his predecessor. That must be why I've heard so much surprise and dismay, from so many quarters, about Bill Clinton agreeing to be the guest of honor at an event with Colombian President Álvaro Uribe this evening.

There is nothing surprising about it. Bill Clinton no doubt sees Plan Colombia as central to his legacy in Latin America, and wants to claim it as a success. He is not about to refuse to share a stage with the scandal-plagued Colombian president, as Al Gore did in April.

So it is that before a VIP crowd at the New York Palace Hotel - Clinton-era officials, Democratic Party bigwigs, the pop star Shakira, but apparently not Hillary - Uribe will bestow the “Colombia is Passion” award on our 42nd president.

(The award's awkward name, which recalls the term “crimes of passion,” comes from the Colombian government's effort to “re-brand” the country to improve its international image. As with seemingly every P.R. campaign today, this one even comes with a YouTube video that its creators clearly hope will “go viral.”)

We shouldn't be surprised that President Clinton is taking part in this event. But we can at least hope for a “Sister Souljah moment.”

For non-U.S. readers (or for U.S. readers who missed the 1992 presidential campaign because they were too busy potty-training), Wikipedia offers this definition.

In a 1992 speech before the Rev. Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition - at the time, an important Democratic Party constituency - candidate Bill Clinton criticized some racially inflammatory remarks made by Sister Souljah, a hip-hop artist and political activist. While many in the audience were unhappy with Clinton, it turned out to be a political masterstroke.

Clinton used the episode to show centrist swing voters that he was unafraid to tell the Rainbow Coalition, “I support you, I consider you a friend, but I reserve the right to criticize you when you are wrong.”

That is exactly the message Bill Clinton needs to convey to Álvaro Uribe and the Colombian government tonight in New York.

It is unreasonable to expect Clinton to carry out “an act of repudiation,” in Wikipedia's words. A finger-wagging speech about para-politics, rampant impunity, human-rights abuse and our failed anti-drug strategy is simply not going to happen. They're giving him an award; the event is sure to be a love-fest.

But without even a single critical word, President Clinton's remarks can still send some very important messages. Here are a few suggestions that we are passing on to Clinton's organization.

1. Uphold the work of Colombia's non-governmental human rights defenders. Make clear that a key measure of democracy's strength is citizens' ability to press for rights and hold their government accountable - even when this means challenging powerful officials friendly to the United States. Celebrate the fact that even after so many years of violence, Colombia has a vibrant, active community of non-governmental human rights defenders. Stress the importance of protecting them. Make clear that they are not “spokespeople for terrorism” or guerrilla allies - as Uribe has called human-rights NGOs on several occasions - but the exact opposite: they are advocates of the rule of law.

2. Uphold the work of Colombia's judicial system, on which so much depends right now. Note that Colombia's paramilitary demobilizations and scandals are a historic opportunity to clean house, curb impunity, and become less of a “winner take all” society. Seizing this opportunity depends on the country's judicial institutions, which are at the center of it all: taking confessions from demobilized paramilitary leaders, dismantling organized crime structures, uncovering paramilitary control over the government, unearthing mass graves, or trying to punish old cases of human-rights abuse.

Judges, prosecutors, and investigators are politically weak, underfunded, undermanned and under-protected. Strong words of praise from President Clinton, emphasizing the urgency and importance of their work right now, would be a timely, high-impact contribution.

3. Express compassion and support for the conflict's many victims. Profess admiration for, and solidarity with, more than 3 million internally displaced Colombians' struggle to return home or to start new lives amid extreme poverty. Express admiration for, and solidarity with, victims of violence who have dared to organize and petition the state - and even to petition feared paramilitary leaders - for the return of stolen land and property, reparations, and the truth about what happened to thousands of murdered and disappeared loved ones.

4. Urge all groups, including the Colombian government, to show more flexibility about returning to the negotiating table. The conflict still kills thousands each year, and is nowhere near its end. Express a desire to see the U.S. government make renewed dialogue a higher policy priority. Praise the work of the Catholic Church, civil-society leaders, and European governments who have been working with the Colombian government to propose creative ways to get the warring parties to talk more and fight less.

5. Encourage the U.S. and Colombian governments to be more creative in their future approach to fighting drugs and controlling territory. Point out that from here onward, the solution lies not with acres sprayed and guerrillas killed, but with people given access to justice and lifted out of poverty.

As these suggestions show, President Clinton need not go so far as a full-throated, 1992-style “Sister Souljah moment.” Award recipients tend not to scold the audience during their acceptance speeches.

But without saying a negative word - without even dropping the smile from his face - he can send some important messages tomorrow. With some well-chosen words of hope and praise, Bill Clinton can help a lot of people in Colombia who have plenty of “passion,” but who could really use a boost right now.

Uribe’s Return to Washington Puts Focus on Human Rights in Colombia
Press Conference
10:30 AM Thursday, June 07, 2007
Longworth 1116

Speakers:
Congressman Phil Hare (IL-17th)

• He is a former union leader and would be dead himself if he were Colombian.
• Uribe has poor labor rights record:
• Killings and disappearances of leaders are still high with few convictions.
• Numerous high officials have paramilitary connections and histories of labor rights abuses. Still, Uribe is willing to exonerate them.
• He will not support FTA unless there is change. Such a deal without progress would be unfair to both American and Colombian workers.

Congresswoman Jan Schakowsky (IL-9th)

• “Come back next year, Mr. Uribe.”
• Uribe has come back so soon asking for more assistance, but the country shown little improvement.
• She needs better results before she would support an FTA. Uribe must take concrete steps to stop human rights abuses, union leader assassinations, and political-paramilitary connections.

• She has concerns about the FTA:
• Hurts legitimate industries
• Union leader deaths
• Any agreement should include a stipulation that Colombia show improvement with coca irradiation.

Congressman Jim McGovern (MA-3rd)

• Uribe keeps getting the same message from U.S. Congress: “human rights, human rights, human rights.”
• These are real concerns and he is going to continue to hear them:
• The para-politics scandal.
• Congress wants to see real, concrete change.
• Congress needs accountability to human rights for and FTA.
• There are specific examples of unionists’ deaths.
• Every Colombian citizen should have the right to criticize public officials and call for their resignations.
• We need real progress for an FTA
• It is “time to take action.” More talk will not suffice.

Jose Miguel Vivanco, Human Rights Watch

• Uribe is proposing to exonerate undeserving criminals:
• He wants to release of paramilitaries who only tell the truth.
• He wants to release FARC prisoners who never even demobilized.
• There is no good reason for these pardons.
• “Impunity itself is a central component of the Colombian tragedy.”

John Jairo Garces, Organización Un Día de Esperanza

• He relates his personal struggle:
• He was forced to flee Colombia.
• His father was killed.
• He cannot escape this pain. The rest of his family is still in Colombia.
• The Government of Colombia needs to guarantee human rights for its people.
• Any FTA or Plan Colombia needs to include human rights as a basic stipulation.
• He points out that many applaud Colombia for its security progress but asks: “is security really better? In what cities?” In his experience, Afro-Colombians all over the Pacific Coast are just as threatened as before.
• The U.S. needs to be aware.

Renata Rendón, Amnesty International

• How should U.S. respond to para-politics scandal? With an FTA?
• Some things are better (kidnappings, justice system).
• But human rights abuses by the Colombian Army are increasing.
• Cites examples of farmers forced out of their homes by the Army, killed, and presented as dead guerrillas. 
• These examples are randomly selected from a long list of similar cases.
• Colombians deserve justice.

Congresswoman Betty Sutton (OH-13th)

• Violence in Colombia is appalling and deserves rebuke.
• Where is the outrage in the U.S.?
• What kind of message does an FTA send?

Nicole Lee, TransAfrica Forum

• Colombia has the 3rd largest Afro population in the Western Hemisphere.
• Unionist deaths are deplorable.
• Afro-Colombians do not receive government aid
• Why should the U.S. Government fund that aid?
• FTA should not be passed.
• Colombian people are saying, “No.” We should too.

Jeff Vogt, AFL-CIO

• The Uribe administration is not deserving of an FTA.
• In the para-political scandal, 12 or more politicians implicated, most of who come from Uribe’s own party.
• Unionists are being murdered.
• Government is trying to play with numbers to make things look better
• Congress should not pass an FTA.
• Uribe is spending $100,000 every month on lobbyists to make the country look better. This money should be spend on supporting justice to make the country actually better.

QA:

McGovern:

• “The FTA is not going anywhere.”
• Congress needs to see concrete changes in Colombian impunity and human rights abuses.
• To actually make this change happen, he would like changes in Plan Colombia:
• The 80/20 military to economic aid ratio is unacceptable.
• He “believes” that the Foreign Operations budget will include as significant shift in spending distribution.

Sutton:

• It is concerning that an FTA could even get to the floor given poor human rights record of Colombia

McGovern:

• “Uribe’s real challenge is in Colombia.”
• He should not come here looking to change things. Congress wants to see change in Colombia before it will support an FTA.

But there is so much else happening right now, and so little time to write about it, that we've been reduced to posting a list of bullet points and hoping to revisit some of them in more detail later. For today at least, we can only apologize for the brevity.

• President Uribe is in Washington all day today. Here is his schedule. Here is a statement from several NGOs. Here is a piece in today's Houston Chronicle in which Rep. Sam Farr (D-California), an Appropriations Committee member, warns, "you can wear out your welcome up here." A Los Angeles Times article adds, "it's not clear how far Uribe's forceful personality will take him with the current Congress." On Friday Uribe will go to New York; at an event there, he will give Bill Clinton something called the "Colombia is Passion" award.
  
  
• Monday's Wall Street Journal reported on the Colombian government's extensive, and expensive, hiring of high-powered lobbyists to influence top congressional Democrats. "The team includes the public-relations firm of Burson-Marsteller, headed by former Clinton pollster Mark Penn, who is also a top adviser to Sen. Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign. The firm has set up a campaign-style operation to respond immediately to any critical news about Colombia."
  
  
• A bipartisan delegation of five House members is back from a weekend trip to Colombia. Their agenda was planned entirely by the U.S. and Colombian governments. They got a big dose of President Uribe, even attending one of his "town hall meetings" in Cali.
  
  
• Uribe's unilateral release of imprisoned guerrilla leaders is continuing. Rodrigo Granda, the so-called "FARC foreign minister" who Colombian authorities went so far as to abduct from Caracas in late 2004, was released on Monday - yet his statement struck a defiant tone indicating that the FARC's conditions for releasing hostages have not changed.
  
  We still have our fingers crossed. We still hope that the prisoner release is not, in fact, a colossal blunder revealing a basic misunderstanding of both the FARC and the basic tenets of negotiation and conflict resolution. But with every passing day, it is looking more like exactly that.
  
  
• A couple of weeks ago, paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso's confession to authorities "confirmed what human rights groups and others have long alleged," as the Washington Post put it. Since then, though, other paramilitary leaders have been clamming up, offering very little information.
  
  Central Bolívar Bloc leader Iván Roberto Duque ("Ernesto Báez") denied any involvement in serious crimes, portraying himself as little more than an AUC ideologist. Élmer Cárdenas Bloc leader Freddy Rendón ("El Alemán") admitted nothing. Tayrona Bloc leader Hernán Giraldo, one of Colombia's most powerful drug traffickers, told authorities that he only owns a few "finquitas" (small farms) with which to pay for reparations to victims.
  
  
• Why, asks the prominent human-rights group CODHES, were two U.S. Army officers present at a May 10 Colombian government meeting with internally displaced community leaders in the highly conflictive department of Caquetá? The officers - major and a lieutenant-colonel - "told the displaced population and local authorities that they must understand that "the FARC doesn't have a war against the police, but against the community" and that they "know about wars because they were in Iraq, where they learned that the strategy of terrorists is to separate the population from the legitimate authorities." What were they doing there?
  
  
• The Colombian peso has risen more against the dollar this year than any other currency in the world. It has gone from 2,500 to 1,900 pesos to the dollar, and Colombian Treasury officials have been unable to stop it. Some wonder whether this owes to a flood of narco-dollars entering the country. Opposition Senator Gustavo Petro told the Financial Times that "Colombia is in a 'narco-bubble,' with growth underpinned by a strong inflow of dollars from drug trafficking."
  
  
• The Center for American Progress published a thoughtful report on U.S. policy toward Colombia, recommending a turn away from Plan Colombia's mostly military focus and more assertive advocacy of peace. The report, written by Columbia University conflict-resolution expert Aldo Cívico, is the first time that the CAP - a large and influential "think tank" founded by former Clinton administration officials and other prominent liberals - has issued recommendations about policy toward Colombia.
  
  
• Human Rights First (formerly the Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights) will honor victims' movement leader Iván Cepeda with its prestigious Roger Baldwin Liberty Award. "This award recognized the importance of Ivan's human rights work and that of other Colombian human rights defenders who are unfairly stigmatized by the Colombian government," they told the Associated Press. Congratulations, Iván!
  
  
• The Bogotá office of a U.S. peace and human rights group, the Fellowship of Reconciliation, was burglarized over the weekend. FOR says it "appears to be a politically motivated attack on its offices," adding that "The individuals destroyed electronic equipment, including part of a satellite phone stole clothing and cash but took out and did not steal a credit card and the passport of one of the FOR team members." This is of great concern, as FOR does important, essential work, especially with "peace communities" like San José de Apartadó. They have published an alert with suggested actions.

That was a long list, wasn't it? If your head isn't spinning right now from the sheer pace of events, then you're probably not paying attention!

The Appropriations subcommittee that drafts the 2008 foreign aid budget bill finished its work yesterday afternoon. This bill is the source of most aid to Colombia - in the past few years, about $550-600 million out of the $700-750 million that Colombia gets.

Colombia's aid through this bill has been about 75 percent military-police assistance, with the rest going to economic aid. (Colombia gets still more aid through the defense-budget bill - usually about $150 million in purely military-police aid - making Colombia's overall total more than 80 percent military aid.)

The Bush administration's 2008 request to Congress would have kept things about the same. It proposed to give Colombia $590 million - about $450 million military-police (76%), and $140 million economic (24%).

We don't have all the details about how the House appropriators altered this request yesterday. (And we're not allowed to share everything we've heard - sorry!) But the key numbers right now are 10, 55 and 45.

• 10 means a 10 percent cut in Colombia's overall aid, from about $590 million to about $530 million. This is unfortunate, and we don't see it as anything to celebrate. But we understand that the subcommittee had less money overall for worldwide aid than the Bush administration's request would have allocated to it - which probably means Colombia is just one of many countries facing a reduction from the requested amount.
  
  
• 55 means that of the remaining $530 million, 55 percent of it - about $295 million, down from $450 million - will go to the usual military and police aid programs, especially fumigation, aircraft maintenance, and interdiction programs. A more than $150 million cut in military aid!
  
  We understand that the cut is intended to come mainly from the fumigation program and related aircraft maintenance contracts, while interdiction efforts are largely unaffected.
  
  
• 45 means, then, that the other 45 percent - about $235 million, or $95-100 million more! - will go to priorities like promoting rural development, strengthening the judicial system, helping people displaced by the violence, and reintegrating of ex-combatants.

$150 million in military-police aid will still go through the defense-budget appropriation - that's unlikely to change this year. Add this, and the House of Representatives - for now at least - would be giving Colombia about $680 million: $445 million (65%) military and $235 million (35%) economic.

This is a major step toward righting the lopsided 82-28 proportion we've seen in the past several years and in the Bush administration's 2008 request. It is a long overdue correction to the course that was set when Plan Colombia began in the late 1990s and early 2000s.

This means some big changes can take place. Among them:

On balance, this is major cause for celebration. Congratulations and thanks are due to Rep. Nita Lowey (D-New York), the chairwoman of the State/Foreign Operations Subcommittee, and all subcommittee members from both parties who had the courage and foresight to make these important corrections.

The official release offers some interesting observations and alarming proposals.

• The U.S. government acknowledges that coca cultivators have found ways to get around fumigation. "Rapid crop reconstitution, a move to smaller plots, and the discovery of previously unsurveyed coca growing areas, have posed major challenges to the techniques and methodologies used to understand Colombia’s coca cultivation and cocaine output. After losing one-third of the estimated coca cultivation to herbicidal spraying between 2001 and 2004, traffickers and growers implemented the widespread use of techniques such as radical pruning and replanting from seedlings."
  
  
• A subtle push to expand spraying into nature preserves and along the Ecuadorian border. "Moreover, farmers appear to be focusing on expanding cultivation into areas off-limits to the spray program, such as national parks and the area along the border with Ecuador, where Colombia suspended spraying in 2006 due to protests from the Ecuadorian government."
  
  
• An admission of uncertainty about how much cocaine is actually being produced in Colombia. "Building on joint research aimed at understanding the yield of the coca bush, the U.S. Government and the Government of Colombia will work in advance of next year’s estimate to better reflect the impact of coca eradication on cultivation estimates and estimates of the output of finished cocaine."
  
  
• On the other hand, a surprising degree of certainty about how much the FARC is profiting from the cocaine trade. "According to a U.S. government study, FARC drug profits declined from $90–150 million in 2003 to $60–115 million in 2005. The FARC’s overall profit per kilogram of cocaine declined from a range of $320–460 in 2003 to $195–320 in 2005."
  
  
• No information whatsoever about how much paramilitaries - current and former - are profiting from the cocaine trade. Not a mention of paramilitaries at all, even though many coca-growing areas (significant amounts in Antioquia, Córdoba, Meta, Nariño and elsewhere) are in paramilitary-dominated zones.
  
  
• A proposal to spray more in areas where the Colombian government is trying to increase state presence. "[T]he U.S. Government, working with the GOC, is shifting the focus of its aerial eradication in coordination with Colombian civil and military efforts to target the areas of most intensive coca cultivation. Complementing Colombia’s Democratic Security Strategy, which seeks to bring security, as well as increased availability of health care, transportation, justice and education services to isolated parts of the country, the U.S. Government will seek to work with the Government of Colombia to increase the tempo of spraying, to help counter the growing tendency toward pruning and replanting."
  But if security and government services are being established, why not make voluntary, manual, permanent coca eradication a part of that? Why intensify the spraying?

A few years ago, though, the coca estimate's release disappeared from the annual narcotics reports, only to be put out in press releases weeks later. Officials insisted they needed more time to come up with a number.

In 2005 and 2006, when U.S. data began to show Colombian coca on the increase, the estimates came out in April, at the very end of Good Friday, the beginning of Easter weekend. This year, though, Good Friday came and went with no word on what happened to Colombia's coca crop in 2006, despite record amounts of U.S.-funded herbicide fumigation and forced manual eradication.

As of June 1, though, we finally have the U.S. coca estimate for last year. It comes from an unusual source: Colombian President Álvaro Uribe.

(Click to enlarge image)

According to the Associated Press, it was no accident that Uribe dropped this bad news just a few days before another visit to Washington (he arrives Wednesday night).

"Yesterday [Thursday] they [the U.S. government] told me they were worried about revealing this number because of my upcoming trip to the United States, that the Americans should reveal it," Uribe said. "But that's why I'm revealing it. We're not trying to put makeup on what is a serious matter."

We understand that the U.S. government will probably follow up with an official release of Colombian coca data sometime today (probably on this page).

Uribe's announcement also comes shortly before Tuesday's meeting of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, which will be "marking up" (drafting and approving) the foreign aid budget bill for 2008. The coca announcement will give further backing to majority-party Democrats who believe that the aerial herbicide fumigation program in Colombia has been unsuccessful and a poor use of scarce foreign-aid funds.

Indeed, the new numbers do indicate that the U.S.-supported program - massive fumigation plus insufficient development aid - has been a shocking failure.

This is true even if one takes into account that the U.S. government is measuring more of the country than before. Many of the remote, empty areas now being measured for the first time probably had no coca until recently. Significant coca-growing in places like Vichada or Chocó began after fumigation elsewhere displaced coca-growing into previously undisturbed jungles.

Changes in measurement methodology may mean that the 2006 figure cannot be usefully compared with previous years. Even if it is inaccurate to say that coca "increased" in 2006, though, we can say for sure that

(1) Large-scale spraying has failed to reduce coca-growing in Colombia. The 2006 figure is the second-highest amount of coca that the U.S. government has ever measured.

(2) We really have little idea how much coca is being grown in Colombia. The U.S. government estimate is now almost exactly double the figure that the UN Office on Drugs and Crime will release later this month (79,000 hectares). The U.S. figure increased in 2006, while the UN figure shrank. What is going on?

(3) This is the time for a new strategy. At the end of 1999, the U.S. government assumed that there were 122,500 hectares of coca in Colombia. It reacted by helping to design "Plan Colombia," and pushing a big aid bill through Congress in early 2000.

Seven years later, after $5.4 billion in U.S. aid to Colombia and 946,000 hectares sprayed or manually eradicated, the U.S. government has found 27% more coca. How will it react now? The answer should be with a profound change in strategy. Forced eradication must give way to governance and economic opportunity in coca-growing zones.

Government representatives have met with dozens or hundreds of FARC members in jails throughout the country. Space is being cleared in the prison in Chiquinquirá, Boyacá, to concentrate guerrillas about to be freed. A presidential decree is forthcoming. It is strongly rumored that one of the first guerrillas to be freed will be Rodrigo Granda, the so-called "foreign minister of the FARC" whom Colombian authorities abducted from Caracas, Venezuela in late 2004. Uribe has set June 7 as the target date for starting the prisoner-release process.

Why is this happening? I wish I could provide an explanation, but I'm as confused as anyone. President Uribe merely cites "reasons of state" that will be revealed soon. "At an opportune moment, within not too many days, the country will know all of that," Uribe cryptically told reporters on Wednesday. "I'm only waiting for the right date and opportunity for the country to know everything."

After combing Colombia's press and having a number of conversations, I've heard four theories that might explain what is going on.

1. Uribe is truly convinced that the mass prisoner release will help move forward a "prisoner exchange" deal in which the FARC releases some or all of the 55 hostages they are holding. The guerrillas have been demanding the demilitarization of two small municipalities (counties) in order to negotiate such an exchange. Uribe could be sending a message that he'd rather just let the prisoners go now than hand the FARC a political victory by agreeing to their troop pullout demand. The FARC has already rejected Uribe's move, and relatives of their hostages worry that the government may in fact be delaying their loved ones' release. So in this scenario, Uribe's initiative is guided mainly by wishful thinking.
   
   
• An El Tiempo editorial Wednesday remarked, "It is worth being skeptical about the possibility that the FARC will respond to a unilateral liberation of guerrillas with a unilateral liberation of hostages. It is more likely that they would consider it to be a provocation, among other reasons because the freed guerrillas would not be able to return to the jungle, and would have to embark on a reinsertion process that the FARC has repeatedly rejected. ... Not to mention that taking guerrillas out of jail to carry out supposed "peace processes" could lead the security forces and the judicial system to ask themselves, "we captured and sentenced them for this?"
  

• In a very lucid column in yesterday's El Tiempo, Liberal Party politician and former Defense Minister Rafael Pardo wrote, "Either this is part of a secret agreement that will deserve applause when it is known, or - if not that - it could be the biggest stupidity ever committed with the FARC."
• "What is behind this proposal? I don't know," says Bishop Luis Augusto Castro, president of Colombia's Episcopal Conference. "But I would be pleased if it were part of an accord that had to do with the liberation of the 56 hostages, because the mere liberation of guerrillas, on its own, would be very frustrating for the [hostages'] families."
  
  

• FARC prisoners in several jails have employed this argument in public statements refusing to be released under these circumstances, calling Uribe's proposal a "smokescreen."
• Writes center-left El Tiempo columnist Daniel Samper, "The general feeling is that in the best case, [Uribe's proposal] is a senseless chaos - but in the worst case, it is a chaos of distraction that seeks to hide even worse issues."
  
  

• The normally very pro-Uribe editorial board of Cali's El País newspaper wrote Wednesday, "Amid so much uncertainty, the country is asking for explanations about what is happening, both inside the head of the Chief of State and within the National Government."
• Uribe's first "super-minister" of interior and justice, the ultra-conservative Fernando Londoño, published a column in Medellín's El Colombiano entitled "President: where are you?" He tosses off an analogy from Homer's Odyssey: "The president we elected with the certainty that he was the man for Peace through Law, today allows himself to hallucinate from the sirens' song, and none of his friends - like the ones Ulysses had - is keeping him tied to the mast of reason and duty."
• José Obdulio Gaviria, a close advisor and ideologist to the president, certainly supported the "lost marbles" thesis when he told the Associated Press this week, "Though many haven't noticed, we have entered a second phase of [the Uribe government's signature] Democratic Security policy. ... The principal sign of the first stage was imprisonment, [now we are moving toward] processes of clemency."

By Tuesday or Wednesday, then - a day or so before President Uribe arrives for another visit to Washington - we will know much more about how - or whether - the Democratic-majority House of Representatives will alter U.S. aid to Colombia.

Will it be cut or increased? Will it put more emphasis on economic aid, or will it be the same mostly military package as always? Stay tuned.

After Tuesday, the foreign aid bill is scheduled to go to the full Appropriations Committee on Tuesday June 12, and to the floor of the full House of Representatives on June 20th. These dates may slip, however, as delays are common. No word yet on when the Senate will begin work.

I focused on the impact of a controversial sanction in U.S. law: the “American Servicemembers’ Protection Act.” Congress passed this provision in 2002 to “protect” U.S. military personnel from the jurisdiction of the new International Criminal Court in The Hague. Part of the law cuts much military aid to governments that fail to sign bilateral immunity agreements promising not to extradite U.S. citizens to the Court.

In Latin America, this proved to be a blunder. Of twenty-one countries asked to sign immunity agreements in the region, twelve refused. When sanctions went into effect in mid-2003, these twelve countries – among them several governments that Washington considers to be close friends – saw their U.S. military aid cut back significantly.

Over the next few years, we heard lots of complaints from U.S. officialdom about the damage the sanctions were doing to U.S. relations with Latin America. The International Criminal Court sanctions, they argued, were forcing them to lose contact with a generation of officers who would someday lead their countries’ militaries. The cuts, they added, were taking place at a time when third countries – especially China and Venezuela – were increasing their own military engagement in the hemisphere.

Ultimately, the Bush administration found itself forced to “take ‘no’ for an answer” from its Latin American counterparts. In October 2006, they relented, allowing most of the frozen military aid to flow once again.

The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act sanctions were unwise. But were their effects as grave as U.S. officials had warned? How much damage did they do to U.S. security relations – and U.S. foreign policy goals – in Latin America?

Overall, I found that the U.S. sanctions were little-noticed in Latin America. The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act was just one of several factors contributing to a historic distancing of relations between the United States and much of the region. Other factors included stagnating or falling overall aid levels in 2006-2008; other, unrelated U.S. sanctions; the arrival of governments whose foreign policy is more critical of Washington; and the U.S. government’s increasingly tarnished image throughout the hemisphere.

This and much more is in the “Taking ‘No’ for an Answer” report, which was produced with generous support from the Open Society Institute. I hope you enjoy reading it as much as I enjoyed researching and writing it.

Incredibly, Noguera was let out of jail in March on the barest of technicalities. (A document that should have been signed by the Prosecutor-General was signed instead by one of his top deputies.) Despite the seriousness of the charges against him, which caused the U.S. government to revoke his visa earlier this year, Noguera is a free man right now.

This display of leniency – for a man who was President Uribe’s campaign manager in the paramilitary-dominated department of Magdalena in 2002 – was viewed very poorly outside Colombia.

Now, Colombia’s José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers’ Collective informs us, Colombia’s prosecutor-general, Mario Iguarán, “must decide in the next few days whether he will send [Noguera] back to prison.” They urge Iguarán to oversee the case personally so that Noguera’s lawyers can find fewer legal loopholes for their client to slip through.

The prosecutor-general is under a lot of political pressure, and his office is overwhelmed by the “para-politics” scandal and the “justice and peace” trials of demobilizing paramilitary leaders. The Jorge Noguera case, however, is an early and important test of the Colombian judicial system’s ability to deal with the power and influence of paramilitarism and organized crime.

Last week, President Uribe proposed releasing from prison all alleged paramilitary collaborators not accused of serious human-rights crimes themselves – a proposal he has since softened a bit. But Noguera is accused of serious human-rights crimes, so he doesn’t even fit the president’s initial definition of who should be let out of jail.

The former DAS director should not be at large right now. Let’s hope that Mario Iguarán is able to do something about it.

Ángela has since become a leading voice among the hostages' family members, who have organized to pressure both sides to negotiate a "humanitarian exchange" of prisoners. The governor of Valle del Cauca, Angelino Garzón, named her to the post of departmental peace commissioner.

Ángela Giraldo was in Washington last week to attend events hosted by the U.S. Institute for Peace. I sat down with her to talk about obstacles to freeing the hostages, and the important role that the U.S. government could play. Here is a five-minute video.

"Collateral Damage: Human Rights and U.S. Military Aid After 9/11" is the product of a team of investigators in the United States and several regions around the world (including noted Colombian journalist Ignacio Gómez and Gerardo Reyes from El Nuevo Herald). They worked for 18 months to come up with a thorough overview of U.S. military aid worldwide since the "war on terror" began.

The report juxtaposes this aid data with official information about the recipient countries' human-rights records, and with amounts each country spent on lobbying and public relations in the United States.

The report ranks Colombia sixth in the world, and first outside the Middle East and Afghanistan, among the world's U.S. military-aid recipients between 2002 and 2004. This sounds right - by 2005 we had expected Colombia to slip to number seven - though right now it is most likely back at number five, above Pakistan and Jordan. Of the top sixteen 2002-2004 military-aid recipients listed, five are from Latin America (Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Mexico and Ecuador).

In addition to the lobbying data, one of this report's biggest contributions is never-before-seen information about aid that has flowed through some very un-transparent aid accounts in the massive Defense Department budget. The "Collateral Damage" website has a "document warehouse" page with the results of several Freedom of Information Act requests. Latin Americanists will find especially useful the country-by-country breakdown of aid that has flowed through the Defense Department's counter-drug programs. These programs - whose aid amounts are very hard to uncover - account for about one-quarter of Colombia's military aid (about $150 million) each year. And they are not subject to the human-rights conditions that apply to the rest of U.S. military aid to Colombia.

The only quibble with the report is that it overstates military aid by throwing in two programs' economic aid. Economic Support Funds are in each country's list of military-aid sources; while this aid sometimes does come in the form of cash transfers that offset military spending, it just as often pays for specific development programs and support for civilian institutions. The report also erroneously portrays the State Department's International Narcotics Control program - which, under the guise of the "Andean Counterdrug Initiative," is the biggest source of aid to Latin America - as an entirely military-aid program, though much of it also pays for programs like alternative development, judicial reform and aid to displaced people.

Overall, though, this is a stunning and necessary piece of work. It is a very highly recommended resource.

This morning's edition of Colombia's most-circulated newspaper, El Tiempo, led with the reaction to a controversial suggestion from President Álvaro Uribe. On Wednesday morning, Uribe said that politicians accused of helping paramilitaries, but not responsible for serious human-rights crimes, should not have to serve prison terms. El Tiempo reported:

[José Miguel] Vivanco said from Washington that the most important point is that the power of "narco-mafias and paramilitarism" be dismantled. "It could be that the best way to achieve this dismantlement might be to release the detained congresspeople, officials and military officers, once they reveal all that they know about the para-mafioso networks in which they participated, and the identities of their allies in the government," he explained.

José Miguel Vivanco didn't say that. He likely disagrees with it. I didn't talk to him today - I spent my day on Capitol Hill. (Incidentally, we ran into Vice President Francisco Santos there, in the basement of the Longworth House Office Building. He - along with DAS Director Andrés Peñate and Colombian embassy officials - were lobbying so vigorously that, even though it was 3:30 PM, they hadn't had lunch yet. They were forced to eat from vending machines.)

But I bet José Miguel is angry, because I said that, not him. El Tiempo ran a rectification later this morning. The article now reads, "President Uribe's proposal was not well-received by the opposition, but the director [of programs] of the Center for International Policy, Adam Isackson [sic.], did not dismiss it." Great.

Why, then, did I say that it would be all right to let paramilitary collaborators out of jail? Here is what I sent to El Tiempo yesterday after they requested a paragraph on the subject. Spanish first, then English.

Lo más importante no es cuántos años deben quedar en la cárcel los acusados. El tema de la cárcel también complicaría cualquier futuro diálogo con los grupos guerrilleros. Lo importante es que se desmonte el poder que los narco-mafias y el paramilitarismo han tenido, desde hace décadas, sobre el estado colombiano. Puede ser que la mejor manera de lograr ese desmonte sería excarcelar a los congresistas, oficiales y militares detenidos, una vez que revelen todo que saben - hasta el último detalle - sobre las redes para-mafiosas en que participaban, y la identidad de sus aliados en el estado.

La verdad tiene que revelarse, con nombres. Los implicados deben ser inhabilitados de ejercer cualquier posición estatal en el futuro. Y deben ceder todos sus bienes ilegalmente adquiridos y pagar generosas reparaciones a sus víctimas, aunque sean víctimas indirectas. Si todo esto se cumpla, el pago de una pena en la cárcel no importará tanto. (Al menos por el momento - la experiencia de países como Argentina muestra que el clamor para la justicia puede volver a escucharse.)

The most important thing is not how many years the accused should be imprisoned. The issue of jail time will also complicate any future dialogue with guerrilla groups. The important thing is the dismantlement of the power that narco-mafias and paramilitarism have had for decades over Colombia's state. It could be that the best way to achieve this dismantlement might be to release the detained congresspeople, officials and military officers, once they reveal all that they know - to the smallest detail - about the para-mafioso networks in which they participated, and the identities of their allies in the government.

They must reveal the truth, with names. Those implicated must be prohibited from holding any public office in the future. They should lose all of their illegally acquired assets and pay generous reparations to their victims, even if they are indirect victims. If all of this happens, jail time will not matter as much. (At least for now - the experience of countries like Argentina shows that the clamor for justice can come back and be heard again.)

I stand by this for three reasons.

1. Insisting on jail time will complicate talks with guerrillas. The ELN and FARC - and any people who supported them - do not intend to go to jail at the end of a future peace process. If this is expected of them, it will be impossible to bring the guerrillas to the negotiating table for anything but surrender terms. Since neither group is anywhere near surrender, to insist on jail time is to delay the start of a peace process and to prolong the fighting.

2. The issue of jail time is being used to distract from the more important issue of dismantling paramilitary groups. Uribe government officials - and, often, President Uribe himself - routinely caricature the critics of the paramilitary process as a bunch of zealots fixated on throwing paramilitaries and their supporters in jail. "How can they call us 'soft' on the paramilitaries," the refrain goes, "when almost the entire paramilitary leadership is in a maximum-security prison?"

This misses the point completely. The main thing that should worry us about the paramilitary process is that, if Colombia's judicial system proves unable to do its job, the AUC leadership and its supporters will come out of the process just as rich and powerful as they went into it. Perhaps more.

The process needs the threat of long, long jail terms for those who hide the truth, keep their stolen goods, fail to make amends to victims and continue to break the law. But for those who cooperate with the authorities, give them what they need to dismantle paramilitary networks, give back assets and pay reparations, jail time need not be a requirement.

3. Is six to eight years much of a punishment anyway? The paramilitaries and their supporters are implicated in gruesome, disgusting, evil crimes. Yet the Justice and Peace law only metes out a maximum of eight years in jail. Even the main alternative to the Justice and Peace law in 2005 - a bill proposed by Sen. Rafael Pardo and backed by most major human rights groups - foresaw a maximum of only ten years in jail.

This raises another question. Salvatore Mancuso planned and ordered the 1997 Mapiripán massacre, and will not be in jail for more than eight years. Gen. Jaime Uscátegui refused to act to stop the massacre, and he may be looking at forty years. Does this make sense?

Let's be clear: everyone who ends up in prison for "para-politics" should stay in jail until (a) it's determined that they were not planning or ordering serious crimes, and (b) they tell everything they know about their networks, give up their illegal assets and pay reparations. Once (a) and (b) are fulfilled, though, President Uribe's proposal makes some sense.

This is a thorny debate, and I'll be interested in reading any comments.

And just so that nobody confuses me with José Miguel Vivanco again: if you see us together, look closely - I'm a bit shorter than he is.

I cornered León yesterday at a U.S. Institute of Peace conference on peace initiatives in Colombia. He has been to Havana twice in the past month to accompany the ELN's peace talks with the Colombian government, including a visit late last week. The message he brings is that a cessation of hostilities is imminent, and that the U.S. government should no longer keep its distance from the process.

(Valencia does not refer here to the ELN's additional demand, announced late Tuesday, that a cease-fire be contingent on Colombia dropping its free-trade agreement with the United States. If this is a consensus position within the ELN - and that is not clear - it could be an obstacle to short-term progress because Bogotá is unlikely to yield.)

Sen. Carlos Garcia, a presidential aspirant and leader of the largest bloc in Colombia's Congress, said Monday in an interview that the failure to pass the trade accord could force the government to withdraw from Plan Colombia, which has cost the United States about $5 billion over seven years.

“If the U.S. Congress does not support Colombia in expanding its markets, there is absolutely no reason to accept Plan Colombia aid. That's just one component of the solution. The best way out of poverty and the cultivation of illegal crops is the marketplace,” said Garcia, who heads Uribe's Social National Unity Party.

The move would salvage “national dignity” and possibly prompt Colombia to move away from its close relationship with the United States and to closer ties with the European Union and Canada, Garcia said.

Asked whether he spoke for Uribe, Garcia answered, “I believe he feels the same way. It would be a logical consequence.”

Oh please. So if the Democrats say “no” to the present free-trade agreement, the Uribe government will pick up its ball and go home, forsaking U.S. aid and bringing U.S.-Colombian relations back to where they were when Ernesto Samper was president?

Talk about an empty threat. We wish Sen. García good luck in Ottawa and Brussels, where leaders are much more critical than their Washington counterparts about impunity for Colombians who support paramilitary groups and kill labor leaders.

After Ms. Araújo asks her brother to come to Bogotá to help her decorate her apartment, the conversation turns to a dispute brewing at the time between Colombia and Ecuador. The Quito government was blasting Colombia publicly for carrying out anti-drug herbicide fumigations along the two countries' border, despite an early 2006 Colombian promise not to do so.

Sergio Araújo: How have things gone with those Ecuadorians?

María Consuelo Araújo: It's that the Ecuadorians don't understand... our territory, our coca, our glyphosate... and they don't let us spray... the jodetería [f***ing mess] is purely pressure from the FARC... Look, in Ecuador's banana crop they use 800,000 gallons of glyphosate each year.

Sergio: And why don't you say that?

María Consuelo: I've said that everywhere.

When the Colombia-Ecuador fumigation crisis ended (if it indeed has ended), the two countries agreed to a visit to the border zone by Paul Hunt, a New Zealander who is the United Nations' special rapporteur on the right to health. Hunt was in northern Ecuador last week; the Colombians denied him permission to investigate on their side of the border.

Hunt announced his preliminary conclusions at a press conference on Friday afternoon (MS Word .doc format). The UN special rapporteur's words were strong, unequivocal, and contrast sharply with what Colombia's foreign minister told her brother back in December.

They also contrast sharply with what the U.S. and Colombian governments have long insisted about glyphosate fumigation. The UN official has dealt a strong blow to the failed fumigation policy.

Here is the relevant excerpt, with emphases added.

In my opinion, there is an overwhelming case that the aerial spraying of glyphosate along the Colombia-Ecuador border should not re-commence. The studies already identified in earlier reports should be undertaken and completed. These are needed for a number of reasons, not least in relation to compensation. As President Uribe of Colombia is reported to have said on 30 April 2007, where damage is proven, compensation should be paid.

My UN report will set out the legal reasons for my opinion.

In summary, Colombia has a human rights responsibility of international assistance and cooperation, including in health. Consequently, as a minimum, Colombia must not jeopardise the enjoyment of the right to health in Ecuador. It must ‘do no harm’ to its neighbour.

There is credible, reliable evidence that the aerial spraying of glyphosate along the Colombia-Ecuador border damages the physical health of people living in Ecuador. There is also credible, reliable evidence that the aerial spraying damages their mental health. Military helicopters sometimes accompany the aerial spraying and the entire experience can be terrifying, especially for children. (Some children told me that, while they were in their school, it was sprayed.)

This evidence is sufficient to trigger the precautionary principle. Accordingly, the spraying should cease until it is clear that it does not damage human health.

It would be manifestly unfair to require Ecuador to prove that the spraying damages human health because Ecuador does not have access to essential information that is required to make that assessment. For example, Ecuador does not know the precise composition of the herbicide that Colombia is using. Thus, Colombia has the responsibility to show that the spraying damages neither human health nor the environment.

When Colombia’s international human rights responsibilities are read, in this way, with the precautionary principle, there is no doubt in my mind that Colombia should not recommence aerial spraying of glyphosate on its border with Ecuador. This legal argument may also apply to other relevant parties. In summary, to ensure conformity with its international human rights responsibilities, Colombia should respect a ten-kilometre no-spray zone along the border.

I accept that glyphosate is used in Ecuador, but there are at least two important distinctions between the Ecuadorian use of glyphosate and its use on the border by Colombia. First, I am informed that the Government of Colombia (or others on its behalf) adds some components to the glyphosate, in contrast to Ecuadorian policy and practice. Second, the general practice in Ecuador is to manually and directly apply the herbicide, whereas in Colombia aerial spraying is used on an extremely widespread basis. Thus, any suggested equivalence between Ecuadorian and Colombian practice is misleading and disingenuous.

Conclusion

The glyphosate aerial spraying issue has become deeply politicised. When an issue becomes politicised in this way, human rights are always among the first victims. The health and lives of ordinary people – especially the most disadvantaged and poor – are forgotten or obscured.

It is imperative that when considering this very important issue the human right to health – at root, the well-being of disadvantaged individuals and communities - is placed at the centre of all decision-making.

Iguarán: [I]n these investigations, the [Supreme] Court and the Prosecutor-General's Office are working within the longer investigation periods allowed by the specialized justice system. But the Law of Specialized Justice, which gives much more time to investigate than the regular justice system does, expires soon, on June 30. That is why we have asked the Congress to approve, before June 16, legislation that will allow us to keep working within the terms of specialized justice. If Congress does not approve this law for us, our ability to investigate as we should will run serious risks.

El Tiempo: What risks?

Iguarán: That many people who today are being investigated and tried under the terms of specialized justice - for example, for conspiracy - will be let out of jail.

El Tiempo: They will all get out?

Iguarán: That is the risk. That is why I have sent official communications to the presidents of the Senate and House, and the bill has a “message of urgency” from the executive branch. It has passed in the committees, but has yet to go through the full houses.

El Tiempo: The congresspeople under investigation could also be freed?

Iguarán: The [Supreme] Court [which handles the cases against legislators] would also have its investigation periods cut back, because it is also working within the specialized justice system. That is what happened in the [César] Gaviria administration, when because the period expired, Prosecutor-General [Gustavo] De Greiff had to set Pablo Escobar free. In order to keep that from happening, Gaviria declared a state of siege.

In other words, Iguarán is saying that if the Congress doesn't approve a bill in less than four weeks, the twelve congresspeople and various other officials in prison awaiting trial for helping paramilitaries could receive a “get out of jail free” card.

Is this likely to happen? Probably not - the bill to renew the “specialized justice” system appears to be moving, slowly but steadily, through the Congress. Its passage will keep the suspected paramilitary collaborators in jail. Nonetheless, the prosecutor-general is clearly worried that the bill could quietly fail.

Will the members of the pro-Uribe majority in Colombia's Congress do the right thing and pass the bill? Or will they do a favor for their jailed colleagues - and for themselves, as many are also under a cloud of suspicion - by letting the “specialized justice” statute expire?

CANINE INTELLIGENCE

An engineer, an accountant, a chemist, an IT specialist and a Colombian senator were bragging about how smart their dogs were.

The engineer told his dog, “Protractor, show what you can do.” The dog gathered some bricks and boards, and built a small doghouse. All agreed that it was incredible.

The accountant said his dog could do better. “Cash Flow, show what you can do.” The dog went to the kitchen, returned with 12 cookies and divided them into 4 piles of three cookies each. That was pretty neat, all agreed.

The chemist said that his dog could do even better. “Oxide, show what you can do.” Oxide walked to the refrigerator, took exactly 500 milliliters of milk, peeled a banana, used the blender and made a smoothie. All agreed that it was impressive.

The IT specialist said he could beat them all. “Megabyte, do it!” Megabyte crossed the room, turned on the computer, checked it for viruses, upgraded the operating system, sent an e-mail and installed an excellent game. All knew that this would be very hard to beat.

They turned to the Colombian politician and asked, “And your dog, what can he do?”

The politician called his dog and said, “Paraco, show what you can do!”

Paraco jumped up, ate all the cookies, drank the smoothie, erased all the files from the computer, “disappeared” the other four dogs, declared himself to be an Uribe supporter, and took over the land title to the doghouse.

Afterward, the politician insisted that he had never met the dog, that he had never even seen it, and that a photograph showing them together was faked...

(OK, maybe it was funnier in Spanish.)

• Para-politics - more members of Colombia's Congress and a governor were arrested for paramilitary collusion. Then top paramilitary leader Salvatore Mancuso began naming some very unusual names - including top government officials, generals and major corporations - in his "justice and peace" confession. (NY Times, Miami Herald, Houston Chronicle,